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Summary 
1. Summary 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of the single market (SM) programme on 
economies of scale, as reflected primarily in changes in firm size by type of industry. 
The study overall has reflected the following approach: 
(a) A comprehensive review of the economic literature. 
(b) A detailed analysis of changes in the actual size of firms over the period 1986-91, as 
compared with the period 1981-86. 
(c) An econometric analysis of the effect of the SM programme on these changes and on 
changes in industrial concentration. 
(d) An examination of firm-specific data held on the PIMS database to identify important 
shifts in performance related to scale between the pre-1985 and post-1985 periods. 
(e) Sectoral case study research into the impact of the SM. 
This report presents the key findings of the study in five chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the 
existing literature on economies of scale with relevance to the SM. Chapter 3 presents the 
statistical background to the empirical analysis using Eurostat data. Chapter 4 presents the 
analytical assessment of the influence of the SM. Chapter 5 discusses business scale, 
profitability and costs based on PIMS data. Chapter 6 presents a summary of the case study 
research in eight manufacturing and two service sectors. 
The following sections of this summary deal with each chapter in turn and then provide some 
overall conclusions. The appendices to the report present detailed information on the case 
study research (Appendix A) and outline technical assessments by industry sector (Appendix 
B), in recognition of the influence of technical change in economies of scale. A bibliography is 
presented at the end of the report. 
1.1. Literature review 
There is an extensive literature on economies of scale. The basic distinction is between 
technical economies of scale in production, and dynamic economies of scale in firm level 
activities such as management, R&D and advertising (discussed in this study as endogenous 
sunk costs). In addition, there may exist economies of scale that are external to the firm or 
industry. 
The most significant reductions in production costs (and an increase in concentration) as a 
result of the SM were expected to be in industries experiencing a high level of national 
protection. Also, as the SM was intended to allow firms access to larger markets, economies 
of scale could result from increasing specialization over a narrower range of products, with 
increased production runs. In the service sectors, economies of scale were expected to be 
largely national rather than pan-European. 
The full realization of both scale economies and competition requires large and open markets, 
particularly if the dangers of oligopoly are to be avoided. Market integration could also 
stimulate technological progress through better dissemination of knowledge and an increased 
stock of knowledge resulting from increased competition. 
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Significant recent work has been undertaken on the distinction between exogenous and 
endogenous elements of sunk costs, and the relationship between these costs and industrial 
structure. Davies and Lyons [1996] develop this distinction into a typology of industries based 
on the type of competition which they face - production based (Type 1), advertising based 
(Type 2A), R&D based (Type 2R) or both advertising and R&D based (Type 2AR). This 
typology has been extensively used in the present study. 
Advertising and R&D expenditure may be seen as a competitive weapon rather than as a 
means to reach economies of scale. Nevertheless, the SM might be expected to offer 
opportunities for spreading R&D costs over a larger output, or for reducing duplication of 
R&D effort, and for exploiting scale economies through the marketing of pan-European 
brands. 
The question of external economies of scale has often been neglected, but the theory of 
multinational enterprises indicates that firms may choose to invest in a particular country or 
region in order to take advantage of local labour market pooling or agglomerative economies 
related to specialized inputs and services. The question of regional specialization has not been 
extensively explored in the present study but external economies may, in principle, be a source 
of high potential gains reinforced by the process of economic integration. 
The first conclusion of the literature review is that the removal of non-tariff barriers and 
regulations may not be a sufficient condition for the exploitation of existing potential scale 
economies by firms. Technological change and rationalization may be equally important. 
Secondly, technical inefficiency could be reduced by improving internal and external 
competition within industries. This conclusion relates indirectly to the type of competition 
experienced in any given industry. Thirdly, the SM may reinforce existing geographic clusters 
of activity, or create new centres for agglomeration economies. 
Finally, the SM programme cannot be disassociated from other important influences on the 
attainment of economies of scale, including the economic cycle, the GATT agreements and the 
process of industrial globalization. 
1.2. Statistical background 
Chapter 3 analyses the available Eurostat data relating to firm size and growth. Two different 
measurements of scale were explored, using the survivor method and the median of the first 
moment distribution (MFMD). However, data limitations are severe in terms of Member State 
coverage, and for practical reasons a calculation of average firm size was preferred. 
The potential to exploit economies of scale in selected three-digit manufacturing sectors was 
identified by means of the ratio of Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) to the five-firm 
concentration ratio at the European level. Using a measure of average market share (average 
sales divided by EU market size), 47 out of 53 manufacturing sectors were calculated to have 
unexploited economies of scale (EOS potential). 
Sectoral sensitivity to the SM was then identified according to the four groups of industrial 
sectors analysed by Buigues et al. [1990]. A quadrant analysis of sectors by EOS potential and 
SM sensitivity was then undertaken. 
Summary 
Changes in firm size by real gross value added were calculated by quadrant, by Member State 
and by type of competition. For SM-sensitive industries with high EOS potential, the average 
size of firm decreased by 11% between 1981 and 1986, and by 13% between 1986 and 1991. 
By Member State. Germany and Denmark showed the strongest recovery in the second period. 
Type 2R and 2AR industries contain firms of larger typical size than other types, and also 
possess the greatest potential for economies of scale. Type 1 industries have the smallest 
average size but the greatest achievement of MES. 
In terms of employment, firms considered most sensitive to the SM and with the greatest EOS 
potential experienced the greatest declines in employment in both time periods. They 
increased their average labour productivity by 7% between 1981 and 1986 (compared with 
10% for all industries), and by 14% between 1986 and 1991 (compared with 8% for all 
industries). German firms demonstrated the strongest productivity growth. 
The ranking of industry types by average employment is the same as for gross value added 
(although Type 1 industries as a whole account for the largest proportion of total 
employment). Based on these employment data, Type 2R industries appear to have emerged 
from recession later than the other industry types. 
These firm size data were then placed in the context of intra-EU trade. Trade openness was 
measured by exports plus imports over production (turnover). Smaller countries are generally 
more open, but there appears to be a growth in openness in all Member States over both 
periods, 1981-86 and 1986-91. R&D-intensive industries are by far the most open and Type 
2A are the least open. 
A version of comparative advantage was measured by exports minus imports over production 
(turnover). Here there is a clear pattern of smaller countries being more specialized, with a 
dramatic increase in specialization in Ireland, and a steady increase in Germany. Standardizing 
for industry types, a small reduction in specialization in 1981-86 was reversed in 1986-91. 
1.3. The influence of the single market 
Chapter 4 discusses the theory of firm size, scale economies and trading costs, and poses two 
questions: what factors determine the average size of business units, and how might a 
reduction in trade barriers affect those relationships? 
It is inaccurate to characterize the SM simply as an expansion of market size, since most 
industries in the mid-1980s already operated to an extent at the international level. The SM 
should therefore be viewed in terms of a marginal/quantitative change rather than a 
discrete/qualitative change in market size. 
The removal of border controls was expected to reduce the fixed cost of exporting, and so 
allow the growth of smaller firms which had previously been restricted to national markets. 
However, where we do not have data on firms with less than 20 employees and we do not have 
industry-specific price deflators, analysis of this effect must be qualified. 
Expansion of demand due to the SM was also expected to reduce the operation of firms at 
inefficiently small scale. A further mechanism applies if firms are not initially on the 
minimum attainable cost curve, given their output level. 
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Based on these principles, an empirical model was specified, aiming to capture the different 
aspects of intra-EU trade barriers in the different types of industries. The key variables in this 
model reflect an industry's level of public procurement, the influence of national regulations, 
the level of intra-EU trade openness and the level of comparative advantage. A measure of 
initial disadvantage is also incorporated, reflecting the expectation that the SM would have a 
greater effect on business size where average size had been low in relation to MES. Finally, 
we would expect to see a greater effect in industries which were previously most affected by 
trade barriers, and this is also incorporated in the model. 
In Type 2 industries, a larger market is more likely to result in larger firms than would be the 
case in Type 1 industries, as a direct result of the escalation of fixed costs in R&D and 
advertising. The role of production economies of scale in determining firm size is much less 
important in Type 2 industries. 
Differences between Type 1 and Type 2 industries in terms of the relationship between 
barriers to trade and firm size depend on the type of barrier. The effect of national regulations 
is also not straightforward, although they may allow larger scale production in Type 2 
industries by deterring domestic entry. In Type 2 industries there is also a high incidence of 
firms that are multinational within the EU (particularly in Type 2R), but a different 
relationship exists between firm size and trade in different types of industry. 
Analysis of developments in industry concentration shows that there has been a significant 
increase at the EU level between 1987 and 1993, particularly in Type 2R industries. There has 
also been a greater increase in concentration in industries where EOS potential is high (many 
of which are Type 2R). Industries with a relatively low EOS potential have experienced a 
larger increase in concentration if they have a high level of SM sensitivity; but SM sensitivity 
exerts no extra impact where EOS potential is high. 
More detailed analysis shows that EU concentration increases where: average business size 
grows more rapidly than industry size in Member States; business size inequalities within 
individual Member States increase; specialization by Member State increases; and intra-EU 
multinationality increases. 
In Type 1 industries, average national business size grew by approximately 6% between 1987 
and 1993, national concentration stayed roughly constant and EU level concentration increased 
slightly. This implies a small increase in intra-EU multinationality and/or an increase in 
specialization within the EU. 
In Type 2A there were quite dramatic increases in the typical business size within Member 
States, but EU level concentration increased at about the same rate as national concentration, 
suggesting little change in multinationality and/or specialization. 
In Type 2R, average business size tended to decline slightly, along with a decline in national 
concentration. However, there was a rapid increase in EU level concentration, reflecting 
increasing specialization and substantial increases in intra-EU multinationality. 
In Type 2AR industries, average business size grew substantially but industry size increased 
more moderately, along with a small increase in national concentration. Concentration at the 
EU level also increased slightly, but not as much as in Type 2R. 
Summarv 
Overall, the analysis confirms that in the manufacturing sector there was potential for further 
achievement of economies of scale at the start of the SM programme. However, industries 
have been affected differentially by national boundaries and by the type of competition which 
they face. 
The clearest effects are in the R&D-intensive industries, where firm size is positively related 
to specialization in Member States with a comparative advantage. However, as a group these 
industries were also experiencing negative industry growth, so this relative effect did not 
translate into greater absolute size on average. 
There is also evidence that firms have been responding to the SM through M&A activity, with 
a substantial effect on EU concentration. This activity is likely to have been prompted by R&D 
and marketing economies, although the resulting corporate rationalization may also feed 
through into production economies. 
1.4. Business scale, profitability and costs 
Chapter 5 uses data on 128 pan-European business units from the PIMS database, which 
shows that there have been significant changes in the performance of such businesses since the 
mid-1980s. The data were split into a pre-1985 set and a post-1985 set. 
In terms of return on capital employed, pan-European businesses performed significantly 
worse than national or regional (i.e. sub-national) businesses in the pre-1985 period. In the 
subsequent period, the gap closed due to a worsening performance by the national and regional 
businesses. 
Pre-1985, the better performing pan-European businesses were: less likely to be exploiting 
scale economies (on the whole they were not European market leaders); more likely to be 
focused on a narrow range of products, services and customer types; very likely to have high 
marketing costs; and less likely to have a high level of innovation. This is largely consistent 
with the characteristics of Type 2A industries. 
There is also some evidence that the ability to exploit external economies of scale was a 
significant success factor pre-1985 as the better performing businesses tended to be more 
dependent on a few suppliers. 
Post-1985, the more successful businesses tended to be: in the top three in terms of European 
market share; more dependent on mass market products with little customization; operating in 
markets where advertising is a significant cost; more innovative; and even more focused on a 
few major suppliers. 
This pattern is consistent with Type 2A industries exploiting scale economies faster than most, 
but also implies some catch-up by Type 2R and Type 2AR industries. Overall, the PIMS data 
indicate that, in the post-1985 period, stronger margins were more clearly associated with 
larger scale relative to competitors. There is also some support for the theory of vertical 
disintegration based on value added/sales ratios. 
The PIMS analysis also considered the relationship between changes in costs and changes in 
output. For manufacturing costs a 1% increase in output pre-1985 is associated with a 0.73% 
increase in costs. This is consistent with the exploitation of economies of scale but could be 
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attributed to other causes (including excess capacity, although this was also examined). The 
propensity for costs to increase in marketing, R&D and administration was higher than for 
manufacturing costs alone. 
It was hypothesized that industries with a steep slope to their cost curve would have most to 
gain from the SM, and so should have experienced the largest increase in business size, as 
analysed in Chapter 3. However, no clear pattern was found, so a quantification of the cost 
savings achieved in industries which experienced business size growth was not possible. 
PIMS data were also used to examine the performance of businesses which have experienced 
major technological change relative to all other manufacturing businesses. There are 
significant differences in return on sales and employee productivity. This implies that the 
benefits of technological change arise from sales growth (reflected in scale) rather than from 
improved single efficiencies. 
1.5. Summary of the case study research 
Sector case studies were undertaken in three Type 2R industries (rail stock, pharmaceuticals 
and computers), two Type 2A industries (chocolate confectionery and beer), one Type 2AR 
industry (motor vehicles), two Type 1 industries (glass and clothing) and two service 
industries (insurance and retailing). Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and Appendix A 
provides the full case studies. 
These case studies are set in the context of industrial change (including patterns of 
concentration and the impact of new technology) and the process of globalization. In each 
sector, the nature of the opportunities for exploitation of scale economies has evolved in a way 
that has been largely independent of the SM programme. Generally speaking, technical and 
dynamic economies of scale have been more important than external economies of scale. 
Strategies of product differentiation, cost reduction and increased focus are all evident in the 
case studies, with a high degree of overlap between the first two of these strategies. In the 
Type 2R industries there has been a move towards greater focus in terms of product 
specialization, particularly in the computer sector. 
The Type 2A industries show divergent trends in marketing, with chocolate experiencing 
economies through more pan-European activity and more specialization in terms of products, 
and beer experiencing increased costs through more country-by-country marketing and an 
expansion in the scope of activities. Both the service sectors studied exhibit the characteristics 
of industries which still largely retain national markets. 
The specific impact of the SM is also analysed by type of industry. In the Type 2R industries, 
rail stock has benefited from the opening up of public procurement in terms of reduced 
product complexity and some longer production runs. Industry consolidation prompted by the 
SM has also facilitated more knowledge transfer in R&D and component sourcing, which has 
helped to maintain the international competitiveness of the European industry. The impact on 
the pharmaceutical sector has so far been limited, but some benefits in terms of movement of 
personnel and pan-European marketing may be emerging. 
Summary 
In computers, restructuring of the industry and public procurement liberalization have led to 
dynamic economies of scale through greater focus and product/service specialization in R&D. 
External economies have also become more important in relation to supplier inputs. 
In the Type 2A and Type 2AR industries studied, the most significant impact of the SM has 
been in the elimination of national restrictions on raw material inputs to the chocolate 
confectionery industry, although the scope for technical economies of scale may be limited by 
the Chocolate Directive (73/241/EEC, as amended). 
In the beer industry, the free movement of both products and capital has assisted the 
realization of technical scale economies, and knowledge transfer in both marketing and R&D 
is leading to a greater diversity of products. In motor vehicles, the impact of the SM, with the 
exception of Whole Vehicle Type Approval (Directive 70/156/EEC, as amended), is thought 
to be limited when compared with the wider issues of globalization in the industry. 
In the Type 1 industries, market growth for flat glass has been stimulated by EU regulations on 
energy efficient buildings (see Appendix C), although the buildings market has been nationally 
defined until relatively recently. The internationalization of this sector may have been partly 
assisted by the improved market access and regulatory harmonization embodied in the SM 
programme. In the clothing industry, the SM has also opened up new market opportunities, 
which have had a growth effect on the supplier industry. Combined with increased levels of 
outsourcing, this has led to increased realization of external economies of scale. 
In the service industries studied, common European approaches in marketing and personnel 
development are emerging in insurance, but these are only due in part to the SM programme. 
Nevertheless, dynamic economies of scale have been achieved, particularly in the non-life 
sector, and the free movement of capital has allowed operators to move towards a single 
business structure within the EU. 
In retailing, knowledge transfer is increasing, and membership of the European Council was 
mentioned as being influential in this. The free movement of products has assisted cross-
border sourcing, and the widening frame of reference for innovation has been assisted by 
expectations of the SM programme. 
1.6. Overall conclusions 
Industries considered sensitive to the SM and with high EOS potential exhibited declines in 
firm size in both 1981-86 and 1986-91. However, labour productivity in these industries 
accelerated substantially in the second period (14% growth compared to 8% for all industries). 
Industries which face R&D based competition (Type 2R) or both advertising and R&D based 
competition (Type 2AR) contain firms of larger typical size than other industries and also 
possess the greatest potential for economies of scale. R&D-intensive industries are also the 
most open in terms of intra-EU trade. 
In 1987-93 there was a significant increase in concentration at the EU level in Type 2R 
industries, and in industries where EOS potential is high (many of which are Type 2R). 
Industries with a relatively low EOS potential experienced a higher increase in concentration if 
they had a high level of SM sensitivity. 
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In the R&D intensive industries firm size is positively related to specialization in Member 
States with a comparative advantage. However, these industries also experienced negative 
growth, so this effect did not translate into a growth in absolute firm size. At the Member State 
level Type 1, Type 2A and Type 2AR industries all exhibited increases in firm size. 
Analysis of PIMS data indicates that Type 2A industries have realized economies of scale 
most quickly, but also that there is now some catch-up being shown in Type 2R and Type 2AR 
industries. In the period since 1985 business profitability is more closely associated with scale 
than was the case prior to 1985. 
The impact of the SM in relation to economies of scale therefore differs according to the type 
of competition faced in an industry. This finding was reinforced by the case study research, 
which also confirmed the importance of public procurement liberalization and industry 
restructuring in the exploitation of scale economies in Type 2R industries. 
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2. Economies of scale and the single market: a review of 
the literature 
The theoretical importance of economies of scale is enormous, and much has been written on 
their impact. In fact, one of the most research-active branches of economics in the last 20 years 
has been industrial organization, which can be defined as the study of markets in the presence 
of economies of scale. Rather less research effort has been put into the quantification of such 
economies. A significant reason for this is the fact that measurement is such a difficult task, 
riddled with methodological problems. The first task of this chapter is to introduce these 
problems, and how people have tried to get round them. The second task is to introduce some 
of the ways in which the single market programme might affect the achievement of scale 
economies. There is not enough space to go into detail on specific industries, so we 
concentrate on general issues; leaving it to Chapter 4 to go into more detail on the mechanisms 
through which the single market will affect different industries. 
We begin, in Section 2.1, by separating out some basic concepts. Three main sources of scale 
economy (production, endogenous overhead costs, and external economies) are identified, and 
we also suggest that economies of scale cannot be assessed independently of other types of 
technical efficiency. This gives us four main areas to look at in more detail in Sections 2.2 to 
2.5. In each case, we identify the sources of economies of scale, review the evidence on their 
importance, and introduce the expected impact of the single market. Section 2.6 highlights 
some important influences on the achievement of economies of scale, other than the single 
market. These will be important in our later attempts to isolate a single market effect. 
2.1. Basic concepts of economies of scale 
This section offers a brief discussion of the meaning of economies of scale, and the theoretical 
basis for increased exploitation of these economies as a result of regional integration. 
Scale economies may be defined initially (and traditionally) as those benefits that result when 
the increased size of a single operating unit (plant), producing a single product, reduces the 
unit cost of production. The minimum efficient scale (MES) is in theory the size of plant at 
which all economies of scale are exhausted and beyond which the long-term average cost 
curve either turns upward, or remains flat (reflecting constant returns to scale in production). 
The cost gradient is defined as the slope of the cost curve. The long-run average cost curve 
identifies minimum average costs for each production level, assuming given factor prices and 
quality, and state of technology. 
In order to understand economies of scale, it is important to identify their different 
dimensions. Scale economies may be internal or external to the plant, internal or external to 
the firm, internal or external to the industry, static and/or dynamic. There are economies of 
scale in production and possibly in functions such as distribution, management, marketing and 
research. 
Technical economies of scale for production are the theoretically best-known type and relate 
to estimates of the MES and cost gradients. The sources of those economies have been amply 
described by Pratten [1988]. We discuss their measurement in Section 2.2. These cost savings 
can accrue from a better division of labour within the production unit, the spreading of fixed 
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costs, and longer production runs. Besides these static scale economies, there is the 
phenomenon of learning effects associated with increasing experience gained through the 
production of a product or a service. The learning curve postulates that the average cost for a 
product is a decreasing function of the total production ofthat product in the past, i.e. there is 
an average cost reduction over time due to production experience. 
Technical economies of scale should not be confused with technical efficiency, which requires 
the minimization of costs for any given output (as distinct from average costs varying with 
output). However, when it comes to measurement issues, the two concepts are inevitably inter-
twined, so we discuss technical efficiency in Section 2.3, albeit at rather less length. 
There are economies of scale arising from firm level activities which are distinct from those 
arising from large plants, large outputs for individual products and long production runs. Such 
firm level economies concern activities in management, advertising, research and 
development, and risk taking (e.g. possibilities for obtaining finance and innovation) and are 
sometimes known as dynamic economies of scale, though we shall discuss them as 
endogenous sunk costs (see Section 2.4). There may also be economies of rapid firm (and 
market) growth. These arise from better scope for taking advantage of economies of scale, 
technical progress, and a relatively healthy working climate. Some economies may also result 
from the operation of multiple geographically-dispersed plants as an integrated system (multi-
plant economies). However, Scherer and Ross [1990] suggested that these may not be 
significant. Multi-product economies can result from the production of a diversified range of 
products (economies of scope). 
External economies of scale usually refer to those that are external to the firm; the average 
costs of the firm depend on the size of the entire industry. A large industry in a country might 
generate a labour force with skills and habits useful for industrial life, support an extensive 
infrastructure, allow many specialized crafts to develop, etc. An important reason for scale 
economies at the industry level is a greater division of labour. Scale economies are national if 
they depend on the size of the national industry. They are international if they depend on the 
world-wide (or possibly EU) size of the industry. External economies are discussed in 
Section 2.5. 
Economies external to the industry may also arise. They can also be national (external to the 
industries but internal to their home country) or international. Such economies result from 
cross-industry externalities. More particularly, they can arise from industrial inter-dependence 
such as that between buyers and suppliers of raw materials or intermediate products. 
Potential economies of scale, as measured by rated capacity, are physical characteristics of the 
production facilities. Actual economies of scale, as determined by the actual amount of 
material processed within a specific time period, are organizational [Chandler, 1990]. Those 
economies would then depend on the organizational human capabilities essential to exploit the 
potential of technological processes such as knowledge, skill, experience and teamwork and/or 
the willingness of the firm (or industry) to reach them. 
Potential economies of scale vary widely between different countries, industries and different 
time periods. It has been argued [Chandler, 1990] that those differences in economies of scale 
(and scope) result from differences in technologies of production and distribution, and 
differences in the sizes and location of markets. This is particularly relevant at a time of rapid 
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technological change and changing market characteristics. Findings from research on 
economies of scale are debatable, requiring careful and sophisticated evaluation. 
Economies of scale have been recognized as important determinants of the structure of an 
industry. Scale economies relate to the industrial organization literature in three main aspects. 
First, they are an important determinant of productive efficiency. Second, we wish to explain 
market concentration and to inquire whether industries are more concentrated than necessary 
to secure production efficiency. Third, we are concerned to know whether economies of scale 
represent a barrier to the entry for new firms (although it could be the presence of sunk costs 
rather than economies of scale that acts as a barrier to entry). 
In the area of industrial structure, Sutton [1991] distinguishes between the effects of 
exogenous and endogenous sunk costs. Production has exogenous sunk costs, but some 
expenditures on advertising and on research and development are endogenous overheads (sunk 
costs) and can be used strategically by competing firms. Furthermore, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
[1988] have suggested that learning-by-doing also involves a form of (exogenous) sunk cost 
that is the cost to produce. 
The conventional theory of economic integration is largely associated with neo-classical and 
factor-endowment trade models, in which the measurement of the impact of economic 
integration is provided by the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. This analysis is 
based on the assumptions that markets are characterized by perfect competition and production 
by constant returns to scale. It can be argued that the traditional theory is 'static' and that 
'dynamic' effects also need to be considered because economic integration can yield 
significant growth-related gains. 
These dynamic gains relate to enhanced economies of scale and scope linked to effective 
single market size as rates of capital formation, human resource development, technological 
change and entrepreneurial activity accelerate. A new literature has emerged in the study of 
economic integration, embracing dynamic effects and concentrating on imperfect competition, 
economies of scale and product diversity. In addition, when dynamic gains are considered, 
their locational distribution becomes an important issue. 
2.2. Technical economies of scale 
2.2.1. Methods o f measurement 
Empirical estimates of scale economies are fairly well covered in the standard literature so that 
the review here will be brief. There are three main techniques of estimation: statistical cost 
analysis, engineering estimates, and the survivor test. 
The statistical approach relates costs to output volume of plants or firms of different sizes. A 
fairly large number of variables have to be taken into account to give significance to the 
results. Firms and plants classified in the same industry often have differences in product mix, 
differences in the age of the capital stock (and hence in the embodied technology), differences 
in input prices, cumulative output volume, and so forth. In practice, complete, reliable data are 
hard to come by. Moreover, this approach may reflect short-run rather than long-run average 
costs, especially as long-run costs often incorporate rents, and so reveal little about economies 
of scale. 
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The engineering approach looks directly for opinions from engineers and managers about the 
shape and position of the cost curves, and so tries to estimate the minimum efficient scale 
(MES) directly based on the use of the 'best current practice' techniques. This approach is in 
principle the most promising. However, engineering estimates require a substantial, costly and 
time-consuming research process, so that they often give comparable estimates for only a 
small range of (manufacturing but not service) industries and deter researchers from 
employing them. Also, engineering data are necessarily hypothetical in the sense that they do 
not allow for managerial diseconomies, inelastic factor supplies, potentially greater strike 
activity in larger plants, transport costs, and heterogeneous products, etc. Nevertheless, they 
provide a useful benchmark, and we use the Davies and Lyons [1996] standardization of 
Pratten's [1988] compilation in Chapter 4. 
The survivor technique attempts to identify the size class which is seen to be increasing its 
share of industry output over a period of time, and suggests that the average size of this class 
represents MES. The idea is that, taking all market considerations into account, the most 
successful size must be most efficient. There are limitations to this technique. It does not say 
anything about the level of costs and does not always clarify the shape of the cost curve. 
Survival patterns are not always stable over time and the criteria for distinguishing surviving 
from non-surviving size classes embody a certain amount of arbitrariness. Survivor estimates 
may be tainted by pecuniary conditions, when plants (and most certainly firms) may increase 
their market share not because they have lower costs but because of increased market power. 
The results of the 'survivor test' may also reflect differences between firms using different 
technologies and showing different innovative performances over a particular period of time. 
Lastly, the selected survival size class contains different plants over time as plants move in 
and out of their size class. We attempt survivor estimates of MES in Section 3.2. 
Measures of typical size 
Faced with these problems, many analysts use existing size data, derived from census size 
distributions (say sales or employment) as a proxy variable for the minimum efficient scale. It 
is important to recognize that these are measures of 'typical' firm size, and not of MES. They 
have no theoretical foundation as direct measures of technical (or any other) economies of 
scale. However, because firm size and economies of scale are intimately related, they will be 
strongly correlated. For this reason, typical firm size is often used as a proxy for MES in 
empirical work. For some purposes, that may be reasonable, but on its own, a measure of 
typical size says nothing about the attainment of scale economies. Where these measures 
become truly revealing is when they are related to an independent measure of scale economies, 
such as engineering estimates. In Chapter 4, we provide a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between typical firm size and economies of scale, and estimate an econometric relationship 
between the two. 
Various proxy measures for MES figure in the empirical literature. The simplest measure is to 
take the arithmetic average (this is used extensively in Chapters 3 and 4). A more refined 
proxy is the average size of plants comprising the upper half of an industry's size distribution. 
Another example of typical size is the Florence median plant size, i.e. the size of plant of the 
midpoint of the size distribution in the sense that 50 per cent of industry size is accounted for 
by plants in excess of the midpoint. Formally, this is the median of the first moment 
distribution (MFMD). We calculate this in Section 3.2. 
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Units of measurement 
Whatever measure of MES or typical size is chosen, we must also choose the units of 
measurement. Common units of measurement are total assets, net assets, sales, employment 
and value added. Empirical results are affected by the choice of size measure since the 
available measures are not perfectly correlated. In this case, studies which use different size 
variables are likely to reach broadly similar but different conclusions. This is a serious 
problem if, for example, the same firm is assigned to different size groups according to which 
size measure is used. In practice, gross value added, sales and employment are the variables 
most likely to be available for use in the measure of size. 
Theoretically the most appropriate measure of a firm's activities is offered by value-added. 
This is what we adopt in Chapters 3 and 4. However, this measure excludes contributions 
from all inputs other than labour and capital, and is affected by the degree of vertical 
integration of the firm. If the size measure is the turnover of the firm, it refers to the money 
values of its different products. Difficulties may arise in finding an appropriate deflation index 
when using data over time, or exchange rates when comparing data from different countries. 
Similar problems surround the valuation of fixed assets. In addition, firms may use different 
accounting procedures due to different depreciation methods, or differences in the lifetime of 
capital assets that is assumed for depreciation purposes. Firms also have different capital 
structure, e.g. representing a collection of capital of different vintages. The use of all these size 
measures may further be complicated by product mix variations between firms or plants. 
Employment is the most common, often unique, measure used in size distributions of firms, 
contained in published national census of production data. Employment, i.e. the numbers of 
workers, is only an approximation of labour input for the firm which is better measured by 
man-hours. In the current period, this may be especially important as there is a large number of 
part-time workers. Bearing all the above points in mind, special care must be exercised in 
interpreting the results from size measurement. 
Real and pecuniary economies of scale 
The measurement of economies of scale is primarily concerned with the 'real' economies of 
scale, i.e. those arising from the reduction of inputs consumed per unit of output at higher 
scales of output. Those technical economies of scale, as defined by Shepherd [1990], arise 
from the actual physical organization of production activities. They result in an increase in 
economic efficiency and a reduction of costs. Yet other economies and advantages of large 
scale may be obtained by individual firms or industries, such as pecuniary gains, but these do 
not reflect any improvement in real efficiency. Pecuniary gains may refer to bargaining power 
to obtain supplies at lower prices, privileged access to the capital market or effective lobbying. 
As mentioned by Shepherd [1990], both technical and pecuniary gains occur together, and no 
easy method has yet been designed in research to exclude all pecuniary elements from 
measures of scale economies. Only engineering estimates can explicitly exclude them. 
2.2.2. Recent empirical studies 
Technical economies of scale are the theoretically best known type of production economies. 
Apart from production economies of scale, economies achievable in other common functions 
at the level of the firm, such as promotion, research and development, management and 
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financing, were often regarded as less significant and/or more difficult to quantify [Owen, 
1983; Pratten, 1988]. Some of these will be taken up in more detail later. 
A feature of the existing analysis on economies of scale is that the information available forces 
a focus on manufacturing. For service industries it is not currently possible to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of scale economies similar to that in manufacturing industries. 
However, the manufacturing sector in Europe has, on the whole, been able to maintain its 
important role in the European Community despite the wild speculation on the 'de-
industrialization' of Europe. 
Currently, the main references concerning estimates of economies of scale have been 
published by the Commission of the European Community. An extensive survey was made by 
Pratten [1988] of engineering estimates of the minimum efficient scale (MES) and cost 
gradients for a number of European industries. He concluded (p. 162) that 'there are 
substantial scale effects for products and production runs to be obtained in a wide range of 
manufacturing industries'. Industries where economies of scale were found to be the largest 
included transport equipment, machinery and instrument manufacture, chemicals and paper 
and printing. Other industries such as textile and clothing, food, drink and tobacco were 
considered as generally having a limited scope for technical economies of scale. 
Engineering estimates are believed to be reasonably reliable estimates of production scale 
economies. However, those estimates have been criticized elsewhere [e.g. Davis et al, 1989] 
and it has been argued that the importance of economies of scale has been grossly exaggerated 
in much of the manufacturing sector as well as in other areas. Many studies have reported 
relatively small optimal plant size (MES), roughly constant costs at the firm level and 
relatively flat cost gradients [Shepherd, 1990]. In addition, Shepherd suggested that estimates 
of cost gradients, especially at the firm level, probably contain a degree of bias as a result of 
pecuniary economies. It may also be that upward bias of estimates of internal economies of 
scale in Europe come from not taking into account the effects of other dynamic and external 
economies in those estimates. 
Many studies have used the United States as a reference point for evaluating economic 
performance in Europe. In a comparative study of managerial enterprise in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Germany from the 1880s through to the 1930s, Chandler [1990] 
attributes the success of (large-scale American) enterprises to large long-term investments in 
manufacturing, marketing and management. Chandler suggests that economic conditions over 
the period made large-scale firms necessary in order to reap the benefit of economies of scale 
and scope. 
However, there cannot be universal generalization, and the success of American managers in 
the first years of the 20th century has to be placed in the context of the use of techniques of 
mass production and mass distribution. For many industries, especially those making 
differentiated products, new flexible manufacturing systems may have reduced the minimum 
optimal scale [Holmes, 1989]. But for other industries, especially mass production ones, there 
may be unexploited, even increasing, economies of scale in production. Technological 
innovations, often sponsored by changes in demand, generate a continually evolving process 
ofchange. 
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As far as services are concerned, estimates of economies of scale are scarce and difficult to 
construct empirically. Several attempts to measure technical economies of scale in services 
have produced different results [Emerson et al, 1988a]. It would seem that those economies of 
scale are generally small and less than for manufacturing [Pratten, 1988]. Economies of scope, 
however, may play a more important role in services [Emerson et al, 1988a]. 
2.2.3. Expected impact of the single market 
One of the key motivating factors for the 1992 single market programme was the belief that it 
would boost efficiency and the rate of economic growth in Member States. The basis for this 
belief was that with the abolition of remaining border controls on intra-EC trade, as well as the 
harmonization or mutual recognition of standards and other regulations, the efficiency of 
resource use and investments would increase through greater intra-EC competition and better 
exploitation of economies of scale. The scale factor has been considered to be a fundamental 
economic reason for integrating the markets of the Community. Indeed, the European 
Commission [1988] estimated that over one-third of the economic benefit of the 1992 
programme would have at its source the further exploitation of economies of scale. In recent 
years, there has been an increasing body of empirical work concerning increasing returns in 
Europe and the impact of the single market programme. 
According to Owen [1983], a very large part of the gains from the initial formation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) came from the exploitation of economies of scale. 
Engineering estimates of Pratten [1988] suggest that there are substantial unexploited 
economies of scale in the EU (see Chapter 3). The potential gains from greater exploitation of 
scale economies in Europe seems to be corroborated by the finding of generally larger 
production runs and bigger plant sizes in the United States than in Europe [Flam, 1992]. 
Many studies, however, have found quite small gains available from unexploited economies of 
scale [e.g. Davis et al, 1989; Shepherd, 1990]. In the business community's perception of the 
completion of the single market's effects on costs, a large minority (36%) does not expect any 
effect, while a few are unenthusiastic (2%) and expect their costs to increase [Nerb, 1988]. 
However, it is noted that the effect reported was defined as the direct effect of the removal of 
barriers, and that the indirect effect of greater exploitation of economies of scale and scope is 
not being taken fully into account in this estimate. 
Where there are large production economies of scale in one industry, and consequently 
predominantly exogenous sunk costs, the level of the concentration of this industry is likely to 
increase with more European market integration [Davies and Lyons, 1996]. Davies and Lyons 
found that the greatest potential for economies of scale are in Type 1 and Type 2R industries, 
in which they expect to observe an increase in European industrial concentration with further 
market integration. In particular, some highly protected Type 2R industries, e.g. among the 
public procurement industries, are likely to incur significant reductions in production costs and 
an increase in concentration as a consequence of the single European market. 
In the context of the realization of the single market, the most significant reductions in 
production costs are expected in industries which have experienced high levels of national 
protection. Even the sceptics agree that there are important unexploited economies of scale in 
the most highly regulated sectors such as the public procurement sector, including power-
generating, rail transport and telecommunication equipment. In these public procurement 
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markets, access restrictions are more or less prohibitive throughout the Community and further 
market integration may mean greater competition, even with fewer firms overall in the 
Community. 
The single market programme, giving access to spatially larger markets, may also induce large 
gains from increasing specialization over a narrower range of product lines, and hence 
increasing the length of production run. Effectively, if a specialized plant is constrained to 
suboptimal scale because of the limited size of its market, the manager may possibly react by 
diversifying the plant's output mix [Caves, 1989]. Thus, producers may respond to an 
increased market size by selecting larger plant sizes, but they may also include fewer product 
lines in a plant of any given size. Both can be interpreted as reaping economies of scale, but 
the latter would not be picked up on most measures. 
The services identified as the most sensitive to the completion of the single market belong 
mainly to the insurance, distribution and banking sectors. Major growth has been experienced 
in insurance and other financial services. There have also recently been complex interlinkages 
between firms, especially within financial institutions. Those corporate strategies of co-
operative arrangements may have been motivated by the spreading of the risks and costs of 
product development or research [Farrands and Totterdill, 1993] and stimulated by the single 
market perspective. Motives for new corporate strategies are nevertheless often confused and, 
in this case, may be different from a stimulus to change from the single market programme. 
For example, in their study of Britain and Germany, Mayes and Hart [1994] claim that the 
1992 programme did not address the most important factors which led to the segmentation of 
the market in the insurance sector. 
In addition, many service sectors are designed by their very nature to serve local markets, 
often tailored to domestic taste. Economies of scale in those sectors are suggested to be 
national rather than international ones, and consequently the scope for economies of scale 
through the completion of the European market is sometimes believed to be limited. 
Nevertheless, some authors [e.g. Mayes et al, 1991] claim that some of the major gains from 
the single market may come from the stimulus to investment and the extension of competition 
to areas such as services and industries, dominated by public procurement. 
It is difficult to know whether, and to what extent, internal economies of scale have already 
been exhausted in the European Community. As suggested by Pratten [1988], pure scale 
economies and rationalization economies are often likely to be associated. Holmes [1989] 
argues that significant scale economies may still be available from rationalization. He 
suggests, therefore, that economies of scale have been systematically under-exploited because 
of a lack of competitive pressure. This problem is directly linked to issues addressed in 
competition policy regarding the operation of mergers. For example, if potential economies of 
scale are large in some sectors, there may be scope for mergers in order to reap them. Yet this 
may not be true of other sectors which attempt mergers. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that there is a tendency in manufacturing industries for the actual concentration to be higher 
than required by scale economies [Holmes, 1989; Scherer and Ross, 1990]. 
This observation consequently raises questions about the merits of the merger boom in 
Europe, as mergers doubled between 1982-83 and 1985-86 and again by 1988-89 [Mayes et 
al, 1991]. The influence of the single market programme on mergers and acquisition may be to 
make them more desirable and/or to help to make them easier. At the heart of the European 
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competition policy is the prediction that the motive of these mergers may have been the 
strengthening of market position rather than reasons related to economies of scale. In many 
industries the trade-off between exploitation of economies of scale and competition may not 
be relevant. As a consequence, an intensified competition and decrease in public subsidies 
may lead to diseconomies of scale (and unrealized economies of scope) in a number of sectors 
as a result of ill-advised past mergers or acquisitions. 
According to Mayes et al [1991], changes in ownership in themselves do not involve more 
efficiency, economies of scale or more innovation. As illustrated by Holmes [1989], there may 
be significant economies of scale available from rationalization. Within the Community, 
exploiting some economies of scale may depend on the willingness and rapidity of individual 
firms and their consequent new corporate strategies. 
Within this perspective, given the existing extent of unexploited scale economies, it seems that 
a strong and (more) credible competition policy should be implemented by authorities; i.e. a 
change in business expectations would only come from a strong string of regulatory changes 
and other measures to increase competition. 
The European economy is dominated by oligopolies such as electronics, telecommunications, 
chemicals, automotive production, and those in a growing range of service industries. Large 
firms in those sectors have been estimated as necessary in order to compete at European and 
global levels. The full realization of both economies of scale and competition require large and 
open markets. With the completion of the single market, these gains would require global 
competition if the dangers of oligopoly are to be avoided. 
A study by Venables and Smith [1988] has been used to illustrate the possible gains from 
integration of the European market, taking into account economies of scale and the effects of 
product differentiation. Their model investigates two interpretations of the European 
integration. The first involves a quantitative change on the assumption that the markets stay 
segmented. The second describes a qualitative change in firms' behaviour on the assumption 
of an integrated market (in which prices net of transport costs are equalized). The gains from 
the second scenario are substantially higher than those in the first, since there is the added 
effect of rationalization and thereby a further lowering of average costs and prices. 
A study by Mayes and Hart [1994] on the stimulus to change from the single market in Britain 
and Germany indicates that where a substantial stimulus exists, few examples have been found 
of existing activity actually being shifted in order to exploit an improved cost structure in the 
single market. This research focuses on the effect of the SM on four industries: retailing, 
pharmaceuticals, insurance and machine tools. It was found for the period considered that 
there was a lack of strong incentives to alter behaviour offered by the SM programme. The 
results show effectively that strong pressures from other barriers in these industries, not 
tackled by the SM programme, did overcome the impact of the SM programme. Much of the 
stimulus to change offered by the SM programme is still to come, as many of the market 
measures have yet to take effect. 
Economies of scale 
2.3. Technical efficiency 
2.3.1. X-inefficiency 
The concept of efficiency in economics expresses the success with which resources are 
utilized, and indicates the extent to which firms are best utilizing their available inputs to 
produce the maximum potential output. In practice, such fully efficient behaviour is never 
realized for the economy as a whole. 
A measure of technical inefficiencies, as first defined by Farrell [1957], is the distance from 
the production frontier. For example, two identical firms with the same technology and same 
combination of inputs may produce two different levels of output. This source of inefficiency 
could be explained by the management's (in)ability to manage and organize the firm, which is 
accounted for in X-inefficiency [Leibenstein, 1966]. X-inefficiency - internal inefficiency -
can be broadly defined by the outcome of some non-optimal conduct [Torii, 1996]. It refers to 
a failure to keep the cost down to the minimum possible level; X-efficiency is reached by 
being on the average cost curve. 
X-efficiency and economies of scale are two separate concepts. As the average cost curve is 
the lower bound to the set of possible average costs, departures above the curve involve X-
inefficiency, a degree of bad management and unnecessary costs. On the other hand, scale 
inefficiency is represented by departures away from the optimum scale of production on the 
curve where costs are minimized. 
This distinction is especially important when examining the economic effects of the SM. It is 
possible that the increased competitive pressure on firms, resulting from the SM, forces 
inefficient firms to improve their performance and move towards the production frontier. If 
they do not, they will be driven out of business. The net result is that the average economic 
performance of firms, measured, for example, by labour productivity, will increase not 
because firms become larger and achieve economies of scale, but because they adopt best-
practice techniques and reduce their costs. In this scenario, the dispersion and skewness of the 
distribution of firms by labour productivity will decrease as firms move towards the 
production frontier. It is also a phenomenon that does not fall within the definition of 
economies of scale, and so lies outside the scope of this study. However, it is a theme to which 
we shall return in interpreting our data. 
2.3.2. Recent empirical studies 
Studies on determinants of productivity or efficiency have been numerous, and clearly stress a 
considerable variety of performance. For example, comparisons have been made at the 
industry level of productivity differences between countries [Hooper and Larin, 1989]. Some 
of this variation could be explained by the difference in size of individual plants within each 
industry and by their choice of inputs. However, there are other sources of variation to be 
considered. 
In production, the firm can suffer from different types of inefficiencies: scale inefficiency due 
to suboptimal scale to minimize costs, X-inefficiencies, and inefficiency in 'catching-up' the 
technology frontier or in adopting a new, more efficient technology. Evidence seems to 
indicate that technical inefficiency is a significant factor in explaining the under-performance 
of firms [Mayes, Harris and Lansbury, 1994]. 
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It has been suggested that in practice, in the typical industry, many firms operate inside the 
production frontier so that only a few best-practice firms operate on the frontier, along with a 
'tail" of inefficient ones [Mayes. 1996; Mayes, Harris and Lansbury, 1994]. Therefore, firms 
could improve their productivity without even altering the quantity, type or combination of 
factors of production. 
A study by Lansbury and Mayes [1996b] has investigated, for the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Japan, Australia, Canada and South Korea, how far the change in performance in the 
1980s is due to an improvement in what can be achieved by the technology available (given 
the inputs employed); and how far it is due to a reduction in the level of technical inefficiency, 
compared with that frontier, of what could be achieved. In other words, they have tried to 
determine how much of the change in performance was due to either shifts in the production 
function, or 'clustering' of individual firms to the production frontier. Their results show that 
the tail of less efficient plants has changed little in size during the 1980s, so that on average 
there has been a small reduction in technical inefficiency in the manufacturing industry. 
However, when inefficiency has fallen, the main determinants involved have been more 
effective internal and external competition. It was furthermore suggested that major gains may 
be reached by a country through catching up with the technology of its more successful 
competitors. 
2.3.3. Expected impact of the single market 
Scale economies and X-efficiency can be seen as two different sources of cost reductions. 
Diverse hypotheses have been tested, and have found some support in the literature as 
regarding constraints on efficiency [Caves, 1989]. Those hypotheses include tariff protection, 
social attitudes and priorities, industrial subsidies, public sector protectionism, collusive 
agreements, etc. If X-inefficiency is widespread, there is a very large potential scope for 
efficiency gains arising from the single market brought about by increased competition. Higher 
competitive pressure in the European Community may not only force inefficient firms and 
plants to close, but also induce more effort from entrepreneurs and less slack within firms. 
Furthermore, it may be that part of the spread in performance is due to the use of more or less 
efficient technologies. This gives some strength to the argument that emphasis should be given 
in industrial and related policies to acquiring and encouraging the adoption of best practice 
technology (e.g. support for R&D, encouragement of the venture capital industry). There may 
be room for reducing gaps between best practice technology in competing countries, and this 
may represent major gains in the whole of each industry in Europe. 
In addition, it has sometimes been argued that market integration itself could induce 
technological progress (e.g. Pelkmans, 1984). Market enlargement may enable a better 
diffusion of a given stock of knowledge, and increased competition may lead to an 
improvement of the stock of knowledge. 
2.4. Endogenous sunk costs 
2.4.1. Economies of scale, market size and industrial concentration 
Recently in the theory of industrial concentration, researchers have focused on understanding 
how different types of economies of scale affect industrial structure. Looking more carefully at 
the determinants of concentration has provided new insights on the role for concentration of 
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(1) the prevalent competitive process between firms in the industry, and (2) the different types 
of scale economies. The relationship between industrial concentration and market size is then 
emphasized as theoretically revealing and empirically robust. 
Sutton [1991] investigated a new approach to the theory of concentration by distinguishing 
between exogenous and endogenous elements of sunk costs, which interact with each other in 
determining the equilibrium pattern of industrial structure. As a consequence, relations 
between concentration and market size are estimated for two different groups of industries, 
and the corresponding processes of market consolidation and evolution are analysed 
empirically. The first group represents industries in which exogenous sunk costs are 
predominant and the form of competition is mainly through price. Exogenous sunk costs are 
associated with those of requiring a plant of minimum efficient scale (set-up costs) and 
possibly some advertising and R&D outlays can be treated as exogenous. 
In the second group, sunk costs are endogenous to the firm, and consequently consist of 
business decision variables such as advertising and R&D outlays. Endogenous sunk costs can 
be used as competitive weapons by the firms, and consequently may involve a competitive 
escalation of those outlays. Sutton's analysis outlines the specificity of markets in which 
advertising plays a major role but his theory 'can be applied in principle to any form of sunk 
outlays that increase consumers' willingness-to-pay for a given firm's product(s)' [Sutton, 
1991, p. 313]. 
The role of production economies of scale can be introduced as involving exogenous sunk 
costs to produce at the minimum efficient scale. These are determined by the nature of the 
underlying technology. Dynamic economies of scale, such as those in R&D and marketing 
activities, can be treated as involving a choice to the firm of incurring sunk costs to enhance its 
demand. The study has therefore provided a useful insight to the implications of advertising 
and R&D outlays for market structure. Firstly, when sunk costs are exogenous, the lowest 
viable concentration decreases to zero when market size increases. Size differences could 
consequently be traced to particular decisions or innovations that apparently provided long-
lived competitive advantages. Secondly, when advertising sunk costs are endogenous and 
advertising competition is important, concentration not only stays away from zero whenever 
advertising competition is sufficiently tough; but it also does not decline significantly with 
relative market size. 
Referring to the work of Sutton [1991], Davies and Lyons [1996] analyse the structure of 
manufacturing in the European Union, with particular reference to the European integration. A 
classification of manufacturing sectors is more fully developed according to the type of 
competition which prevails in the markets, and the way that product differentiation is created. 
The two main sources of product differentiation for firms are advertising and R&D spending 
which are considered as endogenous sunk costs creating economies of scale. Their analysis 
distinguishes Type 1 industries, which engage in little advertising or R&D, from Type 2 
industries. Type 2 industries are further subdivided into three different categories: Type 2A 
industries engaged only in advertising (e.g. food, drink and tobacco), Type 2R only in R&D 
(e.g. machinery, instruments and transport equipment) and Type 2AR in both (e.g. cars, 
domestic electrical appliances, pharmaceuticals). With this typology, the authors further 
investigate the mechanisms which relate the different types of economies of scale to the 
different elements of structure for the four industry types. 
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The influence of production economies of scale on concentration is stressed in Type 1 
industries, whereas such scale economies have a much reduced role in Type 2 industries and 
little influence in Type 2AR. In addition, Davies and Lyons suggest that endogenous sunk 
costs such as R&D and advertising may have increased as the result of competitive escalation 
rather than economies of scale. This typology of industries is used extensively in Chapters 3 
and 4 of this report. 
2.4.2. Scale economies in the process of innovation and marketing 
Next consider the efficiency with which R&D inputs are converted into useful outputs. 
According to Schumpeter, large firms with monopoly power may have more resources for 
R&D and innovation than their smaller competitors, conferring on them an advantage in 
innovation. The assumption of economies of scale for R&D inputs in producing innovative 
outputs has led to hypotheses of inherent advantage for large firms in innovative activity. In 
addition, monopoly power allows better appropriability of the returns to innovation, providing 
better incentives and consequently higher rate of innovation. 
The optimal size of the R&D effort could refer to the 'critical mass' a R&D unit should 
achieve in order to make full use of all its resources. These resources may be expensive, high 
capacity pieces of equipment or a large team of various specialists. The main source of 
economies of scale in R&D activity was identified by Pratten [1988] as the spreading of R&D 
costs. However, if minimum efficient scale in R&D is relevant, it relates only indirectly to the 
optimal size of the firm. 
It is widely known that large firms undertake the bulk of industrial R&D. Scherer [1991] 
concludes nevertheless that after several attempts to find these economies of scale in R&D, the 
relationship between firm size and technological innovation remains uncertain. The empirical 
evidence suggests [Acs and Audretsch, 1991b] that economies of scale do not play any 
significant role in producing innovative output, and that small firms can be at least as 
innovative as their larger counterparts in some industries. Though large firms are more R&D-
intensive, some empirical results indicate diminishing returns to scale as the rule. Indeed, it 
has been argued that the relative contribution of small and large firms to innovation may 
depend on industry conditions. 
As pointed out by Shepherd [1990], technical progress may be closely related to economies (or 
diseconomies) of scale and there may be different Optimal size' at the invention or innovation 
level. There may be such important and pervasive innovations, which require a long 
development period, that only a large firm is able to gather the needed funds, equipment, talent 
and sustained effort. Firms of large size may undertake incremental R&D activities that would 
not otherwise be possible. The need for a large R&D unit may be necessary in some sectors. 
This has been suggested, for instance, in the semiconductor industry, in which R&D 
collaborative arrangements have increased recently to allow for global competition. 
Some of the literature has also focused on attributes other than size that are assumed to make a 
firm more innovative, such as expertise. Pavitt [1992] stressed that firms from different 
industries are facing technological threats and opportunities which are of very different 
natures. The rate and direction of technical change are often seen to be important factors in an 
explanation of the structure of many industries. Moreover, the technological performance of 
firms may depend on an effective technological strategy, especially with increasing 
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international competitive pressure. There are many constraints on the choice of technological 
strategies for firms, such as those of the firm's size and principal products. These 
characteristics reflect the accumulated competencies and skills of the firm, upon which 
strategic decisions are built [Pavitt, 1992]. Pavitt and Patel [1991], for instance, stressed that 
large firms are more likely to have a relatively broad range of technologies and product 
markets than small firms, which are typically more specialized. 
It may finally be said 'there is no optimum size of firm but merely an optimal pattern for any 
industry, such a distribution of firms by size, character and outlook as to guarantee the most 
effective gathering together and commercially perfecting of the flow of new ideas' [Jewkes et 
al, 1958, p. 168]. 
As far as marketing is concerned, there may be economies of scale in some sectors (especially 
in certain consumer goods industries). Some economies are pecuniary (e.g. media discounts) 
and some are real (e.g. threshold levels of advertising to get through to consumers). However, 
marketing expenditure would normally stay national, if only because of language and 
culturally-based taste differences. According to Davies and Lyons [1996], some advertising-
intensive industries may be competing only at the national level, so that the competitive 
escalation of advertising expenditures is unlikely to occur above this level. On the other hand, 
R&D expenditures may increase through EU-wide or even global competitive escalation. 
The learning phenomenon must also be considered. The sources of learning are diverse and 
their importance varies between sectors; they include suppliers, customers, competitors and 
more general development in pervasive technologies [Pavitt, 1992; Pavitt and Patel, 1991]. 
Learning could be firm-specific and cumulative. Similarly, technological competencies could 
also be the result of a firm-specific cumulative process [Pavitt, 1992]. 
Learning from experience in production, or learning-by-doing, is suggested as being important 
in many industries [Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988]. This is a form of dynamic economy of scale 
in production. It has been argued that many European industries which show such learning 
effects still have their volume of output artificially constrained by various barriers and national 
policies [Emerson et al, 1988]. As a consequence, the single market programme would 
contribute to the greater exploitation of this type of scale economy. 
Since production is necessary as a form of (exogenous) sunk cost to allow learning effects, 
there will be an irreversibility in production possibilities (due to increasing returns to 
production). This phenomenon of 'path-dependent' and cumulative processes has also been 
investigated for technologies by Arthur [1989]. His study shows that modern and complex 
technologies often involve increasing returns to adoption. In a spatial dynamic dimension, this 
would mean the emergence of geographical areas locked in by historical events or chance to 
different technologies, and encourage the technology gaps between countries to remain and 
even widen. Similarly, firms may be locked in to certain types of production and technologies. 
The study by Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1988] shows that powerful learning possibilities 
encourage the growth of industrial concentration and the emergence of dominant firms. Thus, 
when the scope for learning is large, a structure which is oligopolistic rather than competitive 
might emerge. 
Economies of scale and the single market: a review of the literature 23 
2.4.3. Expected impact of the single market 
The completion of the single market may bring new opportunities for exploiting economies of 
scale in advertising with, for example, the introduction of European brands. However, the 
relevant geographical range of advertising expenditure is often identified at the national level, 
typically dependent on national media, culture and language. 
A major expectation of the European economy regarding dynamic economies of scale is the 
achievement of significant dynamic efficiency gains which enhance Europe's technological 
performance. Assuming that the single market will lead to more competitive markets, what 
will be the impact on investment in R&D and the rate of innovation? Empirical research on 
the relationship between firm size and innovation, and economies of scale in R&D, is 
inconclusive. Opportunities of R&D economies of scale offered with further European 
integration might be twofold [Pratten, 1988]. First, firms would be allowed to spread 
development costs over a larger output and/or benefit from growing faster development. 
Second, R&D resources could be used more efficiently because of less duplication of both 
research and development. 
It has been suggested that the required size of R&D activity and technological strategy may 
vary from industry to industry. In the semiconductor industry for example, strategic decisions 
are increasingly being made towards technological diversification, acquisition and 
collaboration [Hobday, 1989]. On the one hand, firms with a broad range of activities will be 
more likely to exploit the developments of the increasing complexity and interrelatedness of 
new technologies. On the other hand, strategic decisions on acquisition and collaboration 
(such as joint ventures or strategic alliances) might be seen as a method of dealing with the 
current technological complexity. Firms may find it difficult to cover the entire cost and the 
risk of increasing high financial investment alone, and would begin to look for alternative 
solutions. 
The 1980s saw the emergence of a new generation of European-based multinational 
enterprises in the semiconductor industry, which undertook strategic partnerships as well as 
aggressive investment and marketing strategies in order to compete within a global 
framework. Those new competitive strategies may well have been stimulated by the single 
market programme. Furthermore, the developments often received direct government support 
and led to a range of European Commission collaborative programmes such as Esprit, Eureka 
and RACE. 
When looking at the impact and the role of the single European market, Davies and Lyons 
[1996] show that a large number of mergers which occurred since 1987 involve advertising or 
R&D intensive industries. According to their analysis, the reasons for those mergers were 
primarily the further exploitation of economies of scale rather than the strengthening of market 
position. With such mergers, they suggest that some rationalization is needed in order to 
achieve lower production costs. However, the authors expect to find the highest impact of the 
single market programme in Type 1 industries that compete predominantly through price, and 
in low-trade R&D industries that do not compete at the European level (e.g. some public 
procurement intensive industries). 
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2.5. External economies of scale 
2.5.1. Sources 
The question of external economies and their measurement has often been neglected. There 
has been much controversy about the actual extent of external economies and the effect of the 
completion of the single market. The further exploitation of economies from greater division 
of labour, concentration and agglomeration may represent important additional gains and 
opportunities from the single market programme. 
External economies are often considered as location factors for enterprises, and referred to as 
technological externalities, or technological spillovers. Other factors leading to localization are 
labour market pooling or the availability of non-tradeable specialized inputs and services 
[Krugman, 1991 a&b]. 
In addition, there has been a historical shift towards the formation of more closely integrated 
international networks in the organization of multinational enterprise [Dunning, 1993]. As to 
the role of external economies, a multinational enterprise may, for example, decide to invest in 
a particular country in order to take advantage of the agglomerative economies and/or benefit 
from further international division of labour. The geographical dispersion of activities in 
global multinational enterprises may be further reinforced when located in an economically 
integrated region. 
It has been argued that international scale economies due to greater division of labour may be 
important in the European Community [Ethier, 1988] because European integration was 
followed by intra-industry trade rather than inter-industry specialization. European integration 
would then provide firms with incentives to organize an international division of labour in 
which productive (and innovatory) activity in each country becomes more highly specialized. 
On the other hand, national economies of scale could also be considered, arising from 
geographical concentration of an industry in a particular country. The trade pattern would then 
be more inter-industry. By allowing increased specialization by the partner countries, further 
economic integration can result in gains via such economies. Country size influences the 
importance of national economies of scale, as a small country is less likely to have industries 
composed of firms of efficient scale. 
It is often claimed that the bigger the potential economies of scale, the greater the gains from 
specialization and trade integration, particularly for a small country. However, the 
combination of dynamic effects and external economies may lead to dynamic advantage or 
disadvantage for some countries (or regions). As a consequence, it seems important to 
understand how this dynamic process takes place with the development of the single market 
programme because international trade may not contain self-equilibrating mechanisms to 
ensure a convergence of economies. 
2.5.2. Evidence on external economies 
Clusters of economic activity already exist in Europe, around which there are external 
economies of scale related to a thick market in inputs, a local informal knowledge base, and a 
dynamic competitive spirit (for example, financial services in London). Moreover, a recent 
study for the European Commission by the Netherlands Economic Institute [1993] stressed the 
importance of the desire for companies to be close to other companies carrying out similar 
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activities as a significant location factor. Those clusters should be allowed to develop as any 
industrial policy measures to prevent such external economies would not be consistent with 
the single market programme [Davis, 1993]. 
The study of geographical clustering has given some support to the view that dynamic 
economic development is closely linked to the agglomeration and attraction of economic 
activity. The model of 'new industrial districts' corresponds to a new dynamic conception of 
regional economic development [Farrands and Totterdill, 1993]. An industrial district is 
characterized by agglomerations of inter-dependent and co-operative small and medium-sized 
enterprises, and by a general environment of co-operation and confidence (such as partnership 
with local authorities, industry associations and trade unions). Successful experiences of this 
structure, relying on the dynamic interplay between external economies of scale, have opened 
new perspectives in regional development policy in some European regions. 
As far as the location of innovative activity is concerned, a significant geographic 
agglomeration may then be expected due to the cumulative, non-transferable or location-
specific character of knowledge [Feldman, 1993]. Innovation is expected to agglomerate 
geographically in areas that provide agglomeration economies - or concentration of 
specialized resources - that enhance and facilitate the innovation process. Feldman's 
conclusion supports the proposition of a general significant tendency for innovations to cluster 
geographically, this tendency being still more pronounced when considering individual 
industries. More particularly, her model revealed the importance of having a broad 
technological infrastructure for states. The major factors identified as increasing innovative 
activity are those of spillovers across industries (but still within state boundaries), spillovers of 
university research, and the presence of related industries and specialized business services. 
According to this spatial approach to innovative activity, states that contain concentrations of 
innovative inputs will develop a comparative advantage for innovative industries. However, 
the author warned that this advantage may be lost in the translation of scientific knowledge 
into new commercial innovations. 
Caballero and Lyons [1990] have further investigated, and found, important national external 
economies from cross industry externalities in four selected European countries (West 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Belgium). They conclude that, with the single 
market programme, external economies have a significant role which has generally been 
underestimated and merits further research. National external economies may be particularly 
relevant to the services industries which are often country-specific. However, it may be that 
some industries already benefit from international economies (such as big car makers), having 
already completed a single market [Cohen, 1990]. Oulton [1996] has applied the method 
employed by Caballero and Lyons to UK manufacturing industries in order to test for external 
scale economies due to the expansion of manufacturing as a whole. His results show that, 
whereas returns to scale stay constant at the industry level, there are non-negligible external 
effects at the level of aggregate manufacturing on individual industries. 
It is against this background that we have conducted our case studies (Appendix A, 
summarized in Chapter 6). It is not possible to quantify external economies in simple 
statistical measures, but insights can be gained from the views of experts in the industry. 
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2.5.3. Convergence or divergence in the single market 
Neven [1990] argues that the main beneficiaries from the single market programme are likely 
to be the southern European countries 'both in terms of exploiting comparative advantages and 
in terms of exhausting scale economies' (p. 46). Opposing this view, many arguments have 
been advanced to suggest that the benefits of economic integration will accrue to some of the 
central regions to the detriment of the peripheral regions. They often refer to the new literature 
on the existence and the role of market imperfections, external economies of scale and 
learning curves for individual firms. 
In one contemporary approach to interregional trade, Krugman [1991a] proposed a model of 
regional specialization. The nature of considered externalities is general rather than specific to 
a particular industry. There are pecuniary externalities associated with either demand or supply 
linkages (as opposed to purely technological spillovers). The general set of assumptions 
implies imperfect competition with economies of scale and transportation costs for 
manufactured goods, and the mobility of workers. There are two regions in the economy, and 
two sectors: a mobile or 'footloose' manufacturing sector; and a non-manufacturing sector, 
e.g. agriculture, using a location-specific input and facing a competitive market. Enterprises 
concentrate because of strongly increasing returns to scale, and mobile labour moves into the 
region. In order to minimize transportation costs, firms will be more likely (other things being 
equal) to locate in regions with a relatively large local demand. As firms concentrate, demand 
will expand which will attract more firms and lead to a circular process of agglomeration 
(similar to a dynamic cumulative process) and regional divergence. The determination of 
regions in which this process starts will essentially depend on initial conditions such as the 
spatial distribution of the non-rural population. 
However, the results of the model stress the large degree of indeterminacy of the locational 
choice of firms and therefore of the pattern of regional specialization. There are several 
possible final locations of enterprises, depending on the key parameters of transportation costs, 
the size of the economies of scale and the share of consumption expenditure on manufactured 
goods. A small change in these parameters induces the self-feeding process of agglomeration 
to occur either in the preferred centre - accentuating divergence, or in regions in which the 
initial demand potential was relatively small - favouring convergence. This indeterminacy 
supports regional policy measures, since the economies of scale in the existing agglomerations 
may prevent a substantial relocation in the periphery following the elimination of barriers of 
trade in the process of the economic integration. In another model Krugman [1991b, p. 89] 
suggests that, for the region that becomes the periphery, 'close integration is good but a 
limited move towards integration may hurt' [see also Krugman and Venables, 1990]. 
As a consequence, there should be no strong reasons to expect the elimination of regional 
problems and the centre-periphery pattern through the free interplay of market forces. On the 
contrary, such problems could be aggravated. For example, regions at the centre of the 
European Community are able to exploit their natural positional advantage of being closest to 
the main population centres. In addition, this positional advantage may be reinforced by the 
fact that the central regions contain nearly all the major urban concentrations as well as the 
financial and administrative capital cities. Those big cities have better transport and 
telecommunications facilities as well as access to large and well-qualified labour forces: on 
the whole, these advantages involve external economies of scale and favour the further 
concentration of firms and industries in the central regions. The increasing global and 
footloose nature of international production and other activities, due to both the single market 
Economies of scale and the single market: a review of the literature 27 
programme and the globalization phenomenon, may be likely to reinforce and accelerate 
patterns of 'circular and cumulative causation' within countries and/or regions. The potential 
impact of external economies is therefore great. 
2.6. Non-single market influences on the attainment of economies of scale 
To assess the economic effects of the implementation of the single market programme, one 
needs to isolate the effects of European integration from all the other effects associated with 
the passing of time, such as the natural development of trade flows, the growth of income, 
global trade liberalization, etc. To do so, the existing situation should be compared with one in 
which the institutions and policies of the SM are totally absent. However, in practice some 
speculation cannot be avoided. Therefore, important forces other than the single market 
programme must be identified that influence changes in European industrial structures. In the 
literature, three main influential forces are suggested: cyclical variations in the economy, the 
technological change and the phenomenon of the globalization of industry. 
2.6.1. Economic cycles 
It has been suggested that measures of changes in scale efficiencies or other efficiencies are 
correlated with changes in general economic conditions. Cyclical movements would therefore 
be captured in measures of firms' sizes. The general economic climate may be itself an 
explanation for greater exploitation of economies of scale. In recession years, for example, 
managers may pay much closer attention to costs than in expansion periods. 
As far as X-inefficiencies are concerned, there could be more room in the market for 
inefficient producers during growth periods of the economy [Mayes, Harris and Lansbury, 
1994]. Recessions could induce a general reduction in inefficiencies and even the exit of the 
least efficient firms or plants. Since tails of inefficient businesses remain in industries, the 
influence of economic cycles on production costs may be important. As a consequence, an 
observed downward trend in firms' sizes could be attributable to a recession period rather than 
to any single market effects. 
In addition, the production frontier may also be shifted as a result of economic cycles. For 
instance, the frontier may be shifted because of increased incorporation of new technologies in 
industries experiencing economic growth [Mayes, Harris and Lansbury, 1994; Lansbury and 
Mayes, 1996b]. 
In these circumstances, to identify the extent and determinants of greater exploitation of 
economies of scale is not an easy task. In Europe, economic cycles in the 1980s would broadly 
show a phase of decline in the early 1980s and of growth later in the decade. In our 
econometric work in Chapter 4, we take explicit account of industry-specific growth. 
2.6.2. Technological change 
Changes in the economies of scale over time are also subject to debate. On the one hand, 
Pratten's [1971] estimates show that there are reasons to believe economies of scale increase, 
rather than decrease, in most industries over time. Technical progress may consist, for 
example, of inventing ways in which small scale processes can be profitably scaled up. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that no broad trend toward greater scale economies can be 
identified, be it in manufacturing industry or in other sectors. In many industries, changes in 
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technology and production management have had a decentralizing impact, promoting small 
scale production and reduction of optimal size. Such tendencies can be found resulting from 
the impact throughout manufacturing of technological development in, for example, electricity 
generation, the direct reduction process of steel manufacture, and the reduction in size of 
computers and communications systems. Our sectoral reviews in Appendix Β attempt to 
assess these technological trends. 
Increased computerization may allow small production units to gain access to the latest 
technology, and reduce the cost advantages of large scale and long production runs. Typically, 
industry studies indicate that the range of cost variations between firms of similar size is much 
greater that the cost variations associated with scale [Smith, 1992]. In the car industry for 
example, the apparently important cost advantages of Japanese firms (with their efficient lean 
product development process) over European firms do not seem to be based primarily on 
advantages of scale. 
2.6.3. Globalization 
There has been a growing realization that much more work is required on the globalization 
phenomenon, with the emergence of globally-oriented multinational enterprises and the 
establishment of global networks of trade, production and R&D facilities. In an increasingly 
globalized market, competitive pressures have increased in Europe. In particular, competition 
has intensified between the European Community, the United States and Japan. It has been 
argued that the restructuring of the Community industry that took place in the 1980s is the 
result both of competitive pressures from non-European multinationals and of anticipation of 
the single market [Sharp, 1992]. Furthermore, the globalization process is likely to reinforce 
single market effects. 
However, the European Community is not the only vehicle of trade liberalization since the 
GATT agreement 'bound' the Member States not to raise tariffs on industrial products and 
agree to a series of tariff cuts. The European Community is part of the GATT, although the 
signatories of GATT are the Member States. It has nevertheless been argued that the European 
Community represents a more constraining commitment from the Member States than that of 
the GATT [Holmes, 1992]. 
2.7. Conclusion 
The extent and nature of increasing returns in European industries is a topic of lively debate. 
Although it is believed that the realization of potential economies of scale represents a clear 
gain, empirical evidence on their extent is not conclusive. To quantify and measure the 
different types of scale economies remains difficult and uncertain. 
It has been argued that technical economies of scale in production have often been 
overestimated. Reasons for this may be the impossibility of separating them from other 
pecuniary, external and dynamic economies. Greater production economies of scale may also 
be brought about by a reduction in product variety and consequently longer production runs. In 
addition, the effect of technological change on those economies of scale has not been well 
defined. Whether there are unexploited internal economies depends on the sector considered. 
The highest potential economies of scale are usually expected in the most protected industries, 
especially in public procurement industries. 
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Moreover, the removal of non-tariff barriers and regulations may not be a sufficient condition 
for the exploitation of existing potential scale economies by firms. Rationalization may be an 
equally important condition for this exploitation. This belief leads to the idea that an important 
impact of the single market on economies of scale may arise through a strong and credible 
competition policy, which would change business expectations and behaviour. It is further 
argued that many of the recently increased number of mergers were not necessarily driven by 
the need to exploit new economies of scale, but rather by a desire to expand market shares. It 
has been suggested that this may have been particularly true in R&D and advertising intensive 
sectors, where the size of the market is fundamental in determining the incentive to invest in 
these endogenous sunk costs. 
Technical inefficiency could be reduced in the European Community by improving internal 
and external competition within industries. The removal of barriers within the European 
Community, as part of the single market programme, could be expected to lead to an increase 
in average technical efficiency, given the increase in competition faced by domestic producers. 
It has been argued that R&D and advertising expenditures may be seen as a competitive 
weapon rather than as a means to reach economies of scale. However, opinions remain divided 
in the literature as to whether there are economies of scale in the conversion of inputs to 
outputs in these activities. 
In some industries there may be economies of scale in R&D through the spreading of costs and 
risks. Large R&D resources may be needed, such as large teams of specialists or expensive 
specialized equipment, which a small R&D unit could not afford. This would be especially 
relevant if one assumes an increasing complexity and interrelatedness of new technologies. 
The need for a large R&D unit may then be necessary in some sectors, as suggested more 
particularly in the semiconductor industry, in which collaborative strategies in R&D have 
emerged. Therefore a possible impact of the single market programme may be to stimulate 
such strategies in selected industries. In fact, direct actions have been taken at the European 
level through some EU initiatives in the semiconductor industry. 
In advertising, it is not clear whether an increase in a firm's expenditure is motivated by the 
exploitation of scale economies or by the acquisition of more monopolistic power. One impact 
of further European integration may be to allow the development of new European brands. 
Further exploitation of learning economies of scale may be a benefit of the completion of the 
single market, due to the expected increases in the production level. These dynamic scale 
economies in production may lead, as they accumulate, to advantages or disadvantages as 
firms become locked in to some production processes (or technologies). 
External economies may also be a source of high potential gains reinforced with the processes 
of economic integration. Benefits often relate to a greater division of labour and agglomeration 
economies. However, in a dynamic perspective, the further exploitation of external economies 
may lead to 'circular and cumulative' processes to the advantage or disadvantage of some 
countries (or regions). 
The positive impacts of the completion of the single market with regard to agglomeration 
economies are twofold. Firstly, there may be further exploitation of existing economies, with 
the reinforcement of existing clusters of economic activity. Secondly, there may be the 
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creation of new centres for agglomeration economies in which economic activity would start 
to accumulate. 
Finally, one can argue that the effects of the single market programme cannot be satisfactorily 
disassociated from those arising from other important driving forces, such as the GATT 
agreements or the globalization of industries. However, the European Community may involve 
more constraining (and influential) commitments from Member States than GATT. Global 
change itself may be a driving force for the changes within Europe, and we should expect to 
observe changes as a result of cyclical economic factors as well as the single market 
programme. 
In the next chapter, we begin our analysis by describing what has actually been happening to 
the size of firms across the EU, and provide a background of economic growth and intra-EU 
trade. In Chapter 4, we start to disentangle some of the influences of the single market. 
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3. Statistical background on firm size and growth 
In this chapter, we begin our analysis of the Eurostat size distribution data, and try to discern 
the major trends. In Section 3.1, we discuss some of the limitations of the data and justify our 
later use of average enterprise size, measured by gross value added, as a reasonable measure of 
attained scale. This measure is analysed in some depth in Chapter 4, and the remainder of this 
chapter aims to provide a descriptive background to that work. 
Two important factors must underpin an understanding of firm size (we use the terms firm, 
enterprise and business unit interchangeably in this chapter - the precise empirical definition 
of what we mean is given in Section 3.1.1). First, in the context of this study, size is only 
relevant relative to potential economies of scale; and second, the achievement of any given 
size depends on the type of competition that firms engage in. A deeper analysis of the precise 
ways in which these fit together is left to Chapter 4, but here we present two typologies based 
on the potential for further gains from economies of scale (3.2.1), and the type of competitive 
mechanism typically used in the industry (3.2.2). These typologies are then used to arrange the 
descriptive statistics on the average size of business unit (3.3). It is of considerable policy 
interest to know how the achievement of economies of scale varies across different countries, 
so we also present the summary data by Member State. Finally, in assessing the role of the 
single market programme, we shall be making use of two measures of integration based on 
intra-EU trade. Summary statistics by industry type and Member State are presented in Section 
3.4. 
3.1. Measurement of scale using Eurostat data 
3.1.1. Eurostat definitions 
Data used in the analysis of firm size come from Eurostat, which collates data at the enterprise 
(or Unternehmen) level. 'Enterprise' is defined as the smallest legally autonomous business 
unit, which is quite different from the standard definition of the term 'enterprise' in English-
speaking countries, where it refers to a group of companies comprising the parent company 
and all of its subsidiaries. In this study we shall call this the business unit or enterprise, or 
often simply 'firm' for short, but the reader should always bear Eurostat's definition in mind. 
Note that Member States can differ somewhat in their interpretations of a business unit, so 
cross-Member State comparisons may be partly definitional. However, this should not affect 
the cross-industry comparisons within Member States. The databases used include all firms 
employing at least 20 people (except for Spain which includes all firms) in three-digit NACE 
manufacturing industries. (Luxembourg is excluded due to insufficient data.) 
Part of the analysis utilized a database which distributes data by employment (known as the 
Series D database). Due to the limited number of countries available, this analysis was 
superseded by one which utilized a more comprehensive database, but which lacked 
distribution into size categories (the VISA database). 
Prior to using the data to measure change in firm size, two decisions had to be made: (i) what 
unit of measurement to use (employment vs gross value added vs turnover); and (ii) what 
measure of scale? 
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3.1.2. Unit of measurement 
The ideal unit to measure for the presence of scale economies would be quality adjusted 
volume of production, but this measure is not available. Employment is the most widespread 
and concrete measure; however, it is often affected by both long-term, labour-saving, 
technological change and by short-term cyclical fluctuations in the European economy. 
Productivity growth means that employment continually falls even if production volume rises. 
Sales/turnover, properly adjusted for inflation, gets close to output volume, but is sensitive to 
the position in the production chain - e.g. brokers and traders can have huge turnover, but still 
operate on a small scale because they add little value to the product. Gross value added 
captures the contribution of the industry to real production. This is therefore our preferred 
measure. It is adjusted to general inflation, using annual GDP deflators, although we would 
have preferred an industry specific index (which was not available). The trend towards 
specialization on core activities (vertical dis-integration) would tend to bias this measure 
downwards (e.g. the same number of cars is produced, but value added of gearboxes is now 
contracted out). 
3.1.3. Measurement of scale 
We attempted two measures of economies of scale using size distribution data: the survivor 
method (which attempts direct measure of scale economies by identifying the firm size most 
successful in the market); and a measure of typical size called the median of the first moment 
distribution, whereby half the output is produced in larger firms and half in smaller (a popular 
measure of central tendency of firm size; if 50% of the output is always produced by firms of 
less than MES, it is a direct measure of MES, otherwise it still gives a good measure of typical 
scale). Unfortunately, however, we found that the quality of data was insufficient to provide 
reliable results; there were few observations, a short time series and size classes which were 
too broad. 
Our pilot of 31 industries gave the following results: 
Table 3.1. Results of MFMD and survivor employment calculations: 1986 
UK 
France 
Italy 
MFMD 
Employment 
2.316 
3.643 
1.163 
No. of Obs 
19 
28 
22 
Survivor 
Employment 
77 
688 
913 
No. of Obs 
19 
28 
26 
The only countries which had sufficient data for these calculations were the UK, France and 
Italy. As Table 3.1 shows, the two calculations yielded very different results; the weighted 
averages of industries for each of the UK, France and Italy were much smaller than the 
corresponding MFMD estimates. The reason for this is that in many cases the survivor size 
class was the smallest class, the lower employment bound to this size class being 20. This had 
the effect of pulling the average survivor class down. 
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In order to identify empirically which estimate, MFMD or survivor, was more reasonable, we 
assumed that sales were positively correlated with employment and ran two regressions; one 
regressing the log of the SPES/Pratten MES estimate (measured in sales) on the log of the 
MFMD estimate, with a dummy variable taking the value 0 for Pratten's estimates and 1 for 
SPES estimates; and one regressing the log of the SPES/Pratten estimate on the log of the 
survivor estimate and the SPES/Pratten dummy. Outlying observations were excluded. The R2 
from the regression using the MFMD method was 0.58 while that for the survivor method was 
0.38. The MFMD was therefore deemed to be more accurate. 
The next step was then to calculate the MFMD for two additional years, 1981 and 1991, to 
identify whether any changes took place in firm size before and after 1986. The results are 
given in Table 3.2. They show that there were dramatic changes in the median size of firms in 
the three countries where data were available. The MFMD declined in each of the three 
countries between 1981 and 1986 (by 39% in the UK, 59% in France and 62% in Italy) and in 
two of the three between 1986 and 1991 (by 18% in the UK and 49% in France). Only in Italy 
did the MFMD increase in the latter period, by 73%. 
Table 3.2. Results of MFMD calculations for 1981,1986 and 1991 (weighted averages 
of 31 manufacturing sectors) 
UK 
France 
Italy 
1981 
3.791 
8.905 
3.079 
1986 
2.316 
3.643 
1.163 
1991 
1.900 
1.834 
2.013 
% change 
1981-86 
-38.9 
-58.1 
-62.2 
% change 
1986-91 
-18.0 
-49.7 
73.1 
Since the number of industries under investigation using the MFMD method was limited to 31 
and in only three countries, an alternative method of calculating typical firm size was then 
employed: this involved calculating the average firm size, which has the virtue of simplicity 
and wide availability, but is also sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of smaller firms. 
3.2. Typologies of sectors 
3.2.1. EOS potential 
Early in the project, we had to identify potentially interesting sectors to investigate in those 
parts of the project for which there were insufficient resources to be comprehensive (i.e. case 
studies, and concentration). For selected three-digit manufacturing sectors, a classification of 
their sensitivity to the SM programme against their potential to exploit economies of scale was 
undertaken. The potential to exploit economies of scale was identified by means of the ratios 
of MES (as indicated by Pratten, 1988) to the five-firm concentration ratio at the European 
level (as indicated by the SPES database for 1987, and referred to as CR5). 
We then divided CR5 by 5 in order to calculate the ratio of MES to the average production of 
the largest five firms. When this calculation was carried out, only two sectors (tractors and 
agricultural machinery, and aerospace) had EOS potential greater than 1, indicating that only 
these two industries had unexploited economies of scale. EAG therefore used average market 
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share rather than the average of the largest five firms in order to calculate EOS potential. 
Average market share was calculated as average sales divided by EU market size. By this 
calculation 47 out of 53 manufacturing sectors had unexploited economies of scale. 
Sectoral sensitivity to the SM programme was identified according to the four groups of 
industrial sectors that were expected to be most affected (Group 1 being the most sensitive) as 
given by Buigues et al [1990]. This classification resulted in the ranking of sectors according 
to EOS potential as shown in Table 3.3 and the matrix shown in Figure 3.1. 
Quadrant A includes those manufacturing sectors which were considered to have both a high 
sensitivity of the SM programme, and the potential to exploit economies of scale. The 
quadrant separations for each variable are based on the average of the 53 sectors shown. The 
horizontal line in Figure 3.1 indicates that 8.65 is the average EOS potential. The vertical line 
indicates that 1.2 is the (theoretical) average SM sensitivity; in practice quadrants A and C 
contain all those sectors in Groups 1, 2 and 3 as analysed by Buigues et al. 
3.2.2. Type of competitive mechanism 
For our more comprehensive econometric work, we preferred to directly model EOS potential 
and disaggregate the sources of barriers to the single market. However, following work 
reported in Davies and Lyons [1996], we expected to observe different patterns depending on 
the type of competition prevalent in the industry. A Type 2 industry is one in which typically 
or innately (i.e. most countries and in most time periods) firms engage in advertising and/or 
R&D competition. Roughly speaking, this means industries which have an advertising to sales 
ratio and/or R&D to sales ratio in excess of 1%. A Type 1 industry is one in which firms 
engage in neither type of competition. Within Type 2 we identify three subsets: a Type 2A 
industry is one in which firms typically engage in advertising, but not R&D competition; a 2R 
is one engaging in R&D but not advertising; and a Type 2AR industry is one in which firms 
typically engage in both advertising and R&D competition. 
Type 2A industries (13 industries, accounting for 12% of EU manufacturing production) 
mostly come from the food, drink and tobacco sectors; Type 2R industries (22 industries, 
accounting for 26% of production) include some chemicals, but mainly come from machinery, 
instruments and transport equipment; Type 2AR industries (nine industries, accounting for 
14% of production) include some chemicals such as pharmaceuticals, and soaps and 
detergents, and consumer durables such as cars and domestic electrical appliances; and Type 1 
industries (56 industries, accounting for 48% of production) are mainly associated with 
processing materials, including iron and steel, cement, foundries, grain-milling and the textile 
and wood processing industries. 
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Table 3.3. EOS potential and SM sensitivity of EU manufacturing sectors listed in 
decending order of EOS potential 
Industry 
Tractors & agricultural machinery 
Aerospace 
Electric lighting 
Non-ferrous metals 
Electrical machinery 
Shipbuilding 
Iron & steel 
Rubber 
Man-made fibres 
Telecom & measuring equipment 
Tobacco 
Insulating wires & cables 
Rail stock 
Radio* TV 
Cycle & motor cycle 
Beer 
Industrial & agricultural chemicals 
Fish products 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Machine tools 
Steel tubes 
Paper & pulp 
Pharmaceuticals 
Wine & cider 
Glass 
Medical instruments 
Food & chemical machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Soft drinks 
Paper & wood & etc. machinery 
Oils & fats 
Pasta 
Mining & construction machinery 
Basic chemicals 
Transmission equipment 
Clocks & watches 
Textile machinery 
Flax & hemp 
Chocolate & sugar confectionery 
Boilers & containers 
Computers & office machinery 
Ceramics 
Wool 
Cotton 
Asbestos 
Clothing 
Household textiles 
Starch 
Footwear 
Photo labs 
Carpets 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Jewellery 
NACE 
321 
364 
347 
224 
342 
361 
221 
481 
260 
344 
429 
341 
362 
345 
363 
427 
256 
415 
346 
322 
222 
471 
257 
426 
247 
372 
324 
351 
428 
327 
411 
417 
325 
251 
326 
374 
323 
434 
421 
315 
330 
248 
431 
432 
244 
453 
455 
418 
451 
493 
438 
495 
4911 
MES S(l) 
MECU 
1,000 
4,000 
250 
1,000 
250 
250 
2,000 
250 
500 
250 
2,000 
250 
250 
250 
100 
250 
250 
100 
250 
50 
250 
250 
250 
100 
100 
25 
50 
8,000 
100 
50 
250 
100 
50 
500 
50 
25 
50 
25 
100 
25 
250 
25 
25 
25 
25 
5 
5 
100 
5 
5 
5 
1 
il 
15,216 
32,804 
6,653 
32,059 
36,240 
15,368 
52,628 
23,583 
8,278 
60,624 
31,748 
18,168 
5,309 
36,461 
3,765 
19,851 
34,496 
7,253 
15,951 
17,540 
10,324 
25,244 
41,599 
10,174 
18,988 
6,565 
21,820 
151,214 
11,411 
13,338 
17,147 
4,442 
32,841 
102,942 
13,998 
1,661 
8,288 
1,427 
17,108 
21,290 
30,613 
9,720 
14,917 
19,183 
1,627 
53,097 
6,802 
3,455 
6,367 
2,349 
16,982 
4,075 
9,285 
MES/S= 
Ideal mkt 
share 
6.57 
12.19 
3.76 
3.12 
0.69 
1.63 
3.80 
1.06 
6.04 
0.41 
6.30 
1.38 
4.71 
0.69 
2.66 
1.26 
0,72 
1.38 
1.57 
0.29 
2.42 
0.99 
0.60 
0.98 
0.53 
0.38 
0.23 
5.29 
0.88 
0.37 
1.46 
2.25 
0.15 
0.49 
0.36 
1.51 
0.60 
1.75 
0.58 
0.12 
0.82 
0.26 
0.17 
0.13 
1.54 
0.01 
0.07 
2.89 
0.08 
0.21 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
Avg sales 
198« 
MECU 
13.6 
82.3 
9.3 
46.0 
12.7 
14.7 
135.8 
18.5 
46.9 
23.9 
202.2 
25.5 
26.3 
26.9 
11.1 
28.9 
29.9 
12.7 
32.1 
6.6 
36.7 
38.1 
38.2 
167 
17.1 
4.5 
9.4 
1,516.3 
19.0 
10.7 
53.8 
22.0 
12.0 
121.6 
12.8 
6.4 
13.3 
7.1 
31.7 
8.0 
85.3 
9.5 
9.6 
14.0 
18.4 
4.0 
4.1 
101.4 
5.1 
5.6 
15.2 
4.5 
5.4 
Avg mkt 
share= 
Avg sales/S 
0.09 
0.25 
0.14 
0.14 
0.04 
0.10 
0.26 
0.08 
0.57 
0.04 
0.64 
0.14 
0.49 
0.07 
0.30 
0.15 
0.09 
0.17 
0.20 
0.04 
0.36 
0.15 
0.09 
0.16 
0.09 
0.07 
0.04 
1.00 
0.17 
0.08 
0.31 
0.50 
0.04 
0.12 
0.09 
0.39 
0.16 
0.50 
0.19 
0.04 
0.28 
0.10 
0.06 
0.07 
1.13 
0.01 
0.06 
2.93 
0.08 
0.24 
0.09 
0.11 
0.06 
Averages 
EOS 
potential 
(MES/S)/ 
Avg sales/S 
73.31 
48.63 
26.93 
21.75 
19.68 
16.96 
14.73 
13.50 
10.67 
10.44 
9.89 
9.80 
9.52 
9.28 
8.98 
8.65 
8.37 
7.88 
7.80 
7.61 
6.81 
6.57 
6.54 
6.00 
5.86 
5.57 
5.29 
5.28 
5.26 
4.65 
4.65 
4.54 
4.15 
4.11 
3.92 
3.89 
3.76 
3.54 
3.15 
3.14 
2.93 
2.62 
2.60 
1.79 
1.36 
1.24 
1.22 
0.99 
0.98 
0.89 
0.33 
0.22 
0.18 
8.65 
SM 
sensitivity (2) 
1 
1 
1 
0 
2 
2 
0 
1 
0 
4 
0 
2 
3 
1 
0 
3 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
3 
3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
3 
1 
0 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1.2 
Quadrant 
B 
B 
B 
B 
A 
A 
B 
B 
B 
A 
B 
A 
A 
B 
B 
A 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
C 
C 
D 
C 
D 
D 
C 
D 
D 
C 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
C 
C 
C 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
(1) Size of the EU market (production) in 
(2) SM Sensilivity: 4= highest, (Howest. 
ECU. 
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Figure 3.1. Effects of SM measures: EOS potential vs SM sensitivity of EU 
manufacturing sectors 
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3.3. Average size of businesses 
This section provides descriptive statistics on average size, first by value added, which is used 
in the next chapter. We also provide data on average employment, since this gives insight into 
labour productivity changes. 
3.3.1. Real gross value added 
Changes in firm size as measured by real gross value added were calculated in three ways: first 
by a separation of firms into their respective quadrants (A, B, C etc.); secondly by Member 
State; and thirdly by type of industry (1, 2A, etc.). 
For the quadrant analysis, the calculation of changes in firm size using Eurostat's VISA 
database included those Member States which had nine pieces of information available: 
number of enterprises, employment and gross value added for each of the three years, 1981, 
1986 and 1991. Countries meeting this criterion were Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK. In the event, 112 manufacturing industries were used and 
there were 577 observations per year. 
To test whether there were statistically significant changes in real gross value added before 
and after 1986, the following regression was carried out: In Y/N 86 was regressed on In Y/N 
81 and In Y/N 91 regressed on In Y/N 86 where Y/N is average gross value added per 
enterprise. Dummies were added to the regressions to test if there was any significance in the 
separation into the quadrants A, B, C and D (vs the category with all other sectors used in the 
analysis). 
Table 3.4 shows the results of the average calculations: 
Table 3.4. Changes in real gross value added per enterprise (MECU, 1981 prices) 
GVA/Enterprise Quadrant 
A 
Β 
C 
D 
Other 
Total 
1981 
6.59 
5.92 
2.29 
2.44 
0.89 
1.65 
1986 
5.86 
6.29 
2.63 
2.54 
0.92 
1.73 
1991 
5.11 
6.20 
2.85 
2.60 
1.02 
1.81 
% change 
1981-86 
-11.2 
6.3 
14.8 
3.9 
2.8 
4.7 
% change 
1986-91 
-12.7 
-1.4 
8.3 
2.4 
11.1 
4.5 
There was a slight increase in average real gross value added in the two periods (4.7% in the 
first and 4.5% in the second), but these were found to be not statistically different from 0. The 
increase in average size after 1986 was not greater than before 1986, which does not support 
the view that the year 1986 marks a structural break reflecting the anticipated influence of the 
SM. Moreover, for the SM-sensitive industries in quadrant A, the average size of enterprise 
using this measure decreased by 11.2% between 1981 and 1986 and by 12.7% between 1986 
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and 1991, which does not suggest that the SM led to any economies of scale at the level of the 
enterprise. 
It should be noted that there was a large difference in the number of industries per quadrant: 
quadrant A included six manufacturing sectors, Β included 11, C had eight, D had 28 and 
'other' had 59 for a total of 112 sectors. 
The following tables (3.5 and 3.6) show the results by Member State, including both total real 
GVA and real GVA per enterprise. These analyses include all countries for which data are 
available and only industries for which both 1986 and 1991 data are available, as well as 1981 
data. The number of industries included for each country is given in the right hand column. 
Table 3.5. Total real GVA by Member State and total EU (MECU, 1981 prices) 
Country 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Greece 
Total' 
EUR-122 
1981 
153,480 
102,473 
86,158 
61.896 
39,658 
8,638 
9,965 
4,377 
n/a 
n/a 
2,774 
469,419 
473,203 
1986 
192.228 
86,441 
77,270 
51,803 
26,196 
16,638 
11,668 
6,031 
n/a 
n/a 
965 
469,239 
438,263 
1991 
230,415 
88,837 
71,161 
49,132 
30,490 
19,203 
12,155 
7,237 
4,025 
1,353 
523 
514,531 
453,567 
% change 
1981-86 
25.2 
-15.6 
-10.3 
-16.3 
-33.9 
17.1 
37.8 
-
-
-65.2 
-0.04 
-7.4 
% change 
1986-91 
19.9 
2.8 
-7.9 
-5.2 
16.4 
15.4 
4.2 
20.0 
-
-
-45.8 
9.7 
3.5 
No. of 
industries3 
91 
100 
90 
102 
97 
52 
52 
58 
35 
75 
68 
-
89 
1 Total is sum of 11 Member States given above in table. 
2 EUR-12 is total given in Eurostat VISA database. 
3 Data are included, where available, for NACE codes 221-495 with the exception of the following for reasons of their 
dissimilarity from other manufacturing industries: 231, 232, 319, 348, 352, 365, 435. 
This table shows that generally there was recession in the first period and recovery in the 
second. Strongest growth occurred in Germany and Denmark, which is something that will be 
reiterated later in the chapter. The Greek figures are not considered to be very reliable (and 
this is confirmed by later employment data). 
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Table 3.6. Real GVA per enterprise by Member State (MECU, 1981 prices) and 
initial disadvantage in 1986 
Country 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Portugal 
Greece 
1981 
4.94 
3.72 
3.51 
2.35 
0.26 
3.32 
3.08 
2.22 
n/a 
0.79 
1986 
6.35 
3.24 
3.19 
1.75 
0.19 
4.01 
3.35 
2.53 
n/a 
n/a 
1991 
6.91 
3 .17 
2.80 
1.50 
0.22 
3.97 
n/a 
3.18 
0.16 
0.16 
% change 
1981-86 
28.5 
-12.9 
-9.2 
-25.4 
-25.5 
21.0 
8.6 
13.8 
-
-
% change 
1986-91 
8.8 
-2.2 
-12.2 
-14.3 
15.4 
-1.1 
-
25.5 
-
-
Initial 
disadvantage 
0.53 
0.30 
0.30 
0.26 
n/a 
0.46 
0.59 
0.63 
n/a 
n/a 
No. of 
inds' 
91 
100 
90 
102 
97 
52 
64 
58 
75 
68 
' Data are included, where available, for NACE codes 221-495 with the exception of the following for reasons of their 
dissimilarity from other manufacturing industries: 231, 232, 319, 348, 352, 365, 435. 
Focusing on 1986, Germany has by far the largest size enterprises, followed by the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, and the UK; Denmark has slightly smaller enterprises and Italy 
significantly smaller. (The figures for Spain are so small due to the fact that enterprises with 
less than 20 employees are included.) Portugal and Greece seem much smaller, but the 
reliability of these data is questionable. These averages, however, may say little about 
attainment of economies of scale, because different countries have different industrial 
structures. 
Initial disadvantage expresses unweighted average size (measured in turnover) relative to our 
engineering estimates of MES. Thus, a low figure suggests a large gap between attained size 
and potential EOS, while a number approaching one would suggest that fewer unutilized 
economies of scale remain. An initial disadvantage equal to 1 would not mean exactly all 
economies of scale have been attained since firstly, within an industry, size distribution means 
that even if initial disadvantage were equal to 1, some firms would be smaller than MES and 
some larger; and secondly, initial disadvantage is an average across all industries, so if it 
equals 1, it is likely that some industries will have an average in excess and some below. So 
the interpretation is really just a general indication. Most strikingly, this completely reverses 
the position of Denmark. This is because Denmark specializes in industries which have 
relatively low MES. Now, Denmark, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have least scale 
disadvantage, followed by France, the UK and Italy some way behind. Finally, note how there 
is no clear pattern in average size growth between the two periods when averaged across 
whole Member States. 
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Table 3.7. Total real GVA 
Type 
1 
2A 
2R 
2AR 
1981 
209,177 
37.391 
162,601 
64.034 
by type of industry 
1986 
177,566 
32,034 
166.774 
61.889 
1991 
187,366 
33.653 
165,596 
66,952 
% change 
1981-86 
-15.1 
-14.3 
2.6 
-3.4 
Economies of scale 
% change 
1986-91 
5.5 
5.1 
-0.7 
8.2 
Looking at total real gross value added by type of industry (Table 3.7), Type 1 industries still 
contribute most to gross value added, but are closely followed by 2R. Type 2AR have a few 
large industries and 2A have a larger number of relatively small industries. Types 2R and 2AR 
have been most resistant to recession, while Types 1 and 2A have moved in line. 
Table 3.8. Average real GVA by type of industry 
Type 
1 
2A 
2R 
2AR 
1981 
0.99 
1.62 
4.85 
6.45 
1986 
0.97 
1.64 
5.25 
6.65 
1991 
1.03 
1.84 
5.04 
7.45 
% change 
1981-86 
-2.5 
1.6 
8.2 
3.1 
% change 
1986-91 
6.6 
12.4 
-4.0 
12.0 
Initial disadvantage 
0.72 
0.37 
0.17 
0.16 
The typical size of firms is very much larger in Type 2R and especially Type 2AR, but these 
industries also have the greatest potential for economies of scale as revealed by the initial 
disadvantage ratios. Type 1 industries have the smallest average size, but the greatest 
achievement of MES (note: this sector includes some woodworking and metal treatment 
industries with very low MES). Note that this arrangement of the data is not independent of 
the Member State distribution; e.g. Germany is relatively strong in Type 2R industries, so one 
reason why German firms are larger is because of the industries in which they are engaged. 
Also, the smaller Member States tend to be disproportionately represented in 2A. This is 
another reason why the econometric approach of the next chapter is necessary. A more 
interesting pattern of growth of average size emerges when looking at industry type, which 
shows recent growth in average size in advertising intensive industries and very little growth 
in Type 2R industries. 
3.3.2. Employment 
The following table shows average employment for all industries in each of the three years as 
well as the average employment for each quadrant. There were slight reductions in average 
employment in the two periods (4.9% in the first and 2.8% in the second), but these were 
found to be not statistically significant changes. The figure shows that firms in quadrant A 
(firms most sensitive to the single market and possessing the highest potential to exploit 
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economies of scale) experienced the greatest declines in average employment (16.7% in the 
first period, 23.5% in the second). 
Table 3.9. Changes in average employment per enterprise 
Employment 
per enterprise 
Quadrant 
A 
Β 
C 
D 
Other 
Total 
1981 
324 
255 
86 
127 
47 
81 
1986 
270 
232 
91 
117 
46 
77 
1991 
206 
216 
92 
110 
48 
75 
% change 
1981-86 
-16.7 
-9.1 
5.0 
-7.7 
-2.7 
-4.9 
% change 
1986-91 
-23.5 
-6.9 
1.6 
-5.8 
3.2 
-2.8 
The employment figures are more complete and less vulnerable to price indexation and 
disequilibrium problems (although for reasons discussed above, real GVA is still considered to 
be the preferred method of analysing changes in firm size) than GVA figures. Changes in 
employment over the two periods largely reflect productivity changes. 
If we accept the view that the SM has not yet led to important economies of scale at the 
enterprise level (Eurostat definition) in the sense of altering the typical production frontier, or 
lowering the typical average cost curve, it seems very likely that the SM has stimulated more 
firms to move towards their production frontiers as a result of increased competitive pressure, 
as explained in the literature survey. The evidence for this important development emerges 
from Tables 3.4 and 3.9, which show that the decreases in employment exceeded the decreases 
in output per enterprise. 
Hence, there were increases in labour productivity, which is a standard measure of economic 
performance. For example, the SM-sensitive industries in quadrant A increased their average 
labour productivity by over 14% during the period 1986-91, compared with an increase of 
6.6% during 1981-86. This may be compared with the increase in average labour productivity 
for all industries of 10% during 1981-86 and of 7.5% during 1986-91. Clearly, the SM-
sensitive industries in quadrant A have improved their relative economic performance. 
42 Economies of scale 
Table 3.10. Total employment by Member State and total EU 
Country 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Greece 
Total1 
EUR-122 
1981 
6,996,694 
4,554,437 
4,577,579 
3,444,605 
2,391,430 
359,766 
478,161 
215,010 
104,830 
578,231 
313,752 
24,014,495 
23,779,928 
1986 
6,694,657 
3,964.274 
3,936,891 
3,008,276 
1,950,277 
501,060 
495,896 
291,244 
94,594 
516,406 
284,848 
21,738,373 
21,155,099 
1991 
7,152,675 
3.776.948 
3,701.779 
3.034,522 
2.062,849 
549,109 
489,055 
267,770 
102,858 
554,356 
259,233 
21,951,154 
21,432,564 
% change 
1981-86 
-4.3 
-13.0 
-14.0 
12.7 
-18.4 
39.3 
3.7 
35.5 
-9.8 
-10.7 
-9.2 
-9.5 
-11.0 
% change 
1986-91 
6.8 
-4.7 
-6.0 
0.9 
5.8 
9.6 
-1.4 
-8.1 
8.7 
7.3 
-9.0 
1.0 
1.3 
No. of inds3 
91 
99 
90 
102 
97 
56 
66 
60 
35 
68 
76 
-
89 
1 Total is sum of 11 Member States given above in table. 
2 EUR-12 is total given in Eurostat VISA database. 
3 Data are included, where available, for NACE codes 221-495 with the exception of the following for reasons of 
dissimilarity from other manufacturing industries: 231, 232, 319, 348, 352, 365, 435. 
For example, the German figures show very strong productivity growth. In terms of relative 
Member States, the employment figures largely match the real gross value added figures. 
However, Portugal and Greece look much closer in size as measured by employment to the 
others; the difference reflects the massive productivity gap between these two countries and 
the rest of the EU. It is not really possible to attribute this gap to scale versus technical 
efficiency. (Note that Spain is unique in including firms of size less than 20 employees.) 
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Table 3.11. Employment per enterprise by Member State 
Country 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Greece 
1981 
225 
166 
186 
131 
16 
136 
128 
107 
110 
52 
84 
1986 
221 
149 
162 
102 
14 
117 
126 
121 
103 
54 
n/a 
1991 
215 
135 
146 
93 
15 
110 
n/a 
116 
n/a 
93 
79 
% change 
1981-86 
-1.9 
-10.2 
-12.9 
-22.2 
-8.1 
-14.0 
-1.5 
12.6 
-7.0 
5.0 
-
% change 
1986-91 
-3.0 
-9.3 
-10.3 
-8.9 
4.9 
-6.0 
-
-3.8 
-
71.6 
-
No. of inds' 
91 
99 
90 
102 
97 
56 
66 
60 
35 
68 
76 
' Data are included, where available, for NACE codes 221-495 with the exception of the following for reasons of their 
dissimilarity from other manufacturing industries: 231, 232, 319, 348, 352, 365, 435. 
Table 3.12. Total employment by type of industry 
Type 
1 
2A 
2R 
2AR 
1981 
12.335.006 
1,528.664 
6.967,466 
2,948,792 
1986 
10,579,312 
1.315,101 
6,589,724 
2.670,962 
1991 
10.751.978 
1,342.419 
6.665,009 
2.673,158 
% change 
1981-86 
-14.2 
-14.0 
-5.4 
-9.4 
% change 
1986-91 
1.6 
2.1 
1.1 
0.1 
Type 1 industries now look very much larger than Type 2R as measured by employment. This 
shows the substantial productivity gap between traditional and technically progressive industries. 
Table 3.13. Average employment by type of industry 
Type 
1 
2A 
2R 
2AR 
1981 
56 
64 
204 
279 
1986 
52 
62 
191 
258 
1991 
52 
65 
178 
260 
% change 
1981-86 
-7.1 
-2.7 
-6.5 
-7.7 
% change 
1986-91 
0.0 
3.5 
-6.4 
1.1 
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The ranking of industry types by size is the same as by gross value added. Looking at the 
difference between gross value added growth in Table 3.8 and employment growth, we get 
productivity growth. This increased in the second period for Types 1 and 2A, consistent with 
either a recovery from recession or an SM effect. A different pattern emerges in R&D 
industries. Type 2R were still in recession in the later period, and this is indicated in low 
productivity growth (especially compared with the earlier period). Overall, though, these 
industries had stronger productivity growth. These industries have more global competition, 
which may be the most important influence on efficiency in R&D industries. 
In order to get a better understanding of these descriptive statistics, we need to attempt to 
isolate the different factors that affect the attainment of scale. 
3.4. Intra-EU trade 
An important step in achieving this aim is to place the firm size data in the context of the 
pattern of intra-EU trade. The source of intra-EU trade data is Eurostat's VISA database once 
again. Certain sectors are excluded from the analysis due to poor availability (such as 
jewellery and miscellaneous manufacturing). 
3.4.1. Openness 
Openness is measured by exports plus imports over production (turnover). As expected, 
smaller countries are more open, i.e. they have a higher trade intensity, although the 
relationship is not precise (the UK looks slightly low, probably due to greater trade with non-
EU partners, and the Netherlands is very high). There appears to be continuing growth in 
openness in all Member States and in both periods. 
Table 3.14. Openness by Member State 
Country 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Ireland 
EUR-7 
EUR-12 
1981 
0.28 
0.30 
0.21 
0.32 
0.63 
0.50 
0.55 
0.29 
0.34 
1986 
0.31 
0.35 
0.28 
0.35 
0.73 
0.50 
0.62 
0.34 
0.40 
1991 
0.34 
0.45 
0.33 
0.37 
0.82 
0.56 
0.67 
0.39 
0.45 
% change 
1981-86 
13.8 
15.7 
34.6 
9.9 
15.6 
0.3 
12.1 
16.4 
18.6 
% change 
1986-91 
9.1 
27.5 
18.7 
5.4 
11.3 
11.7 
7.8 
14.2 
13.3 
No. of inds1 
84 
91 
82 
91 
19 
48 
33 
-
83 
' Data are included, where available, for NACE codes 221-495 with the exception of the following for reasons of their 
dissimilarity from other manufacturing industries: 231, 232, 319, 348, 352, 365, 435. 
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Table 3.15. 
Type 
1 
2Λ 
2R 
2AR 
Openness by type 
1981 
0.30 
0.20 
0.42 
0.37 
of industry 
1986 
0.35 
0.23 
0.48 
0.45 
1991 
0.39 
0.26 
0.55 
0.52 
% change 
1981-86 
19.3 
17.6 
14.1 
22.1 
% change 
1986-91 
9.4 
12.2 
16.0 
14.1 
R&D intensive industries are by far the most open, and Type 2A are the least open. There does not 
appear to be any particular pattern of differential growth across sectors. 
3.4.2. Comparative advantage and specialization 
Comparative advantage is measured by exports minus imports over production (turnover). It is not 
really comparative advantage/?ÉT se, which would express this relative to the overall trade balance, 
but captures the main idea of intra-EU competitive success in each industry in each Member State. 
If we look at the weighted averages, this simply reflects the manufacturing balance of trade relative 
to production, which in 1986 was +16% in the Netherlands and +12% in Ireland; and in other 
Member States ranged from +5% in Germany to -5% in France. Apart from Ireland's rise, there are 
no clear trends. By industry, of course, intra-EU trade is in balance (due to measurement errors, in 
fact it is a very small negative number). 
A more revealing presentation of the data is in the standard deviation across industries (Table 3.16) 
where comparative advantage = standard deviation of [(total exports - total imports)/turnover]. A 
high standard deviation would reflect greater specialization amongst countries, and a low standard 
deviation would mean similar trade balances across industries and little specialization. 
Table 3.16. Comparative advantage by Member State 
Country 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Ireland 
EUR-7 
EUR-12 
1981 
0.13 
0.14 
0.11 
0.26 
0.28 
0.65 
0.38 
0.30 
0.03 
1986 
0.14 
0.15 
0.14 
0.30 
0.24 
0.64 
0.52 
0.33 
0.02 
1991 
0.17 
0.18 
0.12 
0.21 
0.23 
0.64 
1.02 
0.39 
0.03 
% change 
1981-86 
12.3 
7.9 
35.3 
16.4 
-13.8 
-0.8 
38.0 
11.7 
-38.8 
% change 
1986-91 
15.8 
24.2 
-15.0 
-30.0 
-4.5 
-0.7 
96.8 
19.3 
47.0 
No. of inds1 
84 
91 
82 
91 
19 
48 
33 
-
83 
1 Data are included, where available, for NACE codes 221-495 with the exception of the following for reasons of their 
dissimilarity from other manufacturing industries: 231, 232, 319, 348, 352, 365, 435. 
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There is a clear pattern of smaller countries being more specialized (although the UK seems 
somewhat out of line). There is no clear pattern over time except a steady increase in 
specialization in Germany and France, and a dramatic increase in Ireland. 
However, a much clearer pattern emerges when we look at industry types. Standardizing for 
these industry types shows a small, but consistent pattern: a small reduction in specialization 
in the first period was reversed in the second. 
Table 3.17. Comparative advantage by type of industry 
Type 
1 
2A 
2R 
2AR 
1981 
0.04 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
1986 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
1991 
0.02 
0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
% change 
1981-86 
-47.0 
-21.0 
-13.9 
-5.1 
% change 
1986-91 
11.4 
149.2 
111.6 
37.4 
The descriptive statistics are informative to a certain extent. To clarify their interpretation, 
however, we must now turn to a properly specified econometric model in Chapter 4. 
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4. Assessment of the influence of the single market 
In this chapter, we attempt an assessment of the influence of the single market on the 
attainment of economies of scale. Following on from the previous chapter, we begin by 
investigating the average size of business unit based on Eurostat data. However, we also take 
the analysis further, to consider how EU industrial concentration has changed. This is for two 
reasons. First, we have been able to collect slightly more up-to-date information on 
concentration; and second, the relationship between changes in the business unit size and in 
EU concentration reveals some important information on business strategies following the 
Single European Act. 
The analysis of average size requires a two-stage methodology. In the first stage, we develop a 
model of what determined average firm size in 1986, that is, in a period prior to the single 
market programme. This provides a background that quantifies the relative importance of 
influences on size, such as minimum efficient scale, market size, public procurement and 
openness to trade. Then, in the second stage, we assess how changes in these factors, some due 
to the single market and others not, have worked to change firm size in the period 1986-91. 
The latter period is really much too short to properly evaluate the impact, but we have been 
constrained by the availability of data. Our theoretical model of firm size is developed in 
Section 4.1. The emphasis is on how various distortions to open competition act to restrict 
size; how the theory of firm size changes qualitatively once the competitive mechanism 
includes endogenous fixed costs (as in Type 2 industries); and how the single market is 
expected to affect the size of firms. Section 4.2 presents and discusses the econometric 
evidence. 
There is a direct identity relationship between average firm size, market size, national and EU 
concentration, intra-EU multinationality, and intra-EU specialization by Member State. This 
means that if we can measure what has been happening to some of these variables (e.g. size 
and concentration), we can imply what has been happening to others (e.g. multinationality and 
international specialization). We formalize this idea as a statistical decomposition, and apply it 
in our commentary on recent trends in concentration. Our analysis of concentration includes 
1993 as the most recent year for which data are available. When we say 'available' we should 
stress that these are not published data, but figures we have had to construct from first 
principles for this project. The methodology is given in detail in Davies and Lyons [1996], as 
is the 1987 base year data. In Section 4.3, we present our decomposition analysis and analysis 
of recent trends in concentration. Once again, we pay particular attention to how the 
relationship differs according to the type of competitive mechanism typical of the industry. 
Section 4.4 concludes the assessment. 
4.1. Firm size, scale economies and trading costs: theory 
The mechanisms by which the creation of a fully integrated single market influences the 
achievement of economies of scale depend crucially on the technologies and competitive 
strategies adopted by firms. If product designs and technologies are stable, and in particular if 
they are not themselves affected by market size, then the core mechanism will be in 
production economies of scale. This is discussed in Section 4.1.1. Such economies are mainly 
achievable at the level of business units, particularly if production takes place at a single 
location. However, if firms compete by investing in R&D in order to develop better quality 
48 Economies of scale 
products, then the most relevant economies of scale will arise in the R&D process. An 
important feature of such economies is that as long as a little more R&D effort results in a 
little better quality, then it is only the size of the market that limits R&D spending. Advertising 
competition has similar characteristics. The consequences of this process are discussed in 
Section 4.1.2. Unlike with production economies, R&D and advertising incentives operate at 
the aggregate firm level, and so are likely to be shown in industrial concentration as well as in 
disaggregated business units. 
4.1.1. Production economies 
It is tempting, but misleadingly inaccurate, to characterize the single market simply as an 
expansion of market size, as firms shift their horizons from national to EU markets. This is 
inaccurate because most industries in the mid-1980s already operated to an extent at the 
international level. The single market effect of reducing or eliminating remaining non-tariff 
barriers must, therefore, be seen for most firms in the context of a marginal/quantitative 
change rather than a discrete/qualitative change in market size. This does not necessarily imply 
that the consequences must be small, but it does mean that estimation of the impact needs 
careful consideration. In Section 4.2.1, we estimate an econometric model of average business 
unit size by industry and Member State. In order to specify that model, we must first ask two 
questions: what factors determine the average size of business? and how might a reduction in 
trade barriers affect that relationship? 
We begin by considering the first question in the context of a hypothetical case, in which there 
is no room for imperfections of the kind that the single market is intended to redress. In a 
perfectly competitive world, with no homogeneous products and inefficiency, so all firms face 
the same U-shaped average cost curves, firm size is determined entirely by the output 
associated with the minimum point of the cost curve. Technological economies of scale are all 
that matters, and market size makes no difference. 
Next, add some realism by allowing firms to differentiate their products. With horizontal 
product differentiation, and monopolistic competition, firms would produce at less than the 
minimum point on the cost curve, but there is little we can say about how market size will 
affect the attainment of scale economies. This is because the balance of higher output per firm 
and new entry depends on consumer attitude to more product variety versus lower prices. 
Nevertheless, Krugman [1979] has argued that at least some of the effect of an increase in 
market size is likely to manifest itself in higher output per firm. 
There is little empirical support for the long-run diseconomies of scale, so next suppose that 
cost curves are L-shaped. Then, any firm size greater than or equal to the minimum efficient 
size (MES) may be observed. The average size of such firms is still likely to be positively 
associated with MES, but larger markets allow for greater growth above that size. In such 
markets, we may expect average firm size to be positively associated with both MES and 
market size: Xjk = f(MESj, market size,). In terms of practical measurement and following our 
discussion in Chapter 3, χ is the mean size (value added) of business units in industry j and 
Member State k. The source for MES is Davies and Lyons [1996], where earlier work by 
Pratten on the collation of engineering estimates is applied and extended consistently across 
the NACE industrial classification for all manufacturing sectors. Market size is total 
production within the EU by NACE industry (source: Eurostat). Thus, we start from a 
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hypothetical, integrated market, where national boundaries within the EU do not affect the size 
of business units. 
With this background case in mind, we can consider how market imperfections, especially 
those associated with trade between different Member States, affect average firm size and the 
achievement of production economies of scale. In the extreme case of prohibitive non-tariff 
barriers between Member States, the appropriate measure of market size would be national, 
not the EU level. Away from this polar case, the relative importance of the size of the EU and 
national markets depends on the heights of such barriers. Put slightly differently, trade barriers 
reduce the effective size at the EU market; and their removal increases it towards the EU level. 
Because of multicollinearity problems, when EU and national size are both included alongside 
national dummy variables, we build on the latter interpretation when building our econometric 
model. 
A necessary condition for a single market effect is that competition is initially not sufficiently 
strong to eliminate inefficiency. Thus, there are firms that can survive even though they are of 
less than MES (or otherwise not minimizing costs). In this context, the Emerson report 
suggests three mechanisms through which the single market was expected to reduce 
inefficiency in production. We consider each in turn, and draw out the implications for 
average firm size. 
First, the removal of border controls reduces the fixed cost of exporting, and so allows the 
growth of smaller firms which had previously been restricted to sell within national borders 
(see Figure 4.1). Even if some such growth is at the expense of larger firms, there will be a 
small net addition to total industry supply, and so average firm output and the achievement of 
production economies of scale should rise, albeit by a very small amount. 
There is one theoretical reservation to this proposition, and two important measurement issues. 
The theoretical reservation is that the greater profitability of small firms may attract new entry, 
and the net effect could then be to reduce average size. It is then possible that the achievement 
of scale economies would not be enhanced by reducing fixed export costs. Turning to 
measurement, if we only observe firms of, say, greater than 20 employees, and the single 
market allows very small firms to grow through this threshold, then it may appear as if we are 
observing an entry effect, even though truly there is growth and greater achievement of scale 
economies. Finally, if we do not have industry-specific price deflators, and can only adjust for 
general inflation, then value measures may be misleading measures of size. For example, if the 
industry elasticity of demand is unity, average size (by value) will depend only on firm 
numbers, and output growth caused by lower prices will be missed. Only if industry demand is 
elastic will real output be positively correlated with the value of output. Although these 
problems need not invalidate an analysis of measured average firm size, it is important that 
they are borne in mind in what follows. 
A second mechanism by which the single market was expected to reduce the operation of 
firms at inefficiently small scale was by expansion of demand (see Figure 4.2). This could be 
brought about in several ways: even with the same number of firms in the EU, the reduction in 
marginal trading costs could enhance competition and increase industry output; greater 
competition could also eliminate some suppliers leaving survivors with greater market shares; 
and both effects could be reinforced if, as firms move down their cost curves, they become 
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more competitive in extra-EU markets. The measurement problems described in the previous 
paragraph remain valid. 
A third mechanism applies if firms are initially not efficient in production, even given their 
output level, i.e. if they are not on the minimum attainable cost curve (see Figure 4.3). Then a 
competitive 'cold shower' effect will force the least efficient firms to either reduce costs or 
exit from the market. In terms of Figure 4.3, firms finding themselves with costs above the 
new price line cannot survive for long without improving their efficiency. In the presence of 
economies of scale, the room for a firm to respond by reducing costs (without changing 
output) will be more restricted if that firm is small. Inasmuch as this means that relatively 
more small firms must leave the market, we should observe an increase in the average size of 
business units. (In the figure, three of the four smallest firms need to adjust, and the smallest 
cannot do so without gaining market share; only half the larger firms are forced to reduce costs 
or exit.) 
Having established the main mechanisms through which the single market (and its absence) 
affects firm size, we can move towards specifying an empirical model that allows for the 
effects to differ across industries. Some barriers to trade, such as border controls, will have 
affected all industries, while other barriers, such as public procurement bias, will have affected 
different industries to very different degrees. In our empirical work, we employ four industry-
specific measures designed to capture different industry-specific aspects of intra-EU trade 
barriers. These will be used to establish the extent to which trade barriers differentially 
distorted the relationship between firm size, technology and EU market size in the mid-1980s 
(i.e. pre-single market). This will then enable us to quantify the industry-specific effects of the 
single market programme as these barriers are removed. 
The first is a dummy variable, PUB, which equals 1 if the industry was considered to be 
heavily influenced by public procurement [European Commission, 1990]; and the second is a 
dummy variable, REG, which equals 1 if the industry was heavily influenced by national 
regulations [same source]. These are intended to capture the distortions created by public 
procurement bias and by a profusion of national regulations and technical standards - arguably 
the two most important types of barrier tackled by the SM programme. We defer our detailed 
discussion of how these affect the achievement of production economies of scale, but note two 
important points. First, different Member States have traditionally adopted different attitudes 
to public procurement and regulation, so we can expect a range of effects depending on the 
degree of national dirigisme. Second, the same governments often adopt different attitudes to 
different industries; for example, trying to create a national champion in one industry, while 
attempting even-handed support for all national firms in another. In the next section, we 
develop a partition of industry types that helps to explain and predict such differences. 
The remaining two industry-specific variables, designed to pick up on pre-single market 
distortions, are based on measures of intra-EU import penetration and the intra-EU export 
propensity, both measured at the Member State level [source: Eurostat]. There are two 
separate effects that are picked up by such measures. The first we call the openness effect: 
high intra-EU trade, either imports or exports, suggests that the national market is already 
integrated into the EU production structure. Put the other way round, the absence of trade may 
result in firms in a Member State being unable to achieve sufficient size to fully exploit 
economies of scale. We call the second effect comparative advantage: high intra-EU exports 
accompanied by low intra-EU imports suggests that a Member State has a comparative 
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advantage in that industry, and that an integrated market is exploiting the advantages of 
international specialization. Some care is needed in interpreting this effect, as it might be the 
case that the existing achievement of scale economies actually creates a comparative 
advantage, rather than vice versa. We measure openness by the sum of import penetration and 
the export propensity, and the comparative advantage effect by the difference between export 
propensity and import penetration. 
Overall, we suggest the following model for explaining the average size of business units prior 
to the advent of the single market : 
Xjk- f(MESj, market sizej, PUBjk, REGjk, opennessjk, comparative advantagejk) (1) 
Having established the initial impact of intra-EU trade barriers on the size of business units, 
we would expect two types of effect on firm size as firms respond to reduced or eliminated 
barriers to trade. First, a general response to greater competition should affect all industries 
(e.g. the removal of border controls). Nevertheless, we would expect even pervasive effects to 
have a greater effect on unit size where average size has been low in relation to economies of 
scale. This initial disadvantage is measured as the average size of business unit relative to 
MES. Note that if all firms were the same size, we would only expect an effect where the 
initial size was less than MES. However, given that there is a distribution of unit sizes, the 
particular equality of average size and MES has no practical significance; and as long as there 
are any units below MES, some effect should be observable. 
Second, we expect to see stronger effects in those industries which were previously most 
affected by the barriers to trade. In terms of public procurement bias and regulated industries, 
since we have no measure of differential implementation of single market measures, we can 
only pick up a general effect of PUB and REG due to higher initial government-induced 
distortions. For our trade-based measures, however, we do have more direct measures of 
changes over time. Thus, our model of changes in average unit size between pre- and post-
single market measures is: 
Axjk = g(initial disadvantagejk, Amarket sizej, PUBj, REG,, Aopennessjk, Acomp. advantagejk) 
(2) 
The Δ refers to a change between two time periods, which are specified in Section 4.2. As 
stated before, a fuller discussion of the industry-specific effects must await the next section. 
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Figure 4.1. Effects of SM measures: removal of border controls 
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4.1.2. Endogenous fixed costs 
Firm size is the result not only of the interaction of demand conditions and production costs, 
but also of the type of competition engaged in by the industry. The effects of increased price 
competition as a result of the single market have been discussed in the previous section. Here 
we focus on how competition in R&D and marketing can affect these outcomes. The crucial 
difference introduced by competition in R&D and advertising is that these are essentially 
endogenous overhead costs; and furthermore, the firm which spends most can usually attract a 
disproportionate market share. For example, the firm which spends most on R&D can 
generally produce a higher quality product, often without any significant increase in marginal 
production costs. Advertising campaigns can have a similar effect on the perceived quality of 
the product. As stated earlier, we call industries competing in: advertising, Type 2A; R&D, 
Type 2R; both, Type 2AR; and neither, Type 1. As Sutton [1991] shows, the Type 1/Type 2 
distinction can have a dramatic effect on the market shares of leading firms. This raises two 
distinct issues in the context of the present study. First, how does this impact on the 
achievement of production economies of scale in the single market? Second, what impact has 
the single market had on the achievement of economies of scale in R&D and advertising? In 
this section, we concentrate on the first question. 
Although endogenous fixed-cost competition typically operates at the broader firm level, 
rather than at the level of an individual production unit, any competitive mechanism that 
increases the size of a firm enhances its ability to achieve production scale economies. An 
important aspect of Type 2 competition is that the larger the market, the greater the incentive 
to invest in R&D and advertising. Thus, in contrast to the hypothetical, classic, competitive, 
Type 1 market discussed in the previous section, where firm size depended only on economies 
of scale and exogenous demand conditions, in a classic Type 2 industry, a larger market will 
result in larger firms as a direct result of the competitive escalation of fixed costs. The role of 
production economies of scale in determining firm size is much reduced. Thus, we expect a 
stronger effect of market size on firm size, and given L-shaped cost curves, this will probably 
translate into bigger business units. In terms of equation (1), we expect industry size to have a 
greater effect in Type 2 industries, and MES is likely to have a reduced influence. 
How will Type 2 industries differ from Type 1 in the relationship between barriers to trade and 
firm size? This depends on the type of barrier. For example, the aims of government 
intervention will be quite different. Public procurement bias is likely to be aimed at creating 
national champions in Type 2 industries, since distributing largesse across a large number of 
firms will be much less effective in encouraging innovation and exports. However, in Type 1 
industries, procurement bias can be used to support a wide range of domestic producers 
without such a loss of R&D incentives due to fragmenting sales. 
The effects of national regulations are less clear. They deter foreign entry, which means there 
may be more room in the domestic market in which to expand; but they also deter exports. 
Inasmuch as Type 2 industries are more concentrated, this may allow leading firms to 
influence national regulations to their own benefit, allowing larger scale production by 
deterring domestic entry. 
Moving away from government intervention, and to the firm's direct point of view, trade and 
trade barriers affect firm size differently in different types of industry. There are strong 
incentives to spread R&D overheads over as wide a market as possible. Thus, these industries 
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tend to have been operating at the EU or even global level for some years, although some Type 
2R industries were still not fully integrated by trade as of 1987 [see Davies and Lyons, 1996]. 
There is also a high incidence of firms that are multinational within the EU, which means that 
individual firms are able to produce in locations with the strongest comparative advantage. To 
an extent, these Type 2 effects also apply to Type 2A and 2AR industries, although there are 
some important modifications. Although marketing expertise can be usefully applied 
internationally, the economies of international scope are much reduced by differences in 
language, media and culture across Member States. Evidence of the value of international 
marketing is found in the fact that Type 2A industries (like Type 2R) are among the most 
multinational in the operation of firms within the EU, though these industries (unlike Type 
2R) tend also to engage in relatively much less international trade [see Davies and Lyons, 
1996]. Thus, we expect to observe a quite different relation between firm size and trade in the 
different types of industry. 
Overall, the pervasive influence of different types of competition suggests that any analysis of 
economies of scale should be carried out separately for different industry types. This is the 
way we proceed in the following section. 
4.2. Econometric evidence on average business unit size 
This section provides an econometric analysis of Eurostat data on the average size of business 
unit disaggregated by industry and Member State. These data have already been described in 
Chapter 3 of this report. Data on industry size and intra-EU trade were also provided by 
Eurostat, and the remaining data come from the UEA/SPES database of 100 manufacturing 
industries. All data are at the three-digit NACE level. Although Eurostat attempts to collect 
data separately for all 12 Member States and for all industries, so that hypothetically there 
could be 1,200 observations of average size in each year, in practice there are many gaps. This 
is partly because many countries do not collect the appropriate data, and partly due to 
confidentiality when small numbers are involved (e.g. Spain does not provide sales data, and 
there are very few industries covered by Luxembourg). Also, no historical data are available 
for the most recent members who joined in 1996. 
The data availability problem particularly affects those Member States which joined in the 
1980s (Greece, 1981; Spain and Portugal, 1986). In fact, there is respectable industry coverage 
for just six Member States, including the big four (Germany, France, Italy, the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark). These are the countries on which we focus, and taking account of 
confidentiality and other data availability problems, this leaves us with just 426 observations 
of average business unit size and the associated variables described in Section 4.1.1. 
The functional form used for estimation was guided by the strong positive skew in the 
distribution of variables measured as levels, so logarithmic transformations were made to 
mean size, EU size and MES. Growth in mean size, growth in EU size and the initial 
disadvantage were each measured as the difference in the logs, and the changes in trade ratios 
are simple differences. Since MES is measured in terms of sales (not value added), the initial 
disadvantage is measured as the difference between MES and mean size measured by sales. 
Given the institutional differences between Member States, separate public procurement and 
regulated industry dummies were estimated for each country. 
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Finally, we included simple dummy variables for each country to pick up more general 
country effects, perhaps reflecting the way national business unit sizes are related to the size of 
the home market. Since the regressions are estimated with a constant, one country dummy has 
to be excluded (to avoid perfect multicollinearity). Germany is the excluded country, so the 
coefficients on the remaining country dummies should be interpreted as measuring the typical 
difference in mean size of business unit, as compared with Germany, and having taken into 
account the other variables in the regression. All variables were then entered linearly into 
equations (1) and (2). Tables 4.1 to 4.4 present the results of estimating these equations 
separately for each industry type. The public procurement industries are all to be found in 
Type 1 and Type 2R sectors, while regulated industries are often associated with consumer 
protection and are concentrated in the Type 2A and Type 2AR sectors. 
Equation (1) is estimated using 1986 data, as the starting point highlighting sources of 
production inefficiency before the single European Act was implemented; we refer to this as 
the levels regression. Equation (2), which we call the changes regression, is estimated for 
changes between 1986 and 1991. The latter date is the last for which Eurostat data were 
available. Thus, the period is dictated entirely by data availability. This is very unsatisfactory, 
not least because the implementation of the single market programme was not due to be 
completed before 31 December 1992, and some measures were still not implemented then (or 
even as late as 1996!). Thus, the changes equation can give little more than a glimpse at the 
effects of the single market programme, picking up only the immediate effects of the first 
measures to be implemented, and the effects of firms with foresight anticipating later 
measures. 
Table 4.1 presents the results for Type 1 industries. First, consider the levels regression. Far 
and away the most significant variable is MES, which gives an elasticity of firm size with 
respect to MES of one third (given a degree of product differentiation, we should probably 
expect to observe an elasticity less than unity). It is striking to observe that there is no effect of 
the size of the EU market on mean unit size. Thus, in the long run in Type 1 industries, firm 
size is determined by economies of scale, not market size. Our measures of trade openness and 
comparative advantage have no effect on mean size, but public procurement does. In all 
countries, this bias tends to create too many small firms (compared with the general 
relationship between average size and economies of scale), but the effect is quantitatively 
strongest in France and the Netherlands, followed by Denmark. Finally, all countries have a 
significantly smaller average size compared with Germany, but there is no systematic 
relationship between the size of this effect and the size of the home market. Italy has by far the 
smallest size firms, and although Denmark has the next smallest, Dutch firms are of similar 
size to those in France and the UK (once all other factors in the regression model have been 
taken into account). 
Turning to the changes between 1986-91, although there is a suggestion that EU growth feeds 
through initially into larger firms (in the long run, entry and exit should re-establish the 
relationship found in the levels regression), there is no evidence of any early single market 
effect. Industries with a larger initial disadvantage are not increasing in unit size any more than 
any others, there is still no trade effect (even though intra-EU trade penetration was rising on 
average), and nor is mean size being made up any faster in public procurement industries. The 
only systematic effect is that most countries, but particularly Italy and the UK, are falling even 
further behind Germany in terms of relative size of unit. As will be seen, the case of Italy's 
low and decreasing relative size of business units is quite pervasive. 
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As expected, Table 4.2 shows that in Type 2A industries, there is a quantitatively smaller 
relationship between mean size and MES, and now a positive relationship with EU size 
emerges. In fact, the effect of market size is three times as large as that of MES. This reflects 
the fact that advertising spending is higher in larger markets and this enables firms to increase 
output per business unit. This appears to be an effective way of increasing size in these 
industries (and contrasts with price-cutting, or whatever other way firms can try to expand 
demand for their products in Type 1 industries). There is only very slight evidence that 
comparative advantage allows positive trade balance locations to achieve greater scale, but as 
we have already stated, integration in Type 2A industries tends to come through multinational 
firms producing internationally, rather than through international trade. The effect of 
regulation is much weaker than was public procurement in Type 1 industries. However, it is 
interesting to note that the predominant effect is now to raise mean size. Presumably, this 
reflects either the deliberate creation of national champions, or (more likely in these 
industries) the effective lobbying by market leaders to skew regulation to their own protection. 
The exception of the (insignificant) negative effect in Germany may be partly due to the way 
the beer industry was regulated there, with the opposite effect of protecting numerous small 
brewers. Finally, only Italy and France have significantly smaller average sizes than Germany; 
and this reflects the strong relative size of Type 2A industries in the UK, Netherlands and 
Denmark [see Davies and Lyons, 1996]. 
Turning to the changes regression for Type 2A, EU growth again shows through as enhancing 
mean size (the short-run effect revealed by the growth coefficient is stronger than in the long 
run). Changes in trade openness are weakly, but negatively, associated with firm size. Perhaps 
the most interesting coefficients are on the national intercepts. Firms in the two smallest 
countries in the sample, Denmark and the Netherlands, are experiencing positive relative 
growth in this sector, even relative to Germany (the coefficient on REG*DEN should be 
ignored as there is only one Danish regulated industry in this sample). 
Type 2R industries display many similarities with Type 2A. Mean size depends on both MES 
and EU size, although (rather surprisingly) the quantitative effect lies between Type 1 and 
Type 2a industries. The trade balance is also a significant determinant of mean size. This 
suggests that firms are drawn to the most efficient locations, and this helps them achieve more 
production economies of scale compared with firms in more disadvantaged locations. Public 
procurement tends to raise unit size in these industries, but this is a significant effect only in 
Italy and Denmark. The most striking finding is the strong size advantage that German firms 
have in these high technology industries, with large negative coefficients on all the national 
intercepts. 
The Type 2R industries have much the most interesting changes regression. Only in these 
industries are there clear signs of a single market effect resisting a decline in (or even raising) 
average unit size systematically more in industries and locations where size was initially 
smallest relative to MES (and even here, it is possible that there was some other cause, such as 
an increase in global competition1). The rest of the story is consistent with the previous two 
industry groups. EU growth is initially channelled into unit size (although in the long run, as 
shown by the 1986 regression, we expect entry to reduce this effect). Also, the national 
See also Table 3.8. 
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intercepts show increasing divergence from Germany; with the divergence trend smallest in 
the smaller countries (Netherlands and Denmark) and France, and greatest in Italy and the UK. 
The final, and smallest, group of industries is Type 2AR. In these industries, there is a much 
fuzzier relationship between business size and technical economies of scale, and a powerful 
relationship with EU size. In fact, the latter elasticity is not significantly different from unity. 
In these industries, therefore, firm size is determined by R&D and advertising economies, and 
production economies of scale have no significant effect. Only in this group does greater 
openness, manifested in higher trade penetration, feed into higher business unit size. There is 
also an interesting pattern to the effects of regulation. In the larger countries, particularly 
Germany, regulation reduces mean size, while in the smaller countries (the Netherlands and 
Denmark), it raises size. This may be partially compensating for a very strong size 
disadvantage that the firms in the latter countries seem to have in relation to Germany 
(compare the size of the country intercept coefficients). The changes regression for Type 2AR 
tells no interesting story other than the negative finding that we were unable to detect a single 
market effect. 
Overall, in our econometric analysis, we find some strong national differences in the 
achievement of economies of scale. The relationship between achieved size and production 
economies of scale depends heavily on the prevalent type of competition in the industry. We 
also find that government intervention in the form of public procurement bias and national 
regulations have a systematic effect on average size, as predicted, tending to reduce it in Type 
1 industries but raise it in Type 2. However, the trade data reveal only a weak suggestion of 
trade barriers contributing to the underachievement of scale economies. As expected, 1991 
was too early to see very much change as a result of the planned single market. Only in Type 
2R industries was there evidence to suggest that firms were increasing the size of business 
units most strongly where there was a significant size disadvantage, in anticipation of future 
competition. Finally, one clear picture did emerge from the analysis of changes: the size gap 
between German firms and those located in other Member States was positive, and increasing 
systematically across industries. 
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Table 4.1. Type 1 industries 
1986 
mean size 
1986-91 
change in 
mean size 
Constant 
MES 
EU size 
Trade penetration 
Trade balance 
PUB * GE 
PUB * FR 
PUB * IT 
PUB * UK 
PUB * NE 
PUB * DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
7.51 
(26.63)** 
0.33 
(14.05)** 
-0.02 
(-0.60) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(1.46) 
-0.21 
(-0.76) 
-0.83 
(-5.14)** 
-0.20 
(-1.06) 
-0.16 
(-1.54) 
-0.52 
(-4.25)** 
-0.28 
(-2.06)* 
-0.50 
(-3.87)** 
-1.18 
(10.02)** 
Number of observations 
-0.57 
(-4.89)** 
-0.52 
(-3.47)** 
-0.82 
(-5.70)** 
0.66 
248 
Constant 
Initial disadvantage 
EU growth 
Change in trade pen. 
Change in trade bal. 
PUB * GE 
PUB * FR 
PUB * IT 
PUB * UK 
PUB * NE 
PUB * DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
R2 
Number of observations 
0.14 
(4.49)** 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
0.23 
(1.63) 
-0.02 
(-0.61) 
0.10 
(0.79) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(-1.15) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.00 
(-0.03) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(-2.45)* 
-0.26 
(-7.15)** 
-0.25 
(-5.60)** 
-0.08 
(-2.02)* 
0.05 
(0.86) 
0.30 
244 
t-ratios in parenthesis, based on White's adjustment for heteroscedasticity. 
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level (2-tail test). 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level (2-tail test). 
+ Significantly different from zero at 10% level (2-tail test). 
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Table 4.2. Type 2A industries 
1986 
mean size 
1986-91 
change in 
mean size 
Constant 
MES 
EU size 
Trade penetration 
Trade balance 
REG * GE 
REG * FR 
REG * IT 
REG* UK 
REG* NE 
REG * DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
R2 
Number of observations 
5.41 
(10.64)** 
0.11 
(2.01)* 
0.33 
(4.64)** 
-0.05 
(-0.60) 
0.26 
(1.95)' 
-0.19 
(-0.95) 
0.48 
(2.97)** 
0.32 
(1.04) 
0.56 
(1.78)' 
0.64 
(1.18) 
0.24 
(0.65) 
-0.34 
(-2.03)* 
-0.92 
(-5.64)** 
-0.13 
(-0.49) 
-0.06 
(-0.21) 
-0.29 
(-0.72) 
Constant 
Initial disadvantage 
EU growth 
Change in trade pen. 
Change in trade bal. 
REG * GE 
REG*FR 
REG* IT 
REG* UK 
REG* NE 
REG * DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
0.24 
(4.22)** 
-0.01 
(-0.75) 
0.41 
(2.63)* 
-0.36 
(-1.88)' 
0.31 
(0.90) 
0.06 
(0.75) 
0.05 
(0.51) 
0.14 
(1.83)' 
0.05 
(0.49) 
0.06 
(0.38) 
-0.26 
(-4.47)** 
-0.10 
(-1.43) 
-0.33 
(-4.10)** 
-0.26 
(-3.91)** 
0.22 
(1.84)-
0.31 
(4.48)** 
0.65 
60 Number of observations 
0.70 
59 
t-ratios in parenthesis, based on White's adjustment for heteroscedasticity. 
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level (2-tail test). 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level (2-tail test). 
Significantly different from zero at 10% level (2-tail test). 
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Table 4.3. Type 2R industries 
1986 
mean size 
1986-91 
change in 
mean size 
Constant 
MES 
EU size 
Trade penetration 
Trade balance 
PUB * GE 
PUB * FR 
PUB * IT 
PUB * UK 
PUB * DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
R2 
Number of observations 
4.59 
(8.75)** 
0.53 
(9.96)** 
0.24 
(3.65)** 
0.31 
0.49) 
0.68 
(2.83)** 
-0.29 
(-0.98) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.71 
(2.04)* 
0.30 
(1.02) 
0.58 
(4.91)** 
-0.69 
(-3.02)** 
-1.37 
(-5.91)** 
-1.15 
(-4.35)** 
-1.19 
(5.18)** 
-1.08 
(4.86)** 
Constant 
Initial disadvantage 
EU growth 
Change in trade pen. 
Change in trade bal. 
PUB * GE 
PUB * FR 
PUB * IT 
PUB * UK 
PUB *DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
0.07 
(2.37)* 
0.46 
(3.14)** 
-0.14 
(-1.24) 
0.24 
(1.58) 
-0.04 
(-0.54) 
-0.28 
(-1.96)-
-0.09 
(-0.88) 
-0.18 
(-1.29) 
0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.15 
(-2.79)** 
-0.39 
(-5.55)** 
-0.27 
(-2.63)* 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.10 
(-1.13) 
0.76 
80 
R2 
Number of observations 
0.47 
77 
t-ratios in parenthesis, based on White's adjustment for heteroscedasticity. 
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level (2-tail test). 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level (2-tail test). 
+ Significantly different from zero at 10% level (2-tail test). 
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Table 4.4. Type 2AR industries 
1986 
mean size 
1986-91 
change in 
mean size 
Constant 
MES 
EU size 
Trade penetration 
Trade balance 
REG * GE 
REG * FR 
REG * IT 
REG * UK 
REG * NE 
REG * DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
R2 
Number of observations 
1.85 
(1.54) 
0.22 
(1.50) 
0.80 
(3.84)** 
0.54 
(2.62)* 
-1.03 
(-1.94)· 
-1.08 
(-2.85)** 
-0.37 
(-1.42) 
-0.25 
(-0.73) 
0.87 
(2.38)* 
1.78 
(3.16)** 
1.33 
(3.14)** 
-1.21 
(2.88)** 
-1.72 
(-4.50)** 
-1.75 
(-4.18)** 
-3.26 
(-4.47)** 
-2.45 
(-4.77)** 
Constant 
Initial disadvantage 
EU growth 
Change in trade pen. 
Change in trade bal. 
REG* GE 
REG * FR 
REG* IT 
REG * UK 
REG * NE 
REG * DEN 
FR 
IT 
UK 
NE 
DEN 
0.15 
(1.32) 
-0.04 
(-0.76) 
0.64 
(¡■94/ 
-0.04 
(-0.20) 
0.69 
(1.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.10 
(1.06) 
0.21 
(1.65) 
0.09 
(0.55) 
-0.35 
(-1.58) 
0.57 
(2.31)* 
-0.11 
(-0.79) 
-0.18 
(-1.06) 
-0.22 
(-1.15) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
-0.24 
(-1.07) 
0.65 
38 
R2 
Number of observations 
0.43 
37 
t-ratios in parenthesis, based on White's adjustment for heteroscedasticity. 
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level (2-tail test). 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level (2-tail test). 
Significantly different from zero at 10% level (2-tail test). 
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4.3. Evidence on EU concentration 
Although changes in mean business size may be, superficially, the most directly relevant 
available evidence on the impact of scale economies, we believe that they can tell only part of 
the story. This is why, at the outset of this project, we planned to collect information on 
developments in concentration, observed at both national and aggregate EU levels, between 
1987 and 1993. It is to this evidence that we now turn, and we shall argue that these data add 
importantly to the overall picture in two ways. First, the data themselves are better, in being 
more up to date and complete than the business size data. Second, and more conceptually, 
changes in concentration reflect a variety of factors, not only changes in the average size of 
businesses, and some of these other factors will also depend upon the consequences of the 
single market. 
It should be recalled that there is no official published information on EU level concentration 
in individual industries. However, in Davies and Lyons [1996], estimates are derived for about 
100 three-digit industries for 1987. As part of the current project, using similar methods, these 
have been updated to 1993. However, this is an extremely time-consuming exercise, involving 
the careful and meticulous use of primary sources, notably company reports; the original study 
required four years, the first half of which was occupied mainly with data collection. Given the 
time constraints of the current project, it would have been impossible to repeat this exercise 
for the full population with the same degree of confidence as before. Nevertheless, we have 
succeeded in generating estimates of the output of market leaders for about three-quarters of 
the population of industries, albeit with rather less cross-checking than would be desirable. 
In order to derive estimates of EU concentration, these figures were expressed as a percentage 
of total EU output taken from Panorama of EU industry 1995/96 [European Commission, 
1996], Davies and Lyons [1996] put considerable effort into adjusting the Eurostat figures to 
estimate gaps in the data, cross-check with national censuses, and adjust for the exclusion of 
small firms from the Panorama database. In this study, we had time only to use our original 
small firms adjustment. In order to make our concentration estimates comparable, we have 
therefore re-estimated our earlier concentration ratios using the cruder denominator, and these 
are the figures presented in this section. They are shown in Table 4.5 as the estimates of CR4 
(the four-firm concentration ratio) in grouped form for the four industry types. They should be 
interpreted as provisional - most importantly because of unresolved uncertainties concerning 
the accuracy of our source (Panorama) for the aggregate industry sizes (i.e. the denominator of 
our concentration ratios). 
As can be seen, there has been a significant increase in concentration at the EU level between 
1987 and 1993. This appears to have been a fairly pervasive trend, but it is particularly strong 
in industries characterized by high R&D, where concentration has grown considerably. 
Of course, this new dataset is of much wider interest than just the current project, and 
development work will continue. For present purposes however, its main value derives from 
its advantages over the Eurostat business size data; not only is it more up to date, but also 
concentration is more immediately responsive to recent events than is the size of business 
units. In particular, a merger taking place before the end of the financial year corresponding to 
1993 should be immediately reflected in the market share estimates from which we have 
computed concentration. On the other hand, bearing in mind that mergers rarely result in 
instantaneous rationalization of individual business units within conglomerate firms, one 
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might argue that Eurostat business size data observed in 1991 will almost certainly fail to 
capture the full restructuring consequences of any merger occurring in the 1990s.2 
Figure 4.4. EU concentration changes (%) 
(High) 
EOS 
;ntial 
Β 
+4.2%(N=16) 
+ 1.3%(N=42) 
A 
+3.8%(N=5) 
C 
+2.9%(N=9) 
(Low) (High) 
SM sensitivity 
Before proceeding with a deeper analysis of what has driven the concentration changes, we 
look at how these changes related to EOS potential and SM sensitivity (as defined in Chapter 
3, but expressing EOS potential as MES relative to 1987 concentration). The basic results are 
presented in Figure 4.4, which reports unweighted average percentage point changes in EU 
concentration. An interesting pattern emerges. Comparing the rows, there has been a greater 
increase in concentration where EOS potential is high. As we shall see, this has much to do 
with these industries being Type 2R. A more complex trend is found by comparing columns in 
the figure. Industries with a relatively low EOS potential have experienced a slightly larger 
increase in concentration if they have a high SM sensitivity; but SM sensitivity exerts no extra 
impact where EOS potential is high. Fleshing out this general pattern, in quadrant A, we find 
An important difference between the two sources concerns the consolidation of subsidiaries. Our concentration data 
consolidate into one all firms under common ownership in a given industry. On the other hand, Eurostat data refer to 
the smallest legally separate businesses. 
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concentration increases of at least 5% in rail stock, pasta, and insulated wires and cables, and 
small declines in shipbuilding and wines and cider. In quadrant B, there are significant 
increases in concentration in man-made fibres, oils and fats and especially in aerospace; but 
there is a decline in motor vehicles. Finally, in quadrant C, there is a big increase in 
concentration in electrical machinery (nearly 10%), and small increases (l%-3%) in 
pharmaceuticals, computers and chocolate and sugar confectionery. 
Turning to the interpretation of concentration changes, there are two stages in the argument. 
First, in any given industry, EU concentration amounts to a weighted average of concentration 
within individual Member States, allowing for the possibility that some firms may be among 
the market leaders in more than one Member State. 
For example, suppose the EU comprises 12 equal-sized Member States, in each of which there 
are ten equal-sized firms. Assuming none of these firms operated in more than one Member 
State, the EU would comprise 120 independent firms in total. However, if each firm operated 
in, say, four of the Member States, then there would be only 30 genuinely independent firms in 
the EU as a whole. This idea underpins what Davies and Lyons refer to as their first core 
decomposition in their [1996] study: 
HEU = HNAT * SPEC * NM (1) 
where HEU refers to EU concentration in a given industry, HNAT refers to the weighted 
average concentrations in that industry in individual Member States, NM is a measure of the 
extent of production across Member States by firms (referred to as intra-EU multinationality), 
and SPEC reflects the distribution of Member State sizes in that industry. All indices are 
derivatives of the Herfindahl index (although similar decompositions are also easily derived 
for other measures such as the entropy.) This decomposition tells us that, for a given industry 
and set of Member State sizes, EU concentration will be higher: (a) the more concentrated is 
the industry within individual Member States, and (b) the higher is intra-EU multinationality. 
The second stage to the argument focuses on concentration within individual Member States, 
and how it relates to average business size. Any measure of concentration depends on two 
aspects of the size distribution of business units: their number, and the inequality in their sizes. 
Concentration will be higher (a) the fewer firms there are (i.e. for a given size of industry, the 
larger is mean size), and (b) the more unequal are their sizes. In the case of the Herfindahl 
index, this relationship can be formalized as: 
H = (s/S).I (2) 
where s is mean business size, S is aggregate industry size, and I measures the extent of size 
inequalities (more precisely, one plus the square of the coefficient of variation). 
Now, if (2) describes the level of concentration in an individual Member State, a weighted 
average thereof defines the HNAT term in (1). 
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Re-expressing the two equations in terms of rates of change over a given time period, and 
substituting (2) into (1), we can write: 
d(HEU) = d(HNAT) + d(SPEC) + d(NM) (3) 
d(HEU) = d(s) - d(S) + d(I) + d(SPEC) + d(NM) (4) 
where the d(.) notation defines proportionate growth over the period, and s, S and I should 
now be thought of as (appropriately weighted) averages across the Member States in the 
growth rates of mean business size, industry size, and size inequalities. 
In words, equation (4) tells us that, in a given industry, EU concentration will increase where:3 
(a) mean business size grows more rapidly than industry size in Member States; 
(b) business size inequalities within individual Member States increase; 
(c) specialization (by Member State within the EU) increases; 
(d) intra-EU multinationality increases. 
This substantiates our earlier claim that changes in concentration provide a richer story than by 
only examining the size of business units. Since it is likely that only a few very large firms 
would organize their activities in one industry in one Member State in more than one legally 
separable unit, our earlier analysis of changes in the size of business unit effectively applies to 
the first term in (4), d(s). We can now see that there are other forces at work in determining 
concentration - each susceptible to changes in the other sources of economies of scale, 
resulting from the competitive escalation of fixed costs such as R&D and advertising. 
In order to quantify (4) using the data presently available, we must proxy HEU by CR4 - the 
four-firm concentration ratio - hardly a major limitation, since most standard concentration 
indices are highly correlated. More importantly, we do not yet have comprehensive data on the 
changes in intra-EU multinationality, specialization and size inequalities, although they are on 
the future research agenda of SPES, outside the present project. Therefore, we shall have to 
infer the likely magnitudes and directions of these changes by observing the typical 
magnitudes of the observable variables in the identity, and by drawing on specific examples. 
Tables 4.5a and 4.5b quantify the components to (4) in the form of averages for each of the 
industry types. Because of incompleteness in the national data, the coverage of industries and 
Member States differs across the columns, except in Table 4.5b, where the industries have 
been paired across the years. Unfortunately, this has been necessary in order to maintain a 
broad coverage in the face of incomplete Eurostat data, and so the following results should be 
interpreted cautiously. 
For Type 1 industries, mean national business size grew on average by roughly 6%, and as this 
is only a little more than the growth in average size of industry, we would expect to observe 
little change in national concentration, unless there were significant changes in (unobserved) 
inequalities. In fact, typical national concentration did stay roughly constant. However, 
concentration at the EU level appears to have increased a little, albeit from a relatively lower 
starting point. The implication is that there was a small increase in the extent of intra-EU 
Moreover, the first two factors, but not the last, will also increase typical national concentration. 
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multinationality and/or an increase in international specialization within the EU. Both factors 
could reflect increased exploitation of production scale economies, although alternative 
explanations are possible.4 
A different picture emerges in Type 2A. Here, there were quite dramatic increases in the 
typical size of business units within Member States, and because they easily outstripped the 
growth in overall national industry size, this implies increased national concentration. This 
indeed happened, albeit by less than was implied by the size data. This would be consistent 
with a narrowing of size inequalities, but it is equally possible that our estimates of national 
concentration, based on only four Member States, are unrepresentative. Turning to 
developments at the EU level, concentration has increased at about the same rate as national 
concentration, suggesting little change in specialization and/or multinationality. 
In Type 2R industries, mean business size has tended to decline slightly, while industry size 
has been virtually static; and this is consistent with the slight decline in typical national 
concentration. However, this contrasts strikingly with the very rapid increase in EU 
concentration. The reasons, we suspect, are increasing specialization, due to increasing 
German dominance and (probably more important) substantial increases in intra-EU 
multinationality. 
Finally, in Type 2AR industries, mean business size grew substantially and industry size 
increased more moderately. This implies the small increase in national concentration which 
we find. Concentration at the aggregate EU level has drifted up slightly, but not as much as in 
Type 2R. Davies and Lyons [1996] find Type 2AR industries, on average, to be more 
concentrated than Type 2R in 1987, and the reversed ranking in Table 4.5b is due to the 
exclusion of too high concentration in Type 2AR industries. Nevertheless, the modest rise in 
concentration in Type 2AR tends to support the speculation in Davies and Lyons, that EU 
integration was already most advanced in 2AR in 1987. By implication, this suggests that 2R 
may have been catching up on 2AR. 
At this stage, and until better data become available, these conclusions are most properly 
defined as preliminary and provisional. Nevertheless, most of this early evidence suggests that 
little of the dynamic between 1987 and 1993 can be attributed directly to the effects of 
increased exploitation of production scale economies. Rather, we suspect that the most 
striking development that will be detected in further work is an upsurge in intra-EU 
multinationality, motivated by, among other things, the drive to exploit economies of scale in 
R&D. For example, in the UK, the 'foreign' multinational share of manufacturing production 
rose from 18% in 1986 to 24% in 1993. While it is true that a part of this was due to increased 
Japanese penetration, particularly in electronics, this is offset by a relative decline in US 
penetration. Most relevant for our purposes is the large increase in the French (and, more 
latterly, German) shares. Moreover, the number of foreign MNEs in the UK's top 100 
manufacturers has risen from 18 to 32 - again, mainly attributable to French companies. It is 
also clear that this penetration is increasingly associated with leading market shares in 
individual industries. We do not yet know whether this picture is replicated in other Member 
States. 
Concentration estimates for a number of very low concentration industries (e.g. woodworking), have not been finalized. 
These are essentially local industries and would probably only dilute the already modest changes observed in Type 1 
industries. 
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Turning to individual firms and/or industries, there are a number of high-profile developments 
consistent with this story including mergers and/or joint ventures involving Carnaud-Metal 
Box, GEC-Alcatel, Rhône-Poulenc, Phillips (Osram from GEC), and Daimler-Fokker. Other 
examples include firms which, although strictly defined as non-EU owned, already have 
extensive operations within the EU; Nestlé's many acquisitions including Perrier and 
Rowntree, Philip Morris-Jacobs Suchard, SmithKline Beecham, and Coca Cola-Cadbury 
Schweppes. Very many of these high-profile examples are most easily explicable as strategic 
moves in oligopolistic industries characterized by endogenous sunk costs including 
advertising, rather than driven by the pursuit of pure production scale economies. Less 
confidently, we suspect that, in a number of industries, size inequalities are widening, with the 
leading firms beginning to forge ahead of their smaller rivals. Of course, this is often the 
consequence of the cross-border mergers/alliances just described, but purely national mergers 
(e.g. Krupps-Hoesch, Daimler-MBB) and/or internal growth (e.g. in margarine and fats, 
pharmaceuticals) are sometimes responsible. Again, it is unlikely that these are driven by 
purely production scale economies. 
Another potential feature highlighted by the above framework is the impact of changes in the 
national specialization in individual industries. For example, increased German dominance in 
some sectors may result in significant increases in EU concentration, even though market 
shares in Germany remain stable. A thorough investigation of this possibility must await more 
up-to-date data on national industry size. 
Table 4.5a. Growth in mean size,1 national level (%) 
Type 1 
Type 2A 
Type 2R 
Type 2AR 
All 
Growth in size 
national level (%) 
Firm (s) 
6.6 
12.4 
-4.0 
12.0 
1.5 
Industry (S) 
5.5 
5.1 
-0.7 
8.2 
3.5 
Mean national 
concentration change 
(C4NAT)2 
-0.3 
1.3 
-1.9 
1.3 
-0.1 
All means are simple (unweighted) arithmetic averages. 
'Mean national' refers to the simple means of Belgium. France, Germany and the UK; for France the time period is 1985— 
92, for Germany it is 1987-93, and for Belgium it is 1986-91. C4NAT represents the change over the period, not the 
annual rate of change. 
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Table 4.5b. Changes in concentration 
Type 1 
Type 2A 
Type 2R 
Type 2AR 
All 
Four-firm concentration ratios, European level (C4EU) 
1987 
13.2 
22.3 
32.9 
30.1 
20.5 
1993 
14.4 
23.6 
38.9 
32.4 
22.8 
Change1 
1.2 , , 8 
1.2 122 
6-1 6.08 
2.3 2.27 
2.3 232 
No of inds2 
38 
11 
15 
7 
71 
1 Rounding errors (2 decimal places given in comer). Changes in concentration ratios refer to the percentage points. 
2 Data are included for Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Our evidence confirms that the EU market was not fully integrated at the start of the single 
market programme, and that potential existed for further achievement of economies of scale. 
However, there are important differences between industries. These result from two 
influences. First, industries have been differentially affected by national boundaries. Second, 
the competitive imperatives, resulting from differences in the prevailing form of competition, 
have created qualitatively different types of industrial structure. In our work, the main 
differences in the achievement of economies of scale have been characterized by separate 
analysis of four industry types. 
The clearest, and most interesting, early effects of the single market programme have shown 
through in the R&D intensive industries. This is particularly important because it was this 
group which had caused most policy concern in the mid-1980s, with fears of a loss of 
European global market share, and which was a major factor in originally inspiring the single 
market programme. We find that firm size is positively related to specialization in Member 
States with a comparative advantage, and even before 1992 there was a clear tendency for 
greater relative structural adjustment in industries which were furthest from attaining full 
economies of scale. However, as a group, these industries were also experiencing negative 
industry growth (see Table 4.5a), so this relative effect did not translate into greater absolute 
size on average. 
A great advantage of our research methodology is to show that this is only part of the story. 
Viewing the industry at the aggregate EU level, we see that firms were responding to the 
situation by international mergers and acquisitions, with a very substantial effect on EU 
industrial concentration. Such activity is more likely to have been motivated by R&D and 
marketing economies than in production, although corporate rationalization may well follow 
as the internal organization of the merged firms settles down. This, plus further locational 
specialization, may feed through into production economies. Although not reported upon here, 
we also have evidence that multinationals which had found it politic to produce in several 
local markets when selling to the public sector, were beginning to pull back and specialize 
production in fewer Member States [see Davies and Lyons, 1996, Chapter 13]. This has not 
yet fed through into the average size data. Thus, underlying the fairly static descriptive 
statistics of what has been happening at the national level in these industries, we find a 
complex dynamic picture. 
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It is not necessary to repeat all the details for each of the other industry types, but a few are 
worthy of note. For Type 1, we found that public procurement had opposite effects on 
achieved scale to that in Type 2R (where a policy of national champions, rather than even-
handed support, lay behind procurement bias). There has also been a marginal growth of EU 
concentration in Type 1 industries, which may anticipate further structural change at the 
national level. Advertising intensive industries have only a weak relationship between 
business size and production economies of scale. We have been unable satisfactorily to 
explain the sharp rise in business unit size in Type 2A. This has been quite pervasive, and at 
least in the short run, undoubtedly has much to do with the strong demand growth in this 
sector. It has shown through only marginally in national and EU concentration. The Type 2AR 
industries were already dominated by large multinationals, who were able to surmount most 
trade barriers, and who were already operating at the largest scale of any industry type. 
Finally, we repeat our earlier warning that because of data availability, we are only able to 
look at the earliest anticipated effects of the single market. Our research methodology could 
usefully be repeated once more up-to-date information becomes available. 
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5. Business scale, profitability and costs 
In our work so far, we have stressed the impact of the single market programme on the actual 
size of business units and on industrial concentration. While we have been careful to express 
these magnitudes relative to potential economies of scale, the previous chapters do not provide 
an assessment of the actual cost savings due to the achievement of scale, or of the financial 
consequences. Such assessments are not possible from the data sources exploited so far. In 
order to gain some insight into these issues, we have had to turn to a quite different database -
PIMS. The PIMS data have the advantage of providing more detailed information on costs, 
especially relative costs by relative size. Against this, it is based on a narrower set of firms, 
and it is difficult to tie the industrial classification used by PIMS to the NACE we have used 
so far. 
In Section 5.1 we provide a brief introduction to the PIMS data, and show how the 
profitability of pan-European businesses has changed relative to national/regional businesses 
since 1985. Section 5.2 highlights some of the reasons that are associated with success, 
particularly focusing on those factors which are strongly related to economies of scale. In 
Section 5.3, we try to match the PIMS classification to the NACE, in order to estimate the 
slope of the cost curve, and thereby the potential for savings due to business size increasing 
with the single market. 
5.1. General approach 
In the second scenario explored by Venables and Smith [1988] the SM programme is thought 
likely to have most effect only if it alters the behaviour and performance of individual 
businesses. For businesses to use the opportunities provided by reductions in barriers between 
national markets in order to achieve scale economies, the new market environment must alter 
the incentives for them to operate in a larger market context. 
For the single market to deliver economic benefits in terms of economies of scale, a number of 
conditions need to be met. One is that businesses which operate on a larger scale should have 
the prospect of more attractive returns - and thus the ability to attract investment for growth -
than those which operate on a smaller scale. If this can be shown to be the case for businesses 
which define their market as Europe-wide, this may provide evidence that the single market at 
least provides the conditions in which scale economies are likely to be exploited. 
Previous published work on this has provided evidence of 'the costs of non-Europe'. Research 
by Yip in 1991 using PIMS data found that 'continental scale businesses in Europe performed 
financially worse than national scale businesses in the period... before the creation of the 
single European market which would reduce barriers'. This study also found that 'in the 
United States by contrast, where barriers and differences between regions are much less than 
in Europe, continental scale businesses performed better than regional scale businesses'. [Yip, 
1992] 
The definition of 'continental scale' in this work is market-based. It depends upon business 
managers confirming their presence in the majority of national markets, identifying the same 
key competitors present across Europe, and adopting a pan-European approach to production, 
distribution and marketing. The implications of this result are that in most industries 
incentives for business managers to invest in continental scale businesses during the 1970s and 
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1980s were low. Possible economies of scale, in production, distribution, development and 
marketing, were more than counterbalanced by additional co-ordination costs, and by loss of 
focus on the needs of customers. These problems appeared not to be present in the US. 
Despite this overall negative conclusion, the sample contained some businesses which had 
adopted a pan-European approach and achieved ROCE levels strong enough to attract 
investment. These businesses shared certain characteristics, which indicated other forms of 
market barriers supporting their profitability. 
In this section we have revisited this work, to check two specific areas: 
(a) to test for any evidence that the performance disadvantages of continental scale 
businesses in Europe have diminished since Yip's conclusions of 1990/91; 
(b) to identify whether the key success factors, which the more profitable pan-European 
businesses share, have changed over the same period; and if so, whether the incentives 
to exploit scale economies have increased. 
Evidence has been examined for 128 pan-European businesses which are among the 600 in the 
PIMS database defining their markets as being 'in Europe'. The unit of observation is a 
business unit within a company, which supplies a specific set of products and/or services, to a 
defined set of customers, against a known set of competitors. This definition is almost always 
drawn at a more specific level than three-digit NACE codes, in terms of a business position in 
a defined served market. 
The 128 businesses describe themselves as operating across the EU, while the rest of 
European businesses compete in a single country or region. Data on each are captured for a 
minimum of four years, and they cover cost, margin and capital ratios, market structure 
variables and competitive measures. A full description of the PIMS data structure, and 
definitions, is given in The PIMS principles by Buzzell and Gale [1987]. An up-to-date 
summary of PIMS business performance data is given in the report Building business for 
Europe submitted to the European Commission's Directorate-General for Industry by PIMS 
and the Irish Management Institute in 1994 [Clayton and Carroll, 1994]. 
Evidence from those businesses which have defined their market boundary as EC or EU over 
the last 15 years shows that there have been significant changes in the performance of pan-
European enterprises since the mid-1980s. These changes appear to have made it less 
attractive for businesses to position themselves defensively behind market boundaries, and 
more attractive to achieve greater scale in their European markets. There is evidence on 
overall cost structure, related to the typology of markets used in Chapter 4 of this report, 
which supports the conclusions reached from industry level data. There are also data which 
support the picture from the majority of case studies, of increasing specialization at points 
within the value chain in enterprises leading to reduced business value added, but at the same 
time increasing scale in the operation of particular processes. This trend, which in some 
industries appears as 'vertical disintegration', is consistent with the data on enterprise size 
which we have seen in Chapter 4. 
By splitting the sample of European business units into data covering the period up to 1985, 
and the period after, we are able to examine how these businesses behave, and how the factors 
related to profit margins (and hence the ability to attract investment) have changed over time. 
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For reasons of commercial confidentiality, most of these data are not sector identified, and 
none are traceable to any individual company. 
The business results for ROCE - pre-tax, pre-interest return on historic net fixed assets plus 
working capital - are sufficiently striking to suggest that the operation of markets for pan-
European businesses has changed post-1985. The data in Table 5.1 below are based on four-
year average performance, and they confirm the Yip conclusions for the period pre-1985; that 
businesses which competed on a continental scale in Europe performed significantly worse 
than those which focused on individual country markets, or on regions within Europe. 
However, after 1985 the gap almost disappears, because the 'regional/national' businesses 
perform significantly worse in the later period - close to the level of 'European scale' 
businesses. 
Table 5.1. ROCE performance of European businesses in PIMS database 
ROCE Pre-1985 Post-1985 
(%) (%) 
Pan-European 14.4 13.8 
Regional/national 24.5 15.4 
As most of the observations are not sector identified, it is impossible to check whether this 
change in the pattern of performance is due to a radically different sample of business types, or 
businesses with different competitive strengths. However, we can 'normalize' the sample to 
check for systematic differences due to share, productivity, quality, and customer bargaining 
power (which are identified for each and every observation). The basis for this is the PIMS Par 
ROCE model, based on regression relationships between ROCE and profit determining 
variables across the whole database. The structure of this model, and statistical relationships 
underlying its key terms, are set out in Buzzell and Gale [1987]. It provides a means of 
checking that the changes observed in performance are not due to major changes in the 
typology of businesses observed. 
The results show that differences in fundamental profit-related variables for businesses in the 
sample do not explain the differences in ROCE performance pre-1985. Nor do they explain 
the changed position post-1985. Par ROCE values for businesses defined as pan-European are 
within two points of those defined as national/regional for the pre-1985 sample, and the values 
post-1985 show only minor, and insignificant, change. 
The data therefore support the hypothesis that national market barriers play a much less 
significant part in determining margin performance post-1985 than before. 
5.2. Performance related factors in European-scale businesses 
The results reported above show that a high proportion of European scale businesses pre-1985 
achieved ROCE results significantly worse than would have been expected given their market 
environment, competitive position and productivity. Yip [1992] suggests that these results 
were due to excess co-ordination costs, and to loss of market focus. In terms of this study, this 
means diseconomies of scale in production, distribution and administration, and inability (at 
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best) to take advantage of potential dynamic economies of scale in development and 
marketing. 
However, there were around one-third of this sample of businesses which made attractive 
returns, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the returns expected, given their share 
position, market attractiveness and productivity. Do these business units share any common 
characteristics which can provide clues as to the real incentives for investors in European 
business opportunities in this period? What business types are likely to achieve high ROCE? 
Table 5.2. Significant factors related to high/low ROCE vs Par ROI - pre-1985 
Significance Strong ROCE Weak ROCE 
ROCE average 37% 6% 
Scale related factors 
(a) Share rank in market 
(b) Share of served market 
(c) Top 3 competitors' share 
(d) Relative share (b/c) 
Scope or 'focus' related 
(a) Relative product range 
(b) Relative customer types 
(c) Relative customer numbers 
Advertising/sales related 
(a) % consumer products 
(b) % advertising in marketing 
(c) Salesforce cost/revenue 
(d) Adv & promo/revenue 
(e) Total sales & mktng/rev. 
Development related 
(a) Leader/follower role 
(b) % proprietary products 
(c) Relative new products 
(d) Relative quality 
**** 
** 
** 
** 
**** 
**** 
**** 
** 
*** 
** 
**** 
**** 
** 
** 
* 
** 
3 or 4 
20% 
47% 
51% 
Same or narrower 
Same or narrower 
Same or fewer 
25% 
7% 
5.5% 
3.3% 
11.6% 
Follower 
20% 
Behind competition 
Above competition 
1.2 or 3 
27% 
41% 
82% 
Same or broader 
Same or broader 
Same or more 
10% 
2% 
3.9% 
0.6% 
5.3% 
Pioneer 
40% 
Matches competition 
Behind competition 
External economy factors 
(a) % from top 3 suppliers 47% 40% 
Key: 
**** Significant at 99%. 
*** Significant at 95%. 
** Significant at 90%. 
* Significant at 80%. 
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As the results summarized in Table 5.2 indicate, strongly performing European scale 
businesses at this period were: 
(a) less likely to benefit from scale economies, because on the whole they were not 
European market leaders and more likely to have market shares below those of principal 
competitors; 
(b) more likely to be focused on a specific segment of a market, with a narrower range of 
products or services offered, and a narrower range of customer types; 
(c) very likely to have high marketing costs, including the costs of advertising, promotion 
and selling; 
(d) less likely to be an innovative business, with fewer new products and having entered the 
market as a follower rather than a leader. 
The evidence suggests that the more successful Europe-wide businesses in the early 1980s 
were 'followers' in their markets. They operated at lower scale than main competitors, and 
lower relative scale within the European market. This pattern suggests that the more successful 
businesses tended to be those which were able to occupy a niche of some kind - effectively 
benefiting from a form of non-geographic segmentation through a specific customer base, or 
in segments demanding a more limited range of products. 
The successful business tended to be in markets where advertising and selling costs were 
heavier. These are characteristics which are found in Type 2A businesses in the typology used 
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, where the fastest rate of firm growth was found, as well as relatively 
rapid concentration increase. This evidence tends to confirm that exploitation of scale 
economies in this area on a European scale was well under way before the single market 
programme. 
The successful businesses pre-1985 also tended to be less innovative, measured in terms of 
order of market entry, ownership of intellectual property, and of new product content. Again 
this is consistent with the analysis in Section 4.2, which suggests that in Type 2R industries 
there was, in the mid-1980s, major scope for exploiting unrealized economies in R&D, but it 
did not happen until later. The PIMS data certainly suggest that the incentives to exploit such 
economies were weak. 
There is, however, some evidence that ability to exploit external economies was a significant 
success factor in this period. Better performing businesses tended to be more dependent on a 
few suppliers. 
After 1985, the performance gap between pan-European businesses and those which define 
their markets in national or regional terms narrows. In addition, the key statistically significant 
factors which differentiate the most and least profitable businesses change. 
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Table 5.3. Significant factors related to high/low ROCE vs Par ROI - post-1985 
Significance Strong ROCE Weak ROCE 
ROCE average 
Scale related factors 
(a) Share rank in market 
(b) Share of served market 
(c) Top 3 competitors' share 
(d) Relative share (b/c) 
(e) Capacity/market value 
31% 
*** 
** 
* 
*** 
*** 
1.2 or 3 
22% 
39% 
75% 
27% 
-6% 
3, 4 or 5 
12% 
48% 
26% 
13% 
Scope or 'focus' related 
(a) 'Customized' products 10% 40% 
Advertising/sales related 
(a) % advertising in mktng 
(b) Adv & promo/revenue 
4.3% 
0.7% 
0.8% 
0.2% 
Development related 
(a) R&D spend/markt. value Increasing Decreasing 
External economy factors 
(a) % from top 3 suppliers 59% 47% 
Key: 
**** Significant at 99%. 
*** Significant at 95%. 
** Significant at 90%. 
* Significant at 80%. 
The pattern for successful businesses after 1985 tends to be those which: 
(a) are likely to be in the top three suppliers to the European market rather than lower rank, 
and more likely to have higher scale relative to direct competitors; 
(b) are more dependent on 'mass marketed' products, with little customization, and so more 
likely to be able to exploit scale economies; 
(c) are likely to be in markets where advertising is a significant part of cost structure, 
supporting the thesis in Chapter 4 that Type 2A businesses are now exploiting 
economies of scale faster than most; 
(d) are no longer likely to be 'laggards' in technology development, and may indeed invest 
more heavily in R&D, which would permit the catch-up growth for Type 2R businesses 
identified in Chapter 4; 
(e) are even more likely than before to focus on major suppliers for the bulk of their 
supplies, suggesting that they enjoy additional competitive advantage via external 
economies. 
This pattern suggests that the more successful businesses post-1985 are those which have 
succeeded in exploiting some economies of scale, either in production, in the development of 
a better offer to customers, or in the use of marketing resources, including salesforce. 
Business scale, profitability and costs 77 
There are differences in the statistically significant factors associated with higher returns on 
capital employed in pan-European businesses before and after 1985. This evidence suggests 
that competitive patterns have changed in ways which favour the exploitation of scale 
economies. 
Factors which pre-1985 are associated with strong returns include fragmented or highly 
segmented markets, lower scale market position, both absolute and relative to competitors, 
lagging innovation, narrow focus and fewer customers. Businesses with these traits are 
unlikely to be the ideal candidates to deliver economies of scale gains. By the late 1980s, these 
factors have disappeared from the PIMS sample of high performing Europe-wide businesses. 
They are replaced by a tendency for stronger margins to be clearly associated with larger scale 
relative to competitors. There is also evidence that successful businesses are those which 
invest more heavily in assets to support employee productivity - normally evidence for sunk 
costs. 
There are, in addition, data available from these two analyses which confirm to some extent 
the 'vertical disintegration' hypothesis. The average value added/sales ratio for each group of 
businesses in 1975 to 1985 has dropped in the post-1985 period. 
Table 5.4. Value added ratios for pan-European businesses 
Value added/sales High ROCE businesses (%) 
Pre-1985 60.6 
Post-1985 53.7 
Low ROCE businesses (%) 
51.3 
46.7 
Thus, it appears that the trend away from vertically integrated chains, from the raw material to 
finished products, has started to be reflected in the statistics for individual businesses. As 
'non-core' functions and competencies are outsourced, to focus on areas of business 
competitive advantage, it is to be expected that vertical integration falls. 
5.3. The relationship between cost change and output change 
PIMS' Competitive Strategy Research Database also contains evidence of changes in costs and 
output for more than 3,000 businesses over a time span of at least three years. Of these, some 
70% are based in North America and 20% in Europe. 
In the following analysis we have used two variables: 
AC/C The change in cost, deflated by the change in wage rates, as a fraction of the initial 
cost.5 
5 We have assumed that cost inflation is captured solely by wage rate changes at the business unit level (i.e. we assume 
(5C/5w)/C = 1). Although costs include elements unrelated to employee remuneration, wages are the largest part of 
manufacturing and other costs, and inflation in non-labour cost elements is likely to be of a similar magnitude. 
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AV/V The change in value added, deflated, as a fraction of the initial value added.6 
In the relationship 
(1) AC/C = a + b.AV/V + e 
the interpretation of the coefficients is that: 
b provides a measure of proportionate rate of change of real cost with real output. In 
part, this reflects the presence of economies of scale; 
a in principle, measures the rate of change of real cost independent of output; 
e is the error term. 
We have looked at data up to the end of 1985 for businesses experiencing a change in real 
value added between -2% and +60% per annum over a three-year period. Businesses with a 
rapid decline in output were excluded on the grounds that their cost change behaviour could be 
radically different from that of businesses which are growing. 
A regression analysis of equation (1) was undertaken for: 
(a) manufacturing and distribution costs; 
(b) costs excluding purchases, i.e. manufacturing and distribution, R&D, marketing, other 
costs (primarily administration). A charge on capital was not included. 
The results for all businesses in the database within these constraints are shown in Table 5.5. 
(a) For manufacturing costs, the value of 'b' is 0.73, i.e. a 1 per cent increase in output is 
associated with 0.73 per cent increase in costs. The difference from 1 is highly 
significant. 
(b) The value of 'b ' for costs excluding purchases is significantly lower than for 
manufacturing costs alone at 0.63. 
(c) Values for 'a' are not statistically significant. 
Result 1 is consistent with economies of scale but could be attributed to other causes. If many 
businesses were operating with excess capacity, real costs would have increased less quickly 
than real outputs. As a check on this we added a variable for 'beginning capacity utilization 
level' in equation (1). The coefficient on capacity utilization level was negative, as expected, 
but not statistically significant. 
Result 2 suggests that for marketing, R&D and administrative costs, the propensity to increase 
costs was lower than for manufacturing costs alone, in the medium term. These costs certainly 
include a much higher proportion of discretionary expenditures than are found in 
manufacturing. 
6 Value added is defined as: revenue less purchases. Revenue change has been deflated by change in prices: change in 
purchases has been deflated by change in price of purchased supplies. Both these inflation measures are captured at the 
business unit level. 
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Separate NACE sectors were examined, where there was sufficient data, and service 
businesses were also considered. (Service businesses in the database operate in a range of 
sectors, including warehousing and distribution, radio and TV broadcasting, banking, 
insurance, vehicle rental and leasing, nursing and personal care and many others). The general 
results are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 and are similar to those found for the whole database. 
(a) The median value of 'b' for manufacturing costs is 0.84. 
(b) The median value of 'b' for costs excluding purchases is lower than for manufacturing 
costs at 0.65. All sectors but one have a value of 'b' less than 1 and in many cases the 
difference is statistically significant. 
We hypothesized that industries with a low 'b' (i.e. a steep slope to the cost curve) would have 
most to gain from the single market, and so should have increased in size most rapidly in 
recent years. We therefore tried to relate the estimates of 'b ' to changes in business unit size as 
measured in Chapter 3. No clear pattern was found. Once again, this may be due to the fact 
that we only have size data up to 1991, but this time we also have the problem of a very small 
set of observations (so, for example, we could not take account of industry type). Given the 
lack of a clear pattern, we did not attempt to quantify the cost savings achieved by industries 
which did experience firm size growth. 
However, we have also looked at the performance of those manufacturing businesses in the 
database that have experienced major technological change, and have contrasted their results 
with those of all other manufacturing businesses in order to identify significant differences 
between the two sets. 
Business performance measures examined include levels of and changes in: 
(a) profitability, 
(b) relative quality and value, 
(c) market share, 
(d) employee productivity. 
Only for change in return on sales and level of employee productivity is the difference 
between the two sets of businesses statistically significant. A similar analysis undertaken for 
service businesses produced similar, generally negative results. 
Two other variables have been examined: 
(a) real sales growth, 
(b) real market growth. 
For these two variables, differences between the sets are extremely significant. 
It appears that the benefits to a manufacturing business from major technological change arise 
not from improvements in internal performance measures, but from relatively rapid sales 
growth arising from market growth. On this evidence, if technological change does not result 
in increased market growth, the business is likely to benefit only if it experiences growth in 
market share. 
The causality of the relationship between technology and market growth can be argued both 
ways - technological change both stimulates and is stimulated by market growth. 
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Table 5.5. Analysis of cost and output change 
Manufacturing Costs 
Costs excl Purchs. 
& Capital Charges 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Value of 
coefficients 
a b 
-0.8 0.73 
0.5 0.03 
-0.2 
0.4 
0.63 
0.02 
No of 
Bus's 
1003 
1003 
RSq 
0.38 
0.42 
F 
622 
740 
Prob 
0 
0 
Table 5.6. Manufacturing cost and output change for selected sectors 
NACE 
CODE 
327 
256 
325 
315 
344 
372 
247 
342 
251 
493 
346 
347 
341 
345 
61-65 
Manufacturing 
Costs 
Other specific equip. 
Other chemical 
products for industry 
Plant for mines 
Boilermaking 
Motor vehicles 
Telecomm. equip. 1 
Medico-surgical equip. 
Glassware 
Electrical equip. 
Basic ind. ehem. 
Photo cine labs 
Dom. type elee. app. 
Lamps & lighting eq. 
Elee, wires & cables 
Electronic equip. 
Services 
Retail/Wholesale 
Quartiles for 
Coefficients 
Upper quartile 
Median 
Lower quartile 
Average 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std errror 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Std error 
Value of 
coefficients 
a 
1.1 
3.5 
4.9 
4.2 
-4.7 
1.9 
0.2 
1.8 
-6.1 
5.6 
0.8 
4.2 
-3.6 
2.2 
-0.8 
2 
-3.4 
2.1 
2.4 
3.1 
-6.9 
4.6 
-3.4 
6.5 
-10.9 
5.1 
0.1 
7.4 
-7.8 
9.5 
2.6 
2.8 
-2.6 
5.2 
0.8 
-2.4 
-4.7 
-2.2 
b 
0.47 
0.25 
0.59 
0.19 
1.17 
0.09 
1.03 
0.15 
1.46 
0.34 
0.48 
0.4 
1 
0.15 
0.69 
0.13 
0.84 
0.09 
0.53 
0.14 
1 
0.2 
0.78 
0.29 
1.24 
0.26 
0.49 
0.38 
1.24 
0.61 
0.53 
0.16 
1.02 
0.41 
1.03 
0.84 
0.53 
0.86 
No of 
Bus's 
13 
38 
10 
9 
8 
16 
16 
10 
42 
53 
9 
10 
13 
14 
15 
34 
20 
RSq 
0.24 
0.21 
0.95 
0.88 
0.76 
0.09 
0.77 
0.77 
0.67 
0.21 
0.78 
0.47 
0.67 
0.12 
0.24 
0.26 
0.26 
F 
3.5 
9.7 
162 
51 
19 
1.4 
47 
27 
80 
13 
25 
7 
22 
1.7 
4.2 
11 
6.2 
Prob 
0.09 
0.004 
0 
0 
0.005 
0.25 
0 
0.001 
0 
0.001 
0.002 
0.029 
0.001 
0.22 
0.061 
0.002 
0.023 
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Table 5.7. Cost (excluding purchases) and output change for selected sectors 
NACE 
CODE 
327 
256 
325 
315 
351 
344 
372 
247 
342 
251 
493 
346 
347 
341 
345 
61 to 65 
Costs excl Purchs & 
Capitel Chgs 
Other specific equipment 
Other chemical products 
for industry 
Plant for mines 
Boilermaking 
Motor vehicles 
Telecommunication 
equipment 1 
Medico-surgical 
equipment 
Glassware 
Electrical equipment 
Basic Indust. chemicals 
Photo cine labs 
Domestic type electrical 
appliances 
Lamps & lighting 
equipment 
Electrical wires & cables 
Electronic equipment 
Services 
Retail / wholesale 
Quart i les for Coeff ic ients 
Upper Quartile 
Median 
Lower Quartile 
Average 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Std Error 
Values of Coeff ic ients 
a 
1.7 
2.5 
3.8 
3.4 
-1.1 
2 6 
-1.2 
1.6 
- 2 3 
4.7 
4.2 
3.8 
-1.6 
1.6 
1.3 
1.7 
-2.0 
1.6 
0.1 
2.3 
-2.5 
3.0 
-3.2 
4.7 
-6.8 
2.7 
0.7 
6.3 
-1.2 
4.2 
2.7 
2.0 
-0.5 
3.0 
0.9 
-1.2 
-2.1 
-0.6 
b 
0.41 
0.18 
0.54 
0.15 
0.99 
0.12 
1.05 
0.13 
0.92 
0.28 
0.23 
0.37 
0.81 
0.11 
0.48 
0.11 
0.66 
0.07 
0.49 
0.11 
0.63 
0.13 
0.72 
0.22 
0.88 
0.14 
0.46 
0.33 
0.45 
0.27 
0.53 
0.11 
0.79 
0.23 
0.83 
0.65 
0.49 
0.66 
No of 
Bus's 
13 
38 
10 
9 
8 
16 
16 
10 
42 
53 
9 
10 
13 
14 
15 
34 
20 
R S q 
0.33 
0.25 
0.89 
0.90 
0.65 
0.03 
0.81 
0.70 
0.66 
0.29 
0.76 
0.58 
0.78 
0.14 
0.18 
0.42 
0.38 
F 
5.4 
12 
66 
62 
11 
0.4 
58 
18 
79 
21 
22 
11 
39 
1.9 
2.8 
23 
11 
Prob 
0.041 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.016 
0.55 
0.000 
0.003 
0.000 
0.000 
0.002 
0.010 
0.000 
0.19 
0.12 
0.000 
0.004 
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6. Summary of the case study research 
As part of this project, a series of sector case studies was undertaken. The reasons for these 
case studies were three-fold: to examine the influence of the SM on dynamic economies of 
scale in activities such as R&D, marketing and personnel development; to examine the 
influence of the SM on external economies of scale and whether this has affected the location 
of activity; and thirdly to explore some of the practical issues underlying the examination of 
costs reported in Chapter 5. 
The typology of Davies and Lyons [1996] is particularly useful in distinguishing between 
sectors affected by different types of competition but also by different types of dynamic 
economies of scale, namely those associated with R&D and those associated with marketing 
and advertising. As discussed in Chapter 2, investment in both of these areas can be 
considered endogenous sunk costs; the question is therefore whether the SM has allowed firms 
which compete in these activities to exploit their investment more fully across the EU. 
Davies and Lyons argue that there have been a large number of fnergers involving R&D and 
advertising intensive industries (i.e. Type 2R, Type 2A and Type 2AR industries) since 1987, 
and these mergers have often been driven by the desire to exploit economies of scale. 
However, in relation to R&D and marketing, these economies of scale may be as closely 
related to learning by doing, knowledge transfer and the exchange of personnel between 
countries as to the establishment of any critical mass (or MES equivalent) in such activities. 
We therefore also explore this question in the case studies. 
In Section 2.5 of this report we discussed the theory of external economies of scale, much of 
which points to a significant potential impact, in terms of the agglomeration of activity, 
resulting from the SM. However, it is recognized that there is a large degree of indeterminacy 
in the locational choice of firms and therefore in the pattern of regional specialization. In the 
case studies we have explored the question of what, if any, external economies exert a 
particular influence on the location of activity by firms in the sectors concerned. The particular 
focus has been on local labour markets and component suppliers. 
However, the case studies do not reflect comprehensive research into regional specialization, 
which is outside the scope of the present project. What they seek to do is to provide some 
insight into the factors driving exploitation of scale economies in the sectors studied. 
Some consideration has also been given to two service sectors in relation to both dynamic and 
external economies of scale. Full reports on the case studies themselves are given in Appendix 
A. The sectors covered are shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1. Case study sectors 
Type 
2R 
2R 
2R 
2A 
2A 
2AR 
1 
1 
s 
s 
Concentration 
quadrant 
A 
C 
C 
C 
A/C 
D 
D 
D 
-
-
Sector 
Rail stock 
Pharmaceuticals 
Computers 
Chocolate confectioner}' 
Beer 
Motor vehicles 
Glass 
Clothing 
Insurance 
Retailing 
6.1. Industrial change and globalization 
All the sectors examined in the course of the case study research have been the subject of 
increasing rates of change in terms of industrial structure over the last ten years. For some (as 
in computers) this change has been profound, while for others (such as beer) the change has 
been more modest. In each case the nature of the opportunities for exploitation of scale 
economies has evolved in a way that has been largely independent of the SM programme. 
The reason for this is that all manufacturing sectors are experiencing the globalization of 
production, albeit at different rates. The phenomenon of globalization is not the subject of the 
present report, but it is an important context in which to place the research. Each case study 
also places the question of external and dynamic economies of scale in the context of the 
market trends evident within the EU over the period 1980-95. 
In certain sectors (such as rail stock and pharmaceuticals) there has been a wave of M&A 
activity prompted by the rising costs of R&D. In others (such as chocolate confectionery) a 
process of concentration has been stimulated by the trend towards global brand marketing, and 
the consequent exploitation of dynamic economies of scale. As was shown in Chapter 4, the 
Type 2R industries saw the greatest increase in concentration between 1987 and 1993, and this 
process has continued in the period since 1993, most markedly in pharmaceuticals. 
Both of the service sectors studied (insurance and retailing) exhibit the characteristics of 
industries which still retain largely national markets, although cross-border activity, including 
recent M&A activity, is increasing (and re-insurance has been global for many years). In these 
sectors, the concept of dynamic economies of scale has more relevance than that of external 
economies of scale, since the development of new insurance products or new retailing formats 
can clearly be influenced by the extent of current knowledge within the firm and the level of 
learning by doing, but the exploitation of external economies is minimal. The nature of the 
local labour market or even the local property market was not considered an influential factor 
in the location of activity by any of our insurance or retailing respondents. 
External economies of scale appear to be most applicable, of the case study sectors, to 
clothing. However, in all the sectors studied, the role of technological change has been 
important. For most, this change has been process-oriented, often bringing production costs 
down but also increasing the rate of innovation. In glass containers, increases in the size of 
furnaces and machines have contributed to a consolidation of production activity, and in beer 
there have been technological improvements leading to fewer, larger, faster breweries. 
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However, in computers and, to a lesser degree, motor vehicles, technological change has also 
been product-oriented. As the lifespan of new products becomes shorter and shorter, the 
incentive to sell those products, in common configurations, across as many national markets as 
possible increases. Removal of non-tariff barriers then becomes more relevant. 
The pursuit of Porter's [1980] three generic strategies of product differentiation, cost reduction 
or focus is clearly influenced by the rate of technological change in any given sector. Brief 
technological profiles of the NACE sectors considered by Buigues et al [1990] to be most 
sensitive to the SM are given in Appendix B. In the case studies we have identified the high 
degree of overlap between product differentiation and cost reduction; in motor vehicles, for 
example, cost reduction in the R&D process through the introduction of new technology has 
allowed firms to explore aspects of product differentiation more effectively and quickly. 
In the Type 2R industries there has been a general move towards greater focus in terms of 
product specialization, particularly in the computer equipment sector. In rail stock and 
pharmaceuticals there are some exceptions to this trend, with an expansion into financial 
services to customers by one rail rolling stock manufacturer and the development of disease 
management services by some pharmaceutical MNEs, but in general product development has 
been more tightly focused, and this has clearly assisted the exploitation of economies of scale. 
Again, the facility to market such products widely across the EU is important to the return on 
investment needed in these R&D intensive industries. 
The Type 2A industry case studies, chocolate and beer, show divergent trends in marketing, 
with the former experiencing economies through more pan-European marketing and greater 
product focus, and the later experiencing increased costs associated with increased marketing 
on a country by country basis, and expansion of the scope of their activities, i.e. a widened 
focus in terms of both product range and geographic coverage. Beer also demonstrates the link 
between process cost reduction and product differentiation through increased innovation. 
In Type 1 industries, the introduction of new process technology is obviously critical to 
competitiveness in terms of production costs. A cost reduction strategy is most apparent in the 
glass case study, but outward processing in clothing is also driven by cost reduction strategies. 
In summary, all three of Porter's generic strategies are evident in the case study sectors, 
although many of these strategic developments are linked to the globalization of production 
and technological change within the industry rather than the SM programme itself. 
6.2. The impact of the SM: Type 2R industries 
In Chapter 4 we discussed the evidence indicating that Type 2R industries have experienced 
the most significant SM effect in terms of resisting a decline in the average size of business 
unit where it was initially smallest relative to MES, and in terms of increased EU level 
concentration, although in both cases there have also been other important forces at work. 
There is no straightforward relationship between size of firm and the level of R&D 
investment, on the one hand, and the rate of innovation, on the other. However, larger firms 
Indeed, the overall size of business unit in the EU. and the level of national concentration have both declined: see 
Section 4.2. 
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may undertake incremental R&D activity which might not otherwise be possible, and 
competitive pressures may force an escalation of R&D expenditure leading to industry 
consolidation (see Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). 
In rail stock, there has been a significant reduction in costs, but for the most part this has not 
been through increases in plant size. Rather, the opening up of public procurement together 
with the harmonization of standards, has facilitated longer production runs of standard (i.e. 
uniform) rolling stock, and consequent reductions in the complexity of product adaptation and 
marketing. However, this standardization is by no means complete, and liberalization of user 
markets has not been sufficient for train specifiers not to add their own special requirements 
and thereby force short production runs. 
Knowledge transfer in R&D and best practice with regard to sourcing have had a major 
impact, and because of the importance of componentry in the total product cost, this has 
resulted in some significant economies. Although this is already a global industry, the case 
study research did indicate that without the consolidation that the SM has prompted, the 
European rail stock producers would have lost their international competitive position. 
In pharmaceuticals the level of competition has greatly intensified, and the reductions in some 
non-tariff barriers have contributed to this. However, a fully integrated EU pharmaceutical 
market is still some considerable way off and the different Member State policies on pricing 
and reimbursement are seen as significant hurdles in this respect. 
In responding to the intensified competition in the EU, partly prompted by Member States' 
own drug spending policies, pharmaceutical firms are engaging in more cross-border strategic 
alliances to gain R&D know-how and local marketing or distribution knowledge, as well as 
M&A activity. Some benefits from the SM in terms of the free movement of personnel and the 
possibilities for pan-European marketing are evident in the pharmaceutical industry, but these 
are emergent only. More significant has been the process of concentration of activity onto 
fewer sites, which may now include some of the peripheral Member States, but which is 
driven by global trends in the industry as much as by the SM programme itself. 
In computers, the ability to move personnel and assets across borders has assisted in the 
restructuring of the industry, but European MNEs are perceived to have lagged behind US 
MNEs operating in Europe in their view of a pan-EU market. This restructuring has led to 
dynamic economies of scale through greater focus and product/service specialization in R&D. 
The opening up of public procurement has also favoured this strategy. 
Labour costs account for a lower proportion of manufacturing costs in computers than they did 
in the period prior to the SM programme, but external economies of scale have become 
significant in relation to the local presence of customer headquarters and suppliers. This has 
encouraged the recent concentration of manufacturing activity in the UK and Ireland. 
Government incentives obviously also play an important part in this. 
6.3. The impact of the SM: Type 2A and 2AR industries 
In some advertising intensive industries, the opportunities for pan-EU marketing are more 
obvious than in others - where customer preferences are more consistent, or where packaging 
and labelling requirements are largely common. However, pecuniary gains (through media and 
advertising production discounts, for example) may still be difficult if, as Davies and Lyons 
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argue, the relevant geographical range of advertising activity is still identified at the national 
level. The question is therefore whether the move towards pan-European marketing and 
advertising has been stimulated or facilitated by the SM in any way and the extent to which the 
difficulties associated with such a move still exist. 
In chocolate confectionery, the most significant impact of the SM has been in the elimination 
of national restrictions on the pricing and supply of dairy and sugar inputs. This has helped to 
bring manufacturing costs down. However, the scope for production economies of scale may 
be limited by the Chocolate Directive (73/241/EEC, as amended), which allows Member State 
governments to set standards for production from their territories. 
The case study respondents felt that marketing had become an even more important 
competitive weapon in the chocolate industry during the period of the SM. There are 
increasing opportunities for marketing products from one EU factory all over Europe, subject 
to meeting national labelling requirements, and in rolling out new product innovations quickly 
across different countries. It is unlikely that such an approach would have been possible 
without the framework established by the SM, even though much of the investment required to 
implement such an approach anticipated the actual SM programme. 
In beer, there exist major differences between national markets in rates of excise duty and tax, 
and in the regulations concerning the supply and sale of alcohol. Consumer tastes also differ 
significantly between national (and even sub-national) markets. However, these latter 
differences are gradually reducing, affording opportunities for more widespread marketing 
campaigns. Knowledge transfer in both marketing and R&D is also growing, and with it a 
greater diversity of products are coming onto the market. 
These developments have been made possible in part by the realization of scale economies, 
which themselves have been assisted by the free movement of both products and capital 
embodied in the SM programme. Physical transportation is now much easier within the EU, 
and major intra-EU acquisitions since 1991 have been facilitated by the greater ease of capital 
movement. The level of cross-border M&A activity has been limited by the over-capacity in 
the industry, but increasingly firms are looking to sell products into EU markets from their 
own production facilities (rather than under licence). However, the siting of such facilities is 
less influenced by the presence of external economies (e.g. in raw material supply) than by the 
most effective use of expensive production facilities. The growth of the 'international' brewers 
and the rise in levels of competition in EU markets both have clear links to the SM 
programme, although the programme may not have provided the initial stimulus for such 
developments. 
In motor vehicles, the process of globalization of production has been a much more dominant 
force in the restructuring of the industry than has the creation of the SM. Globalization has 
been linked with the development of lean production methods, and also with the move 
towards the marketing of vehicles based on common product platforms across as many 
countries as possible. 
Upstream activities such as R&D and component sourcing are also becoming more integrated 
on a global basis; this process is not a result of the SM although the introduction of Whole 
Vehicle Type Approval in the EU is facilitating some concentration of regulatory activity. 
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Downstream activities such as marketing and advertising are still largely undertaken at the 
Member State level, although the after-market for parts is regionalizing to a certain extent. 
The SM does not appear to have influenced the location of vehicle manufacturing operations, 
although it may have positively affected the ability of component suppliers to trade across the 
EU. The realization of dynamic and external economies of scale does not therefore appear to 
have been significantly stimulated by the SM. 
6.4 The impact of the SM: Type 1 industries 
In Chapter 4 we discussed the fact that in Type 1 industries, in which competition is focused 
on production costs, firm size depends on production economies of scale and exogenous 
demand conditions. Public procurement bias obviously affects the second of these factors, but 
for the purposes of the case studies we sought to minimize this by choosing sectors which are 
not procurement intensive, namely glass and clothing. 
The glass industry can be divided into two sub-sectors - container glass and flat glass - and 
these sub-sectors are driven by different user requirements and different competitive pressures. 
Since the early 1980s the branded food and drink companies, to whom the glass container 
producers are suppliers, have become more European, catching up in this respect with the 
cosmetics industry. Users of glass containers have tended to reduce the number of their 
suppliers and to look for more innovation. There are important intellectual property rights 
involved here, but end-user demand still remains relatively conservative. 
Dynamic economies of scale in container glass are generated increasingly through the transfer 
of operational know-how. Mostly this has been associated with domestic M&A activity (in 
Germany, Italy and the UK). The transport costs of empty containers still limit the amount of 
cross-border product movement and hence the level of production and marketing integration 
within the EU. The principal external economy is related to the advances in process 
technology made by plant manufacturers, but these advances are global rather than European. 
Most raw materials are commodities. 
In flat glass, market growth has been boosted by EU regulations, particularly those on energy 
efficient buildings. There has also been some restructuring in the move towards more off-site 
finishing ('remote processing') and in the emergent export capability of Eastern European 
producers. 
Customer needs for flat glass are converging in the automotive sector, but the buildings 
market has been nationally defined until relatively recently. While R&D and marketing for the 
automotive sector can only be structured on an international (or global) basis, that for building 
products is only now moving towards this, through knowledge transfer between national 
operations and the establishment of co-ordinating committees within the glass producer firms, 
particularly the two dominant EU producers (Saint-Gobain and Pilkington). 
This internationalization of the flat glass industry has occurred largely independently of the 
SM, although improved market access and the harmonization of building regulations have 
probably assisted the process. 
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In clothing, there is also a process of internationalization occurring, including increased FDI 
and outward processing by the major Italian companies who were the focus of the clothing 
case study. New relationships are being established between producers and distributors, with 
an increase in the level of downstream control and an increase in distributor concentration. 
The Italian clothing industry mostly uses domestic suppliers, and can exploit particular 
external economies in certain regions in terms of local material sourcing and labour. The SM 
has opened up new market opportunities for the clothing manufacturers, which has had a 
growth effect on the supplier industry, in the south as well as the north of the country. In 
particular, the SM may pave the way for more bulk outsourcing to local SMEs, which offer 
efficiency savings to the manufacturers. 
6.5. The impact of the SM: service industries 
The EU Insurance Directives have led to significant readjustment by most of the major 
operators in relation to a more competitive market environment. The life insurance market has 
not become more concentrated over the period since 1989, but that for non-life insurance has 
consolidated and there has been a wave of cross-border M&A activity. 
In the non-life sector, common European approaches in marketing and personnel development 
are now emerging, but these are only due in part to the SM programme; a process of 
internationalization in the industry was already underway. Nevertheless, dynamic economies 
of scale have been achieved in terms of improved customer servicing and increased innovation 
in claims processing. Reorganization of claims processing for certain major operators has 
taken place on a European basis. In the life sector, on the other hand, different Member State 
tax regimes have precluded this cross-border approach. 
External economies of scale have become available through the increased competition 
between agents and brokers, but this is not linked to the SM programme. The free movement 
of capital, as well as persons and services, has allowed insurance operators to work towards a 
single business structure within the EU, particularly in non-life activities. Market entry in 
Germany has also been greatly facilitated. But overall, the impact of the directives on 
economies of scale has been very limited; the establishment of mechanisms for transfer of best 
practice and the introduction of new information technology have been far more important. 
In retailing, there has been a concentration of activity in almost all EU countries over the last 
15 years. The level of cross-border investment increased during the early 1990s, but there are 
still clearly defined national markets, with distinct customer needs and tastes. Strategic 
alliances are nevertheless becoming more common, with the exchange of market knowledge 
and operating know-how being a key benefit, as well as (in some cases) increased purchasing 
power. One respondent saw their membership of the European Council as important to their 
'relative learning rate'. 
The free movement of products has assisted cross-border sourcing, but food health regulations 
still limit this in some areas. Beyond this, external economies do not really exist. Expansion 
into other EU markets by the major retailers may in fact lead to diseconomies through 
management complexity. Nevertheless, the widening frame of reference for product sourcing 
and innovation, and for store operating systems, has at least been assisted by the expectations 
of the SM programme. 
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APPENDIX A 
Case studies on dynamic and external economies of scale 
A.l. Rail rolling stock 
A. 1.1. Market trends 1980-95 
Demand for rail stock in the EU has been highly volatile over the period, despite an underlying 
upward trend; variations in public purchasing patterns have given rise to major 'spurts' in 
orders at particular points, spread unevenly between EU national markets. However, 
consumption actually fell in real terms during the second half of the 1980s. Combined with a 
severe deterioration in the external trade balance, this produced a large fall in output. Steady 
recovery since then has been built on a strong recovery in apparent consumption, and a more 
erratic trend in external trade. Net exports, recovering strongly in 1990-91 appear to have 
weakened somewhat since. 
The rail stock industry has always been global, in the sense that European firms have been 
active internationally throughout their history, and a number of leading EU producers are 
derived - at least in part - from investment in Europe by major US electrical firms in the early 
part of the century. A large part of EU output has historically gone to third country markets, in 
stiff competition with US and other producers. However, the role of third country exports has 
been variable, with the export:production ratio swinging between 29% and 9% over the last 
ten years. This is partly because of the volatility of international markets, affected as they are 
by major contracts, and partly because historic protection brought about by national preference 
in public purchasing gave rise to excess capacity - which was filled by exports when local 
demand slackened. 
The decline in net exports which has to some extent been evident may reflect increasing 
sensitivity to local costs, but the EU is still by far the largest producer bloc in the world, 
including all three of the world's largest producer companies (excluding China, where the 
valuation of output and estimation of company size is problematic). There has been a major 
fall in overall employment in the sector, from over 90,000 to under 70,000. Individual 
companies have seen even sharper proportionate falls. 
The industry has seen a dramatic shift in concentration. According to contributing companies 
to which we have spoken, these changes in European industry structure have been essential to 
keep it globally competitive; without the changes the participation in export markets would 
have seen a much sharper decline, and even some of the European based operations could 
have been under threat of change of ownership. These changes are summarized as: 
(a) 1988 merger of Asea & Brown Boveri (part outside EU, anticipating entry); 
(b) 1989 merger of GEC/Alsthom, as part of larger restructuring; 
(c) 1989 GEC Alsthom acquired most Spanish capacity, and replaced it; 
(d) 1994 GEC Alsthom took over LHB; 
(e) 1995 merger of ABB/AEG to form Adtranz; 
(f) 1996 (since interviews for this study) GEC Alsthom and Siemens agreed joint approach 
for extra-EU marketing. 
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Adtranz, GEC Alsthom and Siemens are now the three largest rail stock producers in the 
world. With world market value around £13—£20 bn (depending on the value placed on output 
of East European countries and China), producer estimates for the leading company output and 
shares are as follows: 
Company Sales (£bn) Approx. world share 
Adtranz 
GEC Alsthom 
Siemens 
'Japan Inc'* 
GE 
Westinghouse 
Ansaldo 
Bombardier 
Fiat 
1.7 
1.3 
1.0 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
(7%) 
(5%) 
(5%) 
(4%) 
(3%) 
* Japan Inc represents Hitachi, Toshiba etc., who are effectively seen by European competitors on international 
markets as a co-ordinated force, operating in consortia with changing composition. Similar Korean groups are 
coming in behind the Japanese. 
These top nine organizations only produce around 40% of world output - which is evidence of 
a relatively fragmented global supply pattern, in which European firms should have at least 
some scale advantage. The questions we have explored in our discussions with respondent 
companies include: 
(a) Has the concentration process in Europe been influenced by the single market? 
(b) Does it bring EU producers any advantage? 
Markets for rail stock are changing in character, from domination by large state purchasing 
organizations (often as few as two per country - one for underground and one for railways) to 
a wider spread of customers as a result of privatization and deregulation. This process has 
probably gone furthest in the UK, where there will probably be at least 30 train operators by 
1997. These customers will buy train services - rather than trains. Vehicle builders now have 
to market their output to these customers by finding financing partners, who are able to put 
'packages' together to lease products to the train operating companies. These packages can 
significantly change the relationship between the producer of the train and its operator. 
These changing customer needs are altering the cost structure of businesses operating in the 
rail vehicle market, both in terms of the costs of dealing with a larger customer base, and the 
need to meet changing customer specifications. Marketing costs are now significant as a 
measurable cost item for the first time for many years. R&D costs can be up to 3% of total 
costs; these were previously significantly lower in the UK (almost zero in the case of one of 
our respondents) but have historically been higher in France, and to some extent in Germany. 
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A. 1.2. Overview of respondents' operations 
Both respondents consulted for this study are parts of the 'big three' major European 
companies. Both have been affected significantly by the acquisition and consolidation process. 
Both have been transformed from predominantly national operations, and have become parts 
of pan-European firms with production, design, development and marketing capability in five 
or more major consuming countries. 
One respondent has come from being part of a general engineering group, with sales originally 
limited mainly to one EU country, plus exports from surplus capacity to international markets, 
in this situation it had only one operational site, and no R&D capability. It still operates in this 
way within a large group, but now has access to development and marketing resources and to 
supply sources across Europe. It operates as an 'integrator', specializing in design and 
assembly for components produced by others - both inside and outside the larger company. Its 
number of employees since 1981 has been very variable, reflecting the ups and downs of 
major contracts, but is currently half its starting value. 
This company's view of location for production is interesting. It regards its core competence 
to be in design, procurement of components and assembly; the location of assembly is only 
one of the important competitive factors. 'We design a big "Airfix kit" - buy the parts and put 
them together - and the assembly can be moved.' Local assembly can be important; to some 
extent in Europe but even more so elsewhere. So a spread of facilities available for assembly 
(through sister companies) is helpful; 'If you want to be a major supplier in a national market 
in Europe, you virtually have to be there.' Creating local assembly, through leasing capacity, 
subcontracting or longer term partnership, can therefore be a highly desirable move in some 
markets - especially the Far East. 
The other respondent was part of an electrical group, which has made major purchases to 
establish itself as a supplier of complete rail systems, rather than simply components. In doing 
so, it has quadrupled its turnover, tripled the number of production sites, and doubled the 
number of employees. 
Our respondents included the managing director of one company, and the technical director of 
the other. 
Both respondents regard the merger process which has occurred in Europe as essential to 
permit the EU industry to remain internationally competitive. 'Without it we would not have 
been able to keep pace with developments elsewhere.' There has been a steady increase in the 
scale of economic operation for rail vehicle production, and the number of plants has reduced. 
The impact of these scale economies, and strong competition, has shown up in the trend of 
real price reductions - even, for one of the companies interviewed, substantial current price 
reductions. The average price per vehicle sold (uncorrected for changes in specification) has 
reduced from over £650,000 in 1980-85 to under £390,000 in 1995. 
Ability to take advantage of cross-border sales opportunities and component procurement is 
still limited by remaining differences in standards, and by the surviving tendency of the 
remaining national buyers to buy 'one-offs' for their country only. 'They go through the call 
for tenders, but usually there is a locally preferred supplier who is set up to supply the local 
specification', and 'There has been important progress on standards harmonization to promote 
interoperability, but there is still sufficient difference remaining - compounded by power 
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supply differences - to make it possible for purchasers to exercise national preference where 
they wish to.' 
Our respondents have differing views on the role of strategic alliances. One company says that 
'We have work to do managing relationships within the larger company, but may be interested 
in external alliances if they can save us work in the design process, and thus deal with 
customers faster, giving competitive advantage. This may also apply where partners are very 
close (geographically). But we only have one "key supplier" arrangement at the moment'. The 
other manages relationships with three or four external companies - mostly within the same 
national market as the company's home base, but also across the Atlantic. 
A. 1.3. Factors driving dynamic and production economies of scale 
Importance 
Significant changes are in progress in the market factors which influence the effect of scale 
economies. Although the European market is not yet homogeneous in terms of customer 
needs, it is starting to converge due to the willingness of non-state buyers to purchase standard 
units (or units based on standard modules) at lower prices, rather than insist on tailored 
engineering solutions. As the number of independent train operators grows, and they start to 
become more concerned with rail travel as a 'high quality' transport mode - able to compete 
for profitable customers - this tendency is expected by producers to accelerate. As rail 
operators become more customer conscious, and less dominated by operating company-based 
teams of design engineers, the scope for design and production economies will grow. One of 
our respondents claims that its existing order book is already influenced by this trend. 
There is a clear lead market for innovation, especially in the HST product area, and it is 
France; participation in the French market is an advantage for those producers involved, who 
consider that it gives them significant spin-off, both in product capability and design quality, 
and in developing new design and assembly processes. For example, one contributor which 
has a sister company in France engaged in TGV projects, found that a design approach 
borrowed from the sister company was able to halve assembly time for the main shell of the 
train. 
Respondents confirm that the importance of R&D expenditure has increased at the same time 
as common standards have taken hold, and the quality of product expected by train operators 
has improved. One makes clear that in the early 1980s it did virtually no R&D, other than 
short-term research on how to design to rail operators' detailed specifications. This would no 
longer be a feasible strategy. Now, as part of a much larger group, it is able to undertake 
limited research within the operating subsidiary - and more importantly, can now benefit from 
the substantial research activity of its sister operating companies. 
All major competitors are now present in most European countries, usually with the capability 
for local manufacture, which increases competitive pressures to exploit available economies. 
At the same time, cost differences in production factors (mainly labour) have increased over 
time, with the UK having lower input costs. However, productivity differences are probably 
greater still, and tend to operate in the opposite direction; for example, in 1995-96 UK 
productivity was lower, but not enough to outweigh lower UK wages. 
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Free movement of goods and capital may be partially inhibited by differences remaining in 
technical standards, but in practice the capital movement provisions have probably made the 
overall consolidation of the industry possible. This has been done by networks of 
shareholdings across the majority of the largest companies - probably more secure and easier 
to organize within a single capital market. 
Knowledge transfer 
Both responding companies have taken steps to improve the transfer of knowledge in their 
operations across Europe. In one, the process started before 1990, with systems for common 
reporting of production costs and methods. The process was based on reporting systems 
already in use in one of the component companies. This then spread through to procurement 
and development after 1990. It was complemented by external consultant input to develop 
common marketing, product development and personnel/training approaches. 
In the other company, steps to transfer know-how on technical issues have developed since 
1990; learning on production processes is well advanced, R&D is shared, and international 
component purchasing is much more widely practised than it used to be. But development of 
knowledge transfer was initially held up by reliance on reporting systems, rather than using 
direct contact and face to face comparisons. 
A. 1.4. Benefits from dynamic scale economies 
Both respondents identify gains in the following areas since 1980-85: 
(a) cost reduction - in procurement and manufacturing; 
(b) better innovation pay-off from R&D; 
(c) access to better quality components, and improved production techniques; 
(d) more effective marketing, identifying changing customer needs to be met. 
Changes in procurement patterns are covered in the next section, but the impact of European 
scale competition is acknowledged by both respondent companies. Access to a wider range of 
markets, and the ability to 'spread' the benefits of new product designs and process advances 
clearly have made, and are still making, an impact. However, one respondent identified a 
threat which will arise as standards across the EU continue to converge. 'At present it isn't 
worth the Americans' while putting the effort into Europe, because they still have a range of 
specifications and power supply systems to contend with. When there is only one, they will 
make the effort, and secure part of the market - at the expense of EU producers.' 
Diversity and scope of activities 
In both respondent companies, the emphasis of commercial strategy in a larger market has 
been to focus effort at 'the top of the chain', i.e. to be an integrator of either complete rail 
systems or of complete vehicles. Operational focus has been strongly maintained in both 
companies in the areas in which each has competitive strengths. Rather than extending the 
range of products offered, the increase in scope for both has been in the range of financial 
options and services offered to customers - and in the sale of serviced train capacity, rather 
than simply vehicle hardware. 
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The effects of a larger single market permitting scale economies has been different in different 
areas. One of our respondents, catering for a market in which privatization is well advanced, 
already sees the impact of simpler specifications made in longer runs - driven by profit 
motivated train operators who are more interested in train quality than engineering detail. 'If 
they are happy to leave more of the design to us, we can optimize production.' The other still 
sees the need to broaden product range to meet different country needs, and probably incurs 
higher marketing costs as a result. 
Influence of external economies 
Savings in procurement represent in part the external economies achieved from doing a better 
job with specific suppliers, rather than simply exerting bargaining power. 
Inputs to vehicle building appear to have been highly competitive over the last 15 years. An 
estimate from one of the respondents shows average vehicle selling price at just over half what 
it was in 1982 - and approaching 80% of vehicle costs from bought-in components or sub-
assemblies. This can only be achieved because input suppliers have achieved major cost 
reductions. The other respondent estimates price reductions of around 30% in components and 
in finished vehicles over the period 1981-95. 
Access to better (cross company) data on supply sources available across Europe has 
contributed to these results, and so has - in one respondent company - a programme to 
identify best suppliers for specific components. For example, a supplier of seats in France has 
been identified as able to beat others on both quality and cost - and has benefited accordingly, 
with this information fed to other plants within the group. One respondent used to buy the 
majority of components within 100 km of its plant, but now goes further afield - including 
major purchase items such as bodies and bogies from 500 km distance or more - as he now 
has internal suppliers within the group who are able to offer better quality and prices than were 
available in the local area. 
Both respondents make it clear that intensity of competition among component suppliers has 
been fierce. This has led in some instances to outsourcing operations which the unit formerly 
did itself, either as part of the internal rationalization which has occurred as a result of merger 
or acquisition, or simply by buying in components. 
Both respondents confirm that improved innovation and quality have been at least as 
important in developing external relationships with suppliers/partners as have lower costs. The 
need to develop designs quickly to meet specific tender opportunities means that speed of 
response is an important quality of service measure for component suppliers. Developing 
relationships with identified leaders in specific fields has helped at least one of the 
respondents to improve its competitive capability in this respect. 'We would like to share 
development cost and speed up our response to design change needs; if we can delegate part of 
the design job to a key supplier, then we can deal with customers faster.' But both respondents 
are looking for the majority of their key supplier or strategic alliance relationships at firms 
within the country where they have their own main design capability. Proximity is seen to be a 
factor which helps rapid service and good understanding. As one respondent said, 'We prefer 
key suppliers to speak not just the same language, but the same local dialect.' 
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A. 1.5. Role of the single market 
There is no doubt that our respondents believe the single market measures - mainly 
harmonization of standards and opening up of public procurement - have had an impact on the 
operation of the market for rail stock. However, their perception is that these have not been the 
most important factors behind the drive to achieve production scale economies, dynamic scale 
economies, and external economies in supply of components - all of which have occurred. 
In their view, the pressure to realize economies - both from scale and from more efficient 
methods of working - has come about primarily because the industry has continued to feel the 
effects of global competition, in a world market where Europe has for long been leader. The 
benefits of standards harmonization have been slow to be realized, partly because of the 
dominant role of national network engineers in setting procurement specifications. Only now, 
with additional commercial pressures on train operators and purchasers, are train builders able 
to take the initiatives necessary to achieve all the available design and production economies. 
However, it is difficult to accept that an industry which has seen such dramatic real reduction 
in the prices and costs of its output - at the same time as major moves towards concentration -
has not achieved those economies at least to some degree because competition has driven the 
greater scale of enterprises. Both of the respondent companies are clearly aware of the threat 
of greater potential - and actual - competition within their main national markets as a result of 
harmonized standards and more open procurement. They both rate this additional competition 
within the EU as having the greatest impact in prompting the exploitation of production, 
dynamic and external economies. 
However, as one respondent said, 'The concentration process was essential to enable us to 
meet international competition. It is certainly arguable that the mergers and acquisitions which 
made this possible would have been much more difficult to achieve if there had not been a 
single market to guarantee the free movement of capital, and free movement of people and 
skills'. 
If this view is correct, then by facilitating the mergers which have occurred, the single market 
programme may have given the rail stock industry in Europe an opportunity to develop its 
position further. There is still relatively strong competition between EU producers, provided 
there are limits to further concentration, and the groupings which have emerged are taking 
advantage of the scope available to learn best practice from their different component parts. 
Certainly if the structure had remained as fragmented as it was in the early 1980s, EU firms 
would have found it difficult to respond in a market where both costs of technical 
development, and the costs of conducting business with a more complex customer base, are 
rising. 
A.2. Pharmaceuticals 
A.2.1. Market context 
Demand trends 
The world pharmaceutical market is dominated by Europe, the US and Japan; however, 
growth is much higher in the developing world. 
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Pharmaceuticals companies today are addressing four trends facing their industry: increased 
world-wide competition largely due to new technology, increased downward pressure on 
prices and profits from governments reducing healthcare spending, rising R&D costs and 
increased market harmonization. The two most common strategies for dealing with these 
trends are acquisition of other pharmaceuticals companies (and expanding into the OTC 
market; e.g. Glaxo's acquisition of Wellcome, American Home Products' purchase of 
Cyanamid in the US and the Swiss company Roche's purchase of the US's Syntex) and the 
acquisition of drug distributors (e.g. Merck, SmithKline Beecham and Eli Lilly - see Table 
A.2.1), a strategy which is more common in the US. 
Additionally, many pharmaceuticals companies are focusing increasingly on the development 
of self-medication products, responding to the changing behaviour of patients. Some are even 
producing their own generic versions of popular drugs in order to limit sales losses after 
patents expire. 
Increasing pressure on prices (mostly from European governments and changes in national 
reimbursement systems) is having an impact on pharmaceutical research. Greater emphasis is 
now being placed on therapy-oriented medicines which respond to broad medical needs and 
have a large potential market. In some instances, companies are finding it more efficient to 
separate their research and development functions. 
Until the 1990s drugs companies largely concentrated on providing drugs. This decade's 
pressure from governments and insurance companies intent on controlling healthcare costs has 
likewise placed pressure on pharmaceutical companies. Drugs account for less than 20% of the 
world's $2,000 bn expenditure on healthcare, so pharmaceutical companies have recently been 
moving into the other 80% of the market by integrating pharmaceuticals with hospital and 
doctor services. These alliances provide 'disease management services'. The intention is to 
help co-ordination and continuity of patient care, improve cost incentives for early diagnosis 
and preventative measures, and make measurement of the quality of healthcare easier. They 
may also play a direct role in controlling costs in combination with a capitation system of 
paying for care (whereby healthcare providers are paid not according to the number and kind 
of treatments performed, but on a flat fee per head of population basis). Disease management 
packages in areas such as diabetes and cancer could help the setting of that fee by 
encapsulating all aspects of treating a disease and giving it a single price tag. 
This strategy is not, however, being adopted by all pharmaceutical companies. Some have 
chosen to affirm their future in the discovery and marketing of new drugs (e.g. Glaxo's 
purchase of Wellcome). It is predicted that the pharmaceuticals industry of 2000 will be split 
into two camps: research-driven drugs companies and diversified suppliers of healthcare 
[Financial Times, 25 April 1995]. 
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Table A.2.1. The pharmaceutical industry in 
Research-driven drugs 
companies 
Glaxo Wellcome 
Astra 
Amgen 
Rhône-Poulenc Rorer 
Research-driven medical 
products companies 
Pfizer 
Sandoz 
Roche 
Bristol Myers Squibb 
2000 
Research-driven healthcare 
companies 
Merck 
Eli Lilly 
SmithKline Beecham 
Zeneca 
Unreconstructed 
conglomerates 
Bayer 
BASF 
Source: FT. 25 April 1995. 
Concentration 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers generally do not compete in all therapeutic classes of products; 
most focus their efforts on a small number of classes, due to the huge resources necessary to 
cover more than four or five therapeutic classes successfully. There exists strong competition 
in the pharmaceuticals market both within Europe and worldwide. In the early 1990s no single 
drugs company had a dominant position in the market: none had a world market share of more 
than 4%, and the top ten producers had just a 22% world market share based on turnover. In 
1991 the pharmaceutical company selling the greatest amount in the EU market held only a 
4% share. The second and third largest companies had shares only marginally smaller. 
Together the three held less than a 12% EU market share. The top ten accounted for under a 
third. [Johnson, 1993]. 
Table A.2.2. Market shares of leading corporate groups, 1990 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Spain 
UK 
Japan 
USA 
Five leading corporate groups (%) 
22.9 
30.5 
19.1 
21.1 
27.5 
27.8 
18.2 
29.6 
22.6 
28.7 
Source: Johnson, European Industries, 1993. 
These data suggest that the EU pharmaceuticals market is not very concentrated in terms of 
sales. Even in the most concentrated market, France, the top five firms held less than a one-
third market share. So neither is there much support for the notion that national 
pharmaceutical markets are highly concentrated. 
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Mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances 
Pharmaceutical managers responding to a survey of expectations in 19908 expected future 
consolidation in the industry through mergers and acquisitions of SMEs realigning themselves 
to prepare for the single market. They did not, however, believe that EU market integration 
would be the catalyst for consolidation in the first tier of the industry (large multinationals). 
The results of the study indicated that global trends rather than regional integration was the 
driver for mega-mergers in the industry. 
Since most large pharmaceutical companies dominate only a few pharmaceutical market 
segments, many are finding mergers or acquisitions increasingly attractive in order to meet the 
changing market. In addition, collaboration between firms and investment by large 
pharmaceutical companies in local R&D and/or manufacturing is helping to create competitive 
research industries. Marketing agreements and other joint venture programmes are providing 
greater development opportunities for all parties involved. The following table details the 
largest mergers and acquisitions that have occurred world-wide over the past few years among 
companies of the same nationality and cross-border. 
M&As appear to have been quite common among the multinational pharmaceutical 
companies. However, Pfizer, the third largest US drugs company, believes it is possible to cut 
costs and improve R&D without using acquisitions by downsizing across the company, 
combining financial services through Europe, through Asia and in the US, and rapidly 
introducing new technologies by surrounding itself with a ring of biotechnology alliances. 
In 1994 the chief executive of SmithKline Beecham predicted that another wave of mergers 
and acquisitions would change the pharmaceuticals industry, as mid-sized companies 
succumbed to larger competitors better able to compete with developments in the healthcare 
industries. In consequence, he predicted that many manufacturing sites and hundreds of 
distribution centres would close as part of restructuring programmes following acquisitions. 
Purchases would lay the ground for transformation into broad-based suppliers of human 
healthcare whose customers pay for healthcare, not doctors. 
Chaudhry et al. 'The pharmaceutical industry and European integration'. European Management Journal. Vol. XII. No. 
4. Dec. 1994. 
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Table A.2.3. Mergers 
Bidder 
Merck (US) 
Roche (CI I) 
Sandoz (Cll) 
SKB(UK) 
Hoechst (D) 
Eli Lilly (US) 
American Home Products 
(US) 
SKB(UK) 
Glaxo (UK) 
Rhône-Poulenc Rorer (US) 
Pharmacia (S) 
Ciba (S) 
Glaxo (UK) 
Novartis 
namic and external economies of scale 
and acquisitions in the 
Target 
Medco (US) 
Syntex (US) 
Gerber (US) 
Diversified pharmaceuticals 
Marion Merrill Dow (US) 
PCS(US) 
Cyanamid (US) 
Sterling Winthrop (US) 
Wellcome (UK) 
Fisons (UK) 
Upjohn (US) 
Chiron (biotech. US) 
Affymax (mid-sized biotech) 
Ciba + Sandoz 
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pharmaceuticals sector world-wide 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1996 
Value £ 
3.8bn 
3.4bn 
2.4bn 
1.4bn 
4.6bn 
2.6bn 
6.3bn 
1.9bn 
9.0bn 
1.7bn 
8.4bn 
controlling interest 
333m 
Source: Financial Times, various. 
Trade 
The pharmaceutical industries of the EU differ widely among Member States. France and 
Germany accounted for 24% of the EU's ECU 67.9 bn market, the UK 18%, Italy 15% and 
Spain 7% (Remit). The UK and German pharmaceutical industries are largely self-sufficient, 
carrying out all stages of manufacture, supplying most of their own markets and exporting 
drugs and active materials. France differs somewhat in that its industry depends more on 
imports of materials. Likewise, Italy and Spain are major importers of active materials. Other 
Member States whose pharmaceutical industries are highly export-oriented but also import a 
high proportion of consumption are Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
American companies supply most of what they sell in the Member States of the EU by local 
manufacture. The US was the leader in discoveries of new medicines during the 1970s and 
1980s. By the criterion of number of medicines introduced into major markets of the 
developed world, the US was still the leader but was followed closely by the EU. The success 
rate of the UK was particularly high and those of France and Italy quite low. 
A.2.2. Overview of respondents' operations 
The case study respondents included two executives of a major German pharmaceutical 
company and an executive of an American pharmaceutical multinational located in the UK. 
The Germany company maintained 100 sites across the EU responsible for all five of the 
following activities between 1981 and 1990: procurement, production, marketing, R&D, and 
training and recruitment. However, between 1991 and 1995 the company embarked on a 
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centralization programme, particularly in the areas of procurement, production and R&D. This 
has brought the number of sites down to 80. The centralization trend is expected to become 
even more important over the next ten years and will encompass all five activities. In the past 
the company did not consider it necessary to have centralization in Europe because 
profitability was high in all countries. The benefits of economies of scale were simply not 
necessary. Additionally, national laws made it necessary to be physically present in all 
markets. 
Over the past five years the company has increasingly entered into joint ventures all over 
Europe. Additionally, it has entered four new markets, including the building of subsidiaries 
with marketing and administrative functions. The company's alliances in other countries have 
mainly been driven by the need to market successful products in new markets where the 
company formerly had no presence. The most important drivers of these alliances have been 
the need to exploit economies of scale, and reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade. Over the 
next decade strategic alliances will become much more important, especially in the areas of 
production and marketing/distribution. Most of these alliances will probably be of a type 
which will cover several Member States. 
The American firm had growth in European turnover of $500 m in the early 1980s, rising to 
$700 m later in the decade, to $1 bn in the first half of the 1990s. It has had, and continues to 
have, an R&D presence in every European market. The firm has entered into no new EU 
markets in the 1980s or 1990s. The company embarked on strategic alliances in marketing and 
distribution in the 1980s, but this strategy changed in the 1990s when alliances were more in 
the area of R&D. Today the company is entering into more alliances with SMEs and these 
asymmetrical alliances are growing in number. The most important reason given for entering 
these alliances is increased competition in the company's markets. Less important have been 
higher costs in R&D, and of no influence at all has been reductions in non-tariff barriers to 
trade resulting from the SM programme. 
Factors driving dynamic EOS 
In general, a European pharmaceutical company's R&D facilities are widely scattered but its 
discovery research is highly concentrated in the firm's country of origin. The typical 
subsidiary centre does local development work or clinical testing. Concentration in R&D is 
expected to take place slowly, as with production. The SM programme is not thought to have 
much impact on strategies for innovation - other factors such as scientific opportunities and 
labour resources are more important. As with production, downward pressure on prices and 
mergers have had a larger impact. 
With regard to economies of scale in marketing and sales, companies have different sales 
forces for different audiences, e.g. general practitioners versus specialists, and sometimes for 
different products. If mergers lead to the elimination of overlapping products then sales forces 
can be reduced as well. 
In contrast to the opinion of other pharmaceutical executives, those from the German company 
cited the most important factors driving dynamic economies of scale as single market effects, 
including the free movement of capital and people and harmonized technical standards. The 
liberalization of public procurement has not been a factor. Other minor factors include 
homogenous market needs and common marketing approaches. 
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The factors of highest significance driving dynamic economies of scale for the American 
multinational have been increased competition and increasing minimum scale for R&D. Of 
lesser significance, but still factors, have been scale economies in R&D driven by common 
customers, and economies in marketing from common marketing approaches. Another market 
driver has been increasing minimum scale for marketing/advertising. Cost drivers in the form 
of country factor costs differences and communication/personnel efficiency differences have 
been somewhat important in driving scale economies in R&D. The single market effects have 
been important in the area of economies in personnel organization through the free movement 
of people. Scale economies in marketing have been driven by harmonized technical standards 
to a certain degree. 
Knowledge transfer between operations in national markets has occurred in the areas of 
production and marketing for the German company. Between 1991 and 1995 external 
consultants and internal facilitators have assisted in this transfer in the area of production. 
During the same time period, external consultants, internal facilitators, common 
datacommunications and shared training have all helped in the area of marketing, particularly 
in market research. 
For the American multinational, knowledge transfer has occurred in many key activities. In 
procurement this has come about through reporting systems to transfer development ideas. In 
production, knowledge transfer has come through internal facilitators, reporting systems and 
common IT systems. In marketing it has occurred through shared training, and in personnel 
and training it has come about through reporting systems. 
The scope of activities of the German company with regard to marketing approaches and 
channels, technical diversity, range of products/services and skills of new or newly trained 
staff did not change in the survey period. 
The American multinational, on the other hand, has indeed changed its scope of activities. In 
its range of marketing approaches and channels used, the company has narrowed its focus. In 
the area of technical diversity and range of products/services offered it has also narrowed 
focus on fewer therapeutic areas due to increasing global competition and reduced 
pharmaceutical spending at national level. With regard to the range of skills of new or newly 
trained staff, however, the company has increased its range with 'less people doing more' 
facilitated by the increasingly important role of IT. 
The benefits of dynamic economies of scale reaped by the American multinational have been 
cost reduction in procurement, production and personnel development, better quality in 
procurement, production, marketing and R&D development and greater innovation in 
marketing, production and R&D development. 
Influence of external economies of scale 
The German company has not experienced any input cost changes, nor did it therefore report 
any benefits gained from increased external economies of scale. 
The American multinational's cost structure changed between the first half of the 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s. Marketing and selling costs increased from 28% of total cost to 
30%, and R&D increased from 10% to around 15.5%. However, some unit input costs have 
declined. Costs of agents and distributors in the EU declined 20% between 1981 and 1986, 
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and declined a further 6% by 1991. Local labour costs have also dropped - by 10% during the 
early 1980s, and by a further 5.6% during the late 1980s. Driving these changes has been 
increased competition among suppliers and distributors. Of somewhat lesser importance have 
been reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade resulting from the SM programme, and increased 
geographic proximity of suppliers and distributors to the company's operations. Increased 
scale and buying power in the company's own operations has been of some importance, but 
not a great deal. 
The greatest benefit the American multinational has gained from increased external economies 
of scale has been market penetration via strategic alliances, closely followed by innovation in 
products/services and processes, also through alliances. Of some but lesser importance have 
been cost reduction of minor inputs, increases in product and service quality and more 
efficient geographic location of activity. 
Role of the single market 
In 1995 EAG provided financial support for a follow-up survey of pharmaceutical company 
executives along the same lines as the 1990 survey reported in Chaudhry et al [1994]. This 
survey asked participants to identify any strategic issues related to regional integration that 
have affected the pharmaceutical industry. Some of the strategies mentioned which also 
encompass the possibility of reaping greater economies of scale included monitoring the 
potential for vertical and horizontal integration of wholesale distribution in the EU, seeking 
R&D synergies with other firms, rationalizing production facilities, changing the 
organizational structure of the firm (i.e. to restructure the firm from a decentralized to 
centralized approach), developing more co-marketing and co-licensing agreements, and 
creating one pan-European tradename. 
The single market programme's reductions in non-tariff barriers will mean increased 
competition for the German company, which plans to cope via intensive use of strategic 
alliances in future. Other factors which will become increasingly important, although they 
have not been in the past, include homogeneous market needs, common customers, common 
marketing approaches, increasing minimum sale for production and R&D, country factor costs 
differences and public procurement liberalization, all of which the SM programme is expected 
to facilitate. 
The single market programme has been of some importance to the American multinational in 
the areas of personnel organization (through the free movement of people/skills) and in 
marketing (through harmonized technical standards). Pan-European marketing has improved 
the competitive performance of the company, and increased production efficiency has come 
about through opportunities for rationalization which the SM programme has afforded in 
reductions in non-tariff barriers. 
Numerous non-tariff barriers to trade in the EU formerly resulted in a highly fragmented 
European pharmaceuticals market. Differences in marketing authorization rules and different 
classification systems among Member States created technical barriers which have been 
eliminated through the single market programme. A fully integrated EU pharmaceutical 
market requires, however, the further harmonization of national health systems, which today 
have different levels of price controls and reimbursable products. With the elimination of 
these market distortions many more pharmaceutical companies will respond to the SM, 
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particularly SMEs. Large companies have responded to globalization trends through M&As. 
But increased EU harmonization is likely to increase cross-border alliances within the EU 
among medium-sized pharmaceutical companies. 
Additionally, peripheral Member States are expected to become increasingly important as 
investment locations. Production facilities are expected to decline in number as companies 
gain the benefits of increased scale economies through fewer production sites. Factors which 
may impede this outcome are unfavourable local reactions at a time of relatively high 
unemployment, and national health systems which are still in a position to express their 
displeasure through cutting prices, refusing price increases or insisting on low prices for new 
products. 
A.3. Computer equipment 
A.3.1. Market trends 1980-95 
The radical change in the market for computer equipment over this period is from a supply 
situation dominated by relatively few international producers, for whom equipment was the 
primary source of revenue and profitability, to one where competition for hardware is much 
more fragmented, and leading producers are attempting to make service and systems 
integration their major source of income. As one company contact said, 'We used to give 
software and service away to sell the equipment; as the hardware becomes more competitive 
the priority has been learning how to market and create value from them'. Leading equipment 
suppliers now derive a substantial part of their income from sales and service - in some cases 
over 50%. 
Although total EU output of equipment has approximately doubled in current prices over the 
period, employment has remained within 15% of its starting position, and has - over the last 
couple of years - fallen below the level of the early 1980s. Real output is difficult to measure, 
because of the fast changing nature of outputs, but an industry 'rule of thumb' since 1990 is 
that the price of computing power has halved every 18 to 24 months. While exports have 
increased, the net trade balance has become steadily more negative as more equipment has 
been sourced offshore, in large measure by EU-owned firms. 
Within the growing market total, there has been a strong swing away from large systems 
(where demand is in absolute decline) to mid-range 'open' systems and personal computers. 
There has also been a significant increase in the datacommunications component of sector 
demand, reflecting the increasingly blurred boundary between computer equipment and 
telecommunications. 
As the sector has become larger, more closely related to telecommunications and increasingly 
dependent upon service, the strategic response of most producers has been to focus on the 
market sector, or the part of the value chain, in which each has competitive advantage. 
Concentration in each European national market where data are available - measured as the 
share of the top ten vendors - has steadily declined through the 1990s. 
The competitive position of companies active in the European market is, of course, dominated 
by the global marketplace. Product standards in most sectors of the hardware market are 
effective world-wide (led from North America), and most large international competitors are 
US based. US dominance of the world market is less pronounced than it was in the early 
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1980s, being partly shared now with Japan. However IBM, HP, DEC, Unisys, and their 
suppliers and partners still exercise a strong hold on the global market, and account for the 
major part of EU production. 
A.3.2. Cost structure and scale 
Computers and office machinery is an industrial sector where the PIMS database contains 
sufficient observations to draw conclusions on cost structure and its sensitivity to scale. The 
evidence - taken from markets world-wide rather than limited to Europe - shows that: 
(a) there are significant scale economies in manufacturing costs, and in process 
development costs, as a proportion of total business cost and per unit of output; 
(b) there are strong positive correlations between relative scale and the proportion of 
business cost devoted to product development, to advertising and salesforce, and to 
business co-ordination. 
Production and process scale economies have helped to achieve the continuing fall in output 
prices mentioned above. The fact that larger companies undertake a disproportionate share of 
marketing and R&D suggests that, normally, it is the larger enterprises in a competitive arena 
which are better able to bear the costs of product development, and more likely to incur the 
costs of bringing the results of such development to market. This is prima facie evidence for 
the importance of dynamic economies in this sector on an international scale. Since 
sales/marketing and R&D costs typically account for up to 20% of sales revenue for 
businesses in this sector, they also have the potential to benefit from simple scale economies. 
However, the market evidence is that concentration is declining, for the EU as a whole and in 
each national market. This suggests that the dynamic scale economies achieved through 
specialization, as the range of applications in the market proliferates, are more important than 
straight production economies of scale. 
A. 3.3. Overview of European operations 
In the early 1980s, the European IT market was dominated - as it still is - by US companies, 
and a limited number of European national challengers. American companies were usually 
organized on a pan-Europe basis, with manufacture of specific modules located to take 
advantage of development subsidies provided by governments, and to optimize operating costs 
across Europe. Typically the American competitors' European operations were vertically 
integrated (or linked), co-ordinated across Europe, and active in all application sectors. 
At the same period, in the early 1980s, all European-owned competitors were focused heavily 
on their national markets. Copying the American majors, they also tended to be vertically 
integrated, to manufacture at a number of sites mostly within their 'home' countries and to 
offer a range of products to all sectors of their national markets. Activity outside their 
domestic bases was limited. Public sector procurement was what most of them depended on 
for the bulk of their profitable sales. 
In the early 1980s the competition from truly international companies on innovation and costs 
- led by IBM, which was globally at least ten times the size of the largest European - began to 
force a number of changes. European 'national' companies made operating losses because 
they could match neither the rate of new product development nor the production economies 
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of scale. They began to realize that they must grow or specialize - preferably both. ICL in the 
UK, which had been formed by merger during the 1970s, chose early to specialize. It 
identified that it could not remain a fully integrated producer, and exited from chip production 
and printer manufacture. However, in order to sustain a position in the PC sector it acquired 
the PC and network operations of Nokia Data, mainly in Scandinavia, in 1990. Siemens of 
Germany, on the other hand, remained in almost all sectors, and became European leader in 
peripherals, acquiring Nixdorfin the late 1980s. 
At the same time, our respondent companies reduced costs as fast as they were able, in order 
to compete. One achieved a 30% reduction in employees over the period 1981-86, partly by 
outsourcing whole operations and partly by efficiency improvement in manufacture and R&D. 
It also, at the same time, began restructuring its marketing operations into a 'vertical market' 
approach, specializing in specific products and customer types where it had a strong position 
in its home market - and looking for ways to internationalize these strong positions. It entered 
most European national markets, but not for every product. Having set the target of achieving 
at least 50% of its revenue outside its domestic base, it had - by 1995 - achieved effective 
presence for its 'world leading' sector products in all but two EU markets. 
However, the tests which the business applied to its strategic objectives in this period were not 
specifically related to European presence. The competition standards were set by global 
companies, based in the US. For this reason, at least one of the company's international 
businesses, with the majority of its sales in Europe, is headquartered in the US to give it a 
window on US market trends and technology. 
Structural changes in the 1980s in the companies we have spoken to were largely aimed at 
achieving 'critical mass' and at focusing on areas where competitive advantage could be 
achieved. In addition, there was a great deal of attention paid to removing low level cost, with 
some functions - including standard product manufacture - moved offshore. In the 1990s the 
pressure for cost competitiveness has continued this process - for example, IBM has 
outsourced all property management activity to a specialist company - but has also forced 
more sharing of high level cost. 
ICL has, for example, formed strategic alliances with Microsoft on security software 
development, and with Sun Microsystems on open systems development. It has, in addition, 
set up its contract manufacturing organization, D2D, as a stand-alone entity, capable of being 
floated off from the rest of the company. Since D2D also supplies other vendors, this 
represents a form of 'internalized' external scale economy. IBM's separation of its disk drive 
subsidiary Xyratex, again supplying other system vendors, represents a similar phenomenon, 
permitting scale economies in production of modules to be realized despite the increasing 
fragmentation of vendors present in the IT market. However, it is worth noting that one group 
of lower level 'module subcontractors', the producers of assembled printed circuit boards -
which expanded significantly in the late 1980s - has found the market increasingly difficult as 
higher value module producers have become more active in the market. 
A.3.4. Factors driving dynamic economies of scale 
Importance 
In terms of hardware standards, the market has been transformed over the 15 years since 1980. 
In the 1970s European producers 'lived grace and favour of the American majors', in the 
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words of one of our respondents. With proprietary hardware and software systems, the large 
integrated producers had a substantial advantage in setting the competitive framework for 
smaller players. The arrival of open systems, and the work which the European Commission 
carried out to lead the way in setting standards for products, was important because it 'created 
a product area in which scale was less important', and where smaller equipment and software 
suppliers could compete on a common hardware platform, specializing in a specific area to 
gain advantage. Without the lead taken by the EC, with European producers on open systems 
in the early 1980s, it is likely in the view of one of our respondents that fewer EU-owned 
companies would have survived to the 1990s. 
In virtually all other areas covered by our questionnaire, the pressures for exploitation of scale 
economies are driven at a global level rather than within Europe. Market factors are 
approaching global scale. Customer needs for hardware are more or less homogeneous, except 
perhaps in the public sector and certain sectors of the consumer market; large companies tend 
to adopt purchasing strategies for IT which are at least European if not global, and marketing 
approaches are similar across the world. 
Competitive forces are also global; in application markets, such as retail systems for example, 
there are national 'lead' markets in which it is essential for major global suppliers to be 
present. These are the countries in which retailers are developing new approaches, and set the 
standards for point of sale systems elsewhere - even though retailers are for the most part not 
global customers. Production scale for most 'boxes' is set globally, although modular 
specialization enables sub-global scale vendors to compete in many areas. And most markets 
are now developed to the stage where global leaders in each application or product segment 
are present in the majority of markets. There are still significant EU producers which have 
over 50% of their revenue in their original 'home base' national market, but this is usually 
supported by major outsourcing of components and modules to third countries. 
Country factor cost differences within Europe are relatively small, certainly smaller now than 
the 1970s and early 1980s when capital subsidies and low wage rates made some countries 
(e.g. Ireland) particularly attractive. The wage rate content of manufacturing plant costs is now 
significantly lower than it was then. What is more important, according to respondents, is the 
ability of managers to use people and assets flexibly, to provide good service and to respond 
quickly to innovation. 
There is some indication that dynamic external economies determined by capability in these 
areas have begun to develop in the EU's two most IT intensive economies - Ireland and the 
UK. These two countries have also probably benefited from another external economy -
shared language with the world's largest IT market in the US, which has made them a more 
attractive site for work on software and data processing. This advantage is now threatened by 
the Indian sub-continent. 
Knowledge transfer 
There is no doubt that the response of all European-owned manufacturers in taking advantage 
of the opportunities from scale economies in the 1980s lagged behind that of the American -
and even the Japanese - producers. The Europeans were too concerned with national market 
structures, and with defending positions in specific niches - including public procurement 
monopolies. The 'outsiders' were able to set up organizational structures which reflected the 
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existence of a single market, to exploit scale economies, transfer know-how from their home 
base and also between operations in different EU countries. The UK was, for example, the 
international base of IBM's transaction systems business from the 1970s right through this 
period, transferring knowledge to operating units around the world, on an organizational 
model developed to deal with the large single market of North America. IBM's declared 
strategy in this early stage of single market development was for Europe to be operated as one 
organization, with production located in the best place to take advantage of local skills and 
resources, with units supplying the whole continent. 
European-based firms, by comparison, left it relatively late to set up organizational structures 
which were truly European, transferring knowledge and best practice from one centre to 
another. ICL's programme to train a European cadre of managers did not begin until 1985, and 
it has taken until the mid-1990s for the majority of 'line of business' managers in the company 
to come from outside the UK. In addition, organizational structures for pan-European business 
units to ensure coherent marketing approaches did not evolve until 1993. Other EU-based 
companies are probably less well advanced in terms of coverage and systems. 
Benefits from dynamic scale economies 
One respondent identified the impact on R&D costs of scale through focus and specialization 
as very significant; a reduction from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s from an average 12% of 
revenue to around 6% had been achieved. This was partly due to sharing with a much larger 
international partner, and partly by focusing on specific product and market segments. It was 
also assisted by acquisition, using know-how from an acquired EU company to extend 
capability at relatively low cost in a specific market at the same time as acquiring share. 
There have also been savings made through vertical market focus by some vendors in sales 
and marketing costs. In any event, the commoditization of much equipment has left some 
producers unable to recover these costs in their prices. But in the majority of companies, there 
has been a clearer focus of sales and marketing effort on vertical end use markets which has 
helped to improve the value of this effort to end users. In this sense, the benefit of focus has 
been realized through a better quality package of service surrounding the product. 
The process through which technical sales people have been transformed into specialist 
consultants has been important for a number of IT companies. In many cases they have 
changed their marketing organizations from a salesforce incentivized on value of equipment 
sold, to consultants supplying value added services through systems integration - often buying 
in 'boxes' from other manufacturers. 
Both IBM and ICL undertake major projects in which their systems integrators have supplied 
solutions with no own-make equipment involved. From the impressive growth and strong 
performance of some of the specialist IT service companies, it seems likely that economies of 
scale spanning the marketing of services and the marketing of equipment are relatively 
limited. 
Diversity and scope of activity 
The trend away from integrated IT equipment supply has already been described. Even where 
a company, such as IBM, retains virtually full range capability as a vendor, it has still set out 
to specialize its delivery units within the organization. Specialization in equipment and 
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software development, and in the consulting service which accompanies it, is essential to 
efficient and effective development. 
For the European producers, most of whom are working from much lower scale - both 
absolute and relative to their target markets - specialization is essential, both in end-user needs 
targeted and in the technologies which each company chooses to retain as its core competence. 
Without such focus, minimum scale for development and marketing would not be possible for 
them. 
A.3.5. Influence of external economies of scale 
As discussed above, the industry has generated its own external scale economies through 
'spinning off module manufacture from the main computer equipment companies, and also 
through shared component suppliers. In a number of component areas, effective production 
and dynamic economies of scale are very great indeed, with one or two suppliers managing to 
defend global market shares in excess of 50%. But these economies are available on a global 
basis, not just in Europe. 
The 'silicon glen' phenomenon in Scotland and its equivalent in Ireland, initially created by 
government incentives and cheap labour, has begun to create and feed on external scale 
economies. Following the establishment in Ireland of assembly plants by most of the PC 
manufacturers, including Apple, Dell, Gateway, DEC and others, Ireland has become the 
preferred base for a number of other outside investors entering Europe. This preference is 
based not just on the fact that customers and suppliers in the IT industry itself are close at 
hand, but also on external economies in sectors such as packaging, since packaging and 
logistics make up an important part of the cost structure of PC assembly. 
In addition, the establishment of Intel and Microsoft - the key component supplier and the 
most important software systems developer - in Ireland has strengthened the country's 
position. Microsoft in particular requires packaging and logistics expertise, and it uses the 
same type of customer support mechanisms - help lines and call centres - which are used by 
PC suppliers. With lower cost telecommunications, Ireland and Scotland are both becoming 
increasingly important centres for this type of support operation. 
Role of the single market 
In the view of our respondents, the impact of the single market on European producers has 
been significant, but it was felt relatively early. It is certainly argued by some of them that 
without the prospect of a single market the American suppliers who treated Europe as one 
from the 1970s onwards would have found it more difficult to apply North American business 
models across the EC. This example - and the competition - set by the inward investors 
eventually led the more conservative and nationally focused European companies to follow 
suit. 
However, the market pressures which have been exerted on European producers - both 
indigenous and those owned by the US and Japan - have been essentially global. The last area 
of the market to free up its purchasing behaviour from protectionist tendencies, the public 
sector, has certainly been influenced by single market legislation, but the first moves were felt 
in the UK very early in the 1980s as a result of GATT principles being applied early by the 
national government. 
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The product area in which the EC has played a leading role, and made a significant impact on 
the development of the European IT industry, is open systems. The BISON group in the early 
1980s, and the Esprit programme, led to joint definition by experts and producers of the 
elements of open systems, which informed the Commission's work on standards in this area. 
As one respondent said, 'This agreement gave the European producers who were prepared to 
enter the open systems market a breathing space - a short period in which they could compete 
on equal terms with companies which would otherwise have a major scale advantage. The 
experience showed us how important it was to share development costs, to be more open and 
solve problems together'. 
A.4. Chocolate 
A.4.1. Market trends 1980-95 
The European market for cocoa and chocolate products has grown steadily in real value over 
the period, apart from a small decline in value in 1992 which was recovered by 1994. 
Production volume, however, has increased year on year both in the EU as a whole, and in its 
biggest market, Germany. In the next largest, the United Kingdom and France, production has 
also increased significantly, although statistics for the UK are complicated by changes in 
definitions affecting chocolate covered biscuits. A major growth area for chocolate producing 
companies in Europe over the last six years has been Eastern Europe, which has absorbed both 
a large volume of exports and considerable investment in production capacity. 
In none of the EU countries, except perhaps Portugal, has there been any indication of a 
sustained decline in production. Nor has there been any closing of the 'consumption gap' 
between southern country markets - exemplified by Spain and Italy - where per capita 
consumption is less than 2 kg per annum, and northern countries - Germany, Scandinavia, the 
UK - where consumption is typically over 6 kg per annum. 
The chocolate products market in most countries is relatively concentrated, at its highest in the 
UK where Cadbury, Nestlé and Mars account for over 80% of consumption. Other major 
companies, including Ferrerò and Jacob Suchard/Philip Morris, hold somewhat less 
concentrated positions in France and Italy. Only in Germany is there a significantly more 
fragmented structure, partly due to the stronger position of private label brands. In the smaller 
markets, particularly those which are more recent EU members, the typical position is of a few 
local producers competing with two or three international companies in a relatively 
concentrated market structure. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the effect of competition from the large scale brand 
owners has significantly changed the structure of the market. The acquisitions of companies 
whose chocolate sales are focused on one or two countries, by European or American owned 
firms with a continental approach to the market, have continued. The larger firms are 
attempting to secure their position in a concentrating European scale market for globally 
marketed brands; at the same time acquisitions by smaller regional firms seek to bolster their 
positions in defensible national markets with specific tastes. 
During the last three years, in addition to this process, there has been accelerating investment 
in acquisitions in Eastern Europe, and further afield. In 1993/94 the top five chocolate 
producing firms - Nestlé, Cadbury, Suchard/Philip Morris, Mars and Ferrerò - made over 20 
acquisitions, of which nine were in former Communist countries, and four were in the 
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Americas. Not all of these acquisitions were in chocolate. Some reflected the increasing 
interdependence of the chocolate and ice cream markets, following the launch by most 
producers of chocolate bars, in the early 1990s, of ice cream bars under the same brand names 
and aimed at the same consumers. 
The extension of brand names in this way reflects the impact of international marketing 
campaigns, particularly aimed at younger consumers. High levels of TV advertising have 
started to change the consumption patterns of younger consumers, even in some of the smaller 
national markets with more differentiated traditional products. 
Although the spread of strongly branded products has continued to concentrate national 
markets, the scope for production economies of scale may be affected by the existing 
Chocolate Directive (73/241/EEC, as amended). This permits national governments to set 
standards for chocolate recipes for production in their territories - so that a Mars bar made in 
Germany may not have the same composition as one made in the UK or the Netherlands, and 
the scope for replicating production practices may be constrained. 
The respondents in this case study cover a large producer with global brands and a strong 
presence in most European national markets, and a strong regional firm in one of the countries 
which has more recently acceded to the EU. In both cases the respondents were consultants 
who had worked inside the companies on strategic issues over a considerable period. One was 
an employee-consultant, the other independent of the firm. 
A.4.2. Overview of respondents' operations 1980-95 
The 'European' scale firm 
The firm with European scale had begun the period with some form of operation -
manufacturing or a marketing organization - in almost every EU country. Manufacture in 
Germany/Austria was added in the late 1970s, bringing the total to five chocolate 
manufacturing sites. Over the period production has risen by around 40% in volume terms, 
while the total number of employees has reduced by 20%, a physical productivity increase of 
around 70%. This increase in output has been achieved by increasing the number and capacity 
of lines at selected sites. Some technology changes have helped increase line output, and 
capital productivity, by way of improved process control; but some parameters of chocolate 
lines - particularly those determined by physical heating and cooling rates - constrain possible 
advances. 
Product selling price per tonne for the firm has moved in line with inflation in the largest EU 
markets. Over the period the number of principal sites involved in chocolate production in the 
EU has remained unchanged, and the major expansion of capacity at new sites has occurred in 
eastern Europe. Despite lower labour costs in the east, this has not been a significant factor in 
determining production location because factory labour costs account for such a small 
proportion of total costs for this firm. The organization of sales and distribution has been 
largely unchanged - with national selling teams - and the location of R&D has not 
significantly changed. The only aspects of the organization of production which have changed 
over the period are centralization of procurement to fewer centres, and the establishment of a 
European graduate recruitment and training cadre. 
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The reason for this relative stability is that the firm set out during the 1960s and 1970s to build 
its organization on a European basis, with common products where possible (although this 
was sometimes hampered by the legacy of acquired brands). It also had significant in-house 
expertise in plant design and construction, which tended to make it both self-reliant and co-
ordinated in its approach to products and capacity. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the firm organized itself more explicitly on a European 
basis, with pan-European reporting structures - but without changing the location of many of 
its activities. Thus, for example it now has a single R&D structure in Europe, but R&D is still 
located in four countries. In a number of functional areas the evidence available within the 
firm suggests that co-ordination costs have shown some increases as a result of these changes. 
The 'regional'firm 
Volume for the firm has been more or less static since the late 1980s. Production was 
originally based in three countries, then four (all western European but not all within the EU), 
and now the firm has reduced the number of plants. It has also made an acquisition in one of 
the 'near east European' countries - both to secure a base in the local market and to gain 
access to lower cost production capacity. Its procurement has moved from being strictly 
national for each plant to a European basis, and major economies on input prices for sugar 
have been achieved. The firm's marketing activities have continued to centre around its strong 
brands in its home markets but have also expanded into one or two neighbouring markets, 
particularly into the German supermarket brand area. It has also created and retained a position 
in distribution to airport and duty free outlets across certain parts of Europe. 
Prices in its home markets have been significantly affected by the opening-up of tariff barriers 
and deregulation after accession to the EU. The very substantial premium which existed over 
large EU markets such as Germany and the UK - for some products, over 50% - have been 
quickly eroded by competition from producers of the major international branded products. 
While penetration of these products was at first relatively slow during the 1980s due to 'taste 
barriers', increased levels of advertising have changed buyer behaviour and therefore much 
of the market growth has gone to these imported brands. The single market has therefore 
delivered substantial price reductions to consumers in these markets, and the profits of 
regional producers (including our respondent) have suffered accordingly. 
A.4.3. Dynamic economies of scale 
Key drivers and changes over the period 
Although the European market for chocolate is far from homogeneous, the degree of similarity 
between national markets, the marketing approaches and the products offered, is much greater 
in 1996 than it was in 1980. In part this is because consumers are more mobile, and subject to 
more uniform lifestyles. But advertising, packaging, and the needs of retailers have also had an 
important impact. Advertising programmes for some products now have a common European 
format, sharing images between different countries and varying the soundtrack. Packaging for 
a significant range of products is also designed for a European market, with labelling in most 
EU languages, and meeting the different standards of national regulations on composition of 
chocolate. This permits identical images to be used in adverts. Since advertising for a pan-
European producer typically accounts for around 5% to 8% of product value, and other sales 
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and marketing costs for 4% to 6%, the impact of cost sharing in advertising and marketing can 
be significant. 
Packaging approaches have also been used to increase the attractiveness of products, and 
economies of scale in creative approaches are available here. The impact of better pack design 
for Rowntree products after the acquisition by Nestlé was an important part of the added value 
from the takeover. In addition, the use of new packaging films and techniques has improved 
the shelf life and handling qualities of chocolate products from the retailers' point of view. 
The ability of producers to innovate in these areas, and to spread the benefits of such 
innovation across a number of national markets, is an increasingly important aspect of 
competitive advantage. 
Retailers have made initial steps towards pan-European sourcing of chocolate products, some 
through operations in a range of countries, others through shared activity in international 
buying groups. The importance of store brand chocolate products in Germany - the largest 
single national market - reinforces this trend. The sourcing arrangements now permit retailers 
to ship products to take advantage of arbitrage between national markets, or to exert 
bargaining power to force price parity. These are the forces which have removed the price 
premiums in peripheral EU national markets which used to be protected. 
There is no 'lead market' for innovation in the European chocolate industry; national tastes are 
still sufficiently different for new products to develop in various ways. However, innovations 
are probably more likely to occur in the 'high consumption' markets of the north, and some 
product transfers from the US appear in the UK first, perhaps because of shared language. 
Increasing production scale has been brought about through stronger European competition 
between major companies, and costs have been reduced by increasing the number of lines per 
plant. As noted above, marketing and advertising costs have not increased as a proportion of 
sales value for the pan-European producers - but the absolute level of spend by these 
companies has increased as their share has grown. The threshold scale for effective advertising 
has therefore risen, and this is reflected in the increasing burden reported by smaller regional 
companies in matching the impact of the multinationals. 
The pattern of competitive activity across Europe is certainly not uniform. Most of the big six 
are present in the majority of national markets, but the UK is a significant exception, since 
Suchard/Philip Morris and Ferrerò are so far behind the other three. 
Knowledge transfer 
There are no significant factor cost differences or major efficiency differences which mark out 
specific areas or countries as cost leaders. Leading companies tend to exchange information 
between their national operations to take advantage of skills acquired and developed. Our pan-
European respondent has had systems in place to achieve this since the early 1980s; reporting 
systems for procurement and manufacturing, internal facilitation systems for marketing, and 
the more recently developed European management cadre. In regional firms there seems to be 
no problem in exchanging skills between plants in different countries, as shown by the ability 
of our respondent to move products between plants without major problems. 
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Benefits from scale economies 
We have already referred to scale economies in procurement and production achieved by our 
pan-European respondent, and similar - though less dramatic - economies have been available 
to regional producers. Both have benefited from liberalization of the sugar market, and those 
for other ingredients; both have increased their output per plant quite substantially - one by a 
40% volume increase from the same number of plants, and the other from a reduction in the 
number of plants with constant output. Scale economies in costs at the plant level consist, 
according to our respondents, of a sharing of fixed administrative and logistics costs over a 
larger volume; this is usually achieved by grouping more lines in each plant. 
The increase in competitive scope has increased MES, but because of the variety of products 
in the market, and the lack of homogeneity remaining between countries, an estimate of how 
much MES has increased, or of its level, is extremely difficult. For plants which are involved 
in production only, supplying private label products to supermarkets, high volume efficiently 
run plants are essential; but firm size can be much smaller as it does not have to maintain a 
critical mass of advertising and marketing expenditure. 
Dynamic economies of scale in production - through intersite learning and transfer of 
practices - are reported by both our pan-European respondent and the regional firm, although 
for the latter it is relatively recent as a formal system. 
Advertising and marketing economies are clearly significant in determining the strategies and 
the performance of respondent firms. It is important to recognize that advertising is only the 
visible half of costs in this area, and that for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) firms the 
costs of maintaining a sales and marketing organization to support in store display and 
distribution is usually just as important. Advertising is what prompts consumers to take the 
product from display; sales and marketing effort to put the product on display is a 
complementary - but equally expensive - activity. 
Work recently completed (and as yet unpublished) with a dozen European FMCG producers 
on salesforce operation shows that economies of scale in salesforce costs are very significant 
within countries, but not yet across national boundaries. The costs of operating a salesforce in 
a country are to a considerable extent fixed, and so salesforce cost as a proportion of total cost 
shows a strong negative correlation with output. None of these companies (which included our 
chocolate respondent) were yet able to operate truly automated sales order handling or 
customer service systems which crossed the important national boundaries. However, a 
number of them were very interested in being able to do this once a single currency was in 
place. 
Development costs are quoted by our pan-European respondent as an area in which significant 
dynamic scale economies have been achieved over the last ten years. The ability to roll out 
new products across a number of markets, either simultaneously or in quick succession, has 
given the continental scale producers the scope to derive the maximum impact from R&D 
activity. It has become much easier to undertake innovation as a result of a unified structure, 
and particularly to take the big steps in new product introduction which are needed to gain 
advantage in market position. 
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Α.4.4. Diversity and focus 
Our two respondents provided a classic contrast in the position of high and low share 
businesses in response to this question. The regional company, since the opening up of the 
single market and stronger interest in its domestic market by pan-European firms, has 
concluded that it can no longer afford the marketing cost to support its full, pre-1990, range of 
products. It has therefore reduced its product range to focus on brand positions which are 
stronger, and which are proportionately cheaper to support. In addition, it has sought to 
develop its position in confectionery materials, as a supplier to other branded and catering 
product manufacturers. At the same time, it has sought to develop routes to market for finished 
consumer products which are less marketing intensive, including distribution to duty free 
shops, and expanding its presence in the store brand market. Having been affected by the 
eastward push of other large-scale European firms, it has had to strengthen its efforts in the 
east. 
There are, by contrast, 'brand owners' in the market which are able to assemble relatively 
small, focused positions of premium products into major international businesses. For 
example Leaf, originally of Finland - which operates in other confectionery markets in 
addition to chocolate - has a range of brand positions, including Elizabeth Shaw, and a 
substantial US business. It is headquartered in the Netherlands and claims to be one of the top 
ten global confectionery companies. Leaf is an example of a type of consumer marketing 
company found in other product markets, built on a core competence in marketing, innovation 
and developing premium positions. Such skills are often transferable from one market to 
another irrespective of market barriers, because they do not necessarily depend on the physical 
movement of products. They do, however, depend upon the free movement of capital and 
people, and the effective protection of intellectual property and brands. 
Our pan-European respondent, by contrast, shows a different pattern of behaviour, although at 
first sight there are some similarities. In the latter part of the 1980s the firm spent time and 
energy on simplifying and consolidating its product range, and on simplifying its marketing 
approaches to major retailers. This appears in part to have been a 'deck clearing' exercise to 
prepare for later expansion in other areas. 
Since 1990 the firm has launched a major brand extension into ice cream, using the 'pull' 
advertising for chocolate products to assist the launch. Although there were various difficulties 
associated with this product diversification, mainly to do with access to channels of 
distribution, it has provided a significantly broader base over which to spread brand 
advertising costs. The firm has also pursued very strong geographical diversification into all 
the markets of eastern Europe, based on its European/global brands. The strength of these pan-
European/global brands has given the company major advantages in media advertising, 
particularly given the spread of satellite media which cover larger areas, and the growing 
importance of brand exposure through international sporting events. 
In the view of our respondent, ability to innovate successfully is the most important 
competence for the competitive performance of the firm, and the role of the single market has 
not changed this. However, the integration of European markets has increased the importance 
of marketing effectiveness relative to production efficiency. The responses given on behalf of 
the regional firm support this view of the increasing importance of marketing costs and 
capability, and the necessity to have strongly positioned, focused, brand positions. 
Appendix A: Case studies on dynamic and external economies of scale 117 
External economies 
In this area, our respondents are agreed that significant benefits have been achieved. In the 
early 1980s each country manager in our pan-European firm would find local partners for the 
supply of key materials, reflecting local regulations on chocolate recipes and local market 
conditions. Since 1994 a European approach has been adopted for the procurement of sugar 
and of dairy products, with some benefits to pricing, to process control, and to the control of 
working capital - although it is too early to judge the overall trade-off between operational 
benefits and co-ordination costs. The regional respondent has seen significant savings in 
materials costs - around 30% - as a result of a more open and deregulated market. 
The approach of the two companies to strategic alliances to achieve economies is somewhat 
different. The pan-European firm has pursued a number of avenues, focusing on suppliers 
closer to its plants, using the scale and buying power of its operations, and also contracting out 
certain non-core operations. It has, for example, made more use of 'co-packers' as 
subcontractors for certain packaging operations. Its approach to packaging suppliers has also 
become significantly closer, with the expectation that producers of packaging material will 
take greater responsibility in the value chain, and retain ownership of the wrapping film until 
the point where it enters the packing machine. This transfer of responsibility can only be 
managed effectively if the firm concentrates on a limited number of suppliers. 
For the regional firm, downstream alliances are more important. Focusing on specific outlets 
to market, either via store brands or duty free outlets, has been important in securing 
reductions in marketing costs. 
A.4.5. Role of the single market 
Our respondents are agreed - from opposite perspectives in the market - that the single 
market, together with deregulation, has achieved a significant reduction in the cost of 
materials for the chocolate industry, and that it has increased the importance of marketing as 
an international competitive weapon. The increase in producer scale has not reduced 
marketing costs as a proportion of total costs, but it has raised the ability of major internal 
suppliers to promote and benefit from strong brand positions. 
The ability to sell products made in one factory all over Europe (subject to meeting national 
labelling regulations) has increased the ability of firms to achieve site economies of scale in 
production, although in practice our pan-European supplier which makes use of this ability 
double-sources most of its major products to ensure security of supply and flexibility in 
logistics. The remaining barrier to uniform products, in the shape of the Chocolate Directive 
which allows national governments to set recipe limits, may constrain companies, but not 
enough to hinder their ability to roll out product innovations across Europe with minimal 
delay. 
Although the perspective of our pan-European respondent is that the single market programme 
has had relatively little effect on their operations, this is in the light of a strategic approach in 
which 'trade barriers are not seen as important to investment, and the structure of the 
European business is based upon an integrated approach'. Whether such an approach would 
have been possible without the framework provided by the movement towards a single market 
is more than questionable. Much of the company's European structure was put in place before 
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the single market initiative, but on the assumption that the framework for movement of 
capital, people and products would be developed over the succeeding decade. 
This pattern of pre-emptive investment in anticipation of being able to operate in an 
increasingly open market is observable in other product areas within the EU, and is now 
clearly visible in the near eastern European markets. Particularly in products where strong 
brand positions are an important driver of profitability, the need to enter markets ahead of the 
competition, to secure share and brand awareness advantage, has led to investment behaviour 
ahead of the measures which are designed to promote it. For our pan-European respondent this 
seems to be true; a European approach to manufacturing and marketing predated the 'official' 
single market programme by ten years. It is arguable that such pre-emptive investment was 
easier for companies which are the owners of global brands than for companies building up 
from, or amalgamating, national positions. 
For our regional respondent, the impact of increased competition has forced the reduction of 
internal costs - partly through plant scale and partly through efficiency gains, as well as a 
critical re-examination of marketing costs. The strategic impact has been to encourage 
specialization on those products and market positions where customer preference is more 
clearly expressed, and on parts of the value chain where smaller scale is not a disadvantage. 
A.5. Beer 
A.5.1. Market trends 
Demand trends 
The market for beer in Europe is a relatively stable one, with overall volume demand growth 
of around 0.3% p.a. between 1980-93. Within this relatively static market there have been 
some national markets - particularly those where wine has traditionally been the dominant 
alcoholic drink, such as Spain - where beer demand has been faster than average. Others, such 
as Germany which is predominantly a beer market, have shown absolute decline of up to 3% 
p.a. In this sense the pattern of demand for alcoholic drinks across Europe has become 
marginally more homogeneous over the last 15 years, but very large differences remain. 
Common patterns across the EU in terms of changing consumer behaviour include the move 
towards selling beer through retail grocery outlets as opposed to bars or specialist retailers, the 
shift towards lighter beers (including low alcohol beers) for health reasons, and the increasing 
role of 'fashion' beers such as those from South America and those imported from elsewhere. 
Thus, although overall demand in the EU has been virtually static, imports into ten out of the 
12 national markets showed increases in volume terms over the period 1990 to 1994. 
Exports, on the other hand, increased from every single national market except Luxembourg, 
reflecting the strong performance of EU producers not just in intertrade, but also in net exports 
to the rest of the world. Extra-EU exports increased by over 60% during the period, but still 
account for less than 10% of production. 
Technology impact 
Technology changes in the beer industry have shown effects in two areas. Firstly, the 
improvements in process control, which have made the operations of larger breweries more 
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efficient - but have not necessarily increased the minimum economic scale of brewing 
operations since they have also, to some extent, benefited smaller units. There has been a 
reduction in the number, of breweries through a shift to larger scale in most countries, but a 
bigger reduction in the number of people employed per brewery. 
Secondly, there have been significant changes in the technology used for packaging and 
distributing beer. Faster filling lines for bottles and cans have made it more economic to use 
these types of packaging, partly in response to the increased demand for products through 
supermarkets for home drinking. There has been substitution of these packaging and 
distribution methods for barrels and tankers in many countries. 
Structural changes 
In virtually every country there has been some degree of concentration over the period since 
1980. However, the concentration pattern, and the share of the leading producer, varies 
enormously from country to country. 
Table A.5.1. Producer pattern by national market 
Country 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Total 
Number of 
breweries 
102 
17 
27 
1281 
7 
7 
19 
16 
8 
27 
95 
1606 
Production 
(mhl) 
14.7 
9.5 
20.8 
115.4 
4.5 
6.9 
11.7 
20.4 
6.6 
24.3 
56.7 
291.5 
Growth p.a., 
1980-89 (%) 
-0.16 
1.25 
-0.29 
-0.04 
4.60 
0.95 
2.50 
2.00 
4.80 
1.50 
-1.00 
0.26 
Share of 
largest firm 
(%) 
68 
53 
48 
9 
75 
60 
39 
33 
55 
27 
30 
6 
Market scale of 
largest firm 
(mhl) 
10.0 
5.0 
10 
10.4 
3.4 
4.1 
4.6 
6.7 
3.6 
6.6 
17.0 
17.0 
Sources: Panorama of EU Industry, ELRA, PIMS estimates. 
As can be seen from the above table, the leading players in most countries enjoy a substantial 
domestic share of total national production, but the leading European producer (Heineken) 
only accounts for around 6% of the total beer market in Europe. Industry estimates suggest 
that Heineken now sells about 17 mhl of its beer throughout the major European markets. 
They are estimated to sell 5 mhl in Holland, 6 mhl in France, 4 mhl in Spain and 2 mhl in the 
UK. Interestingly the newly formed Scottish Courage now sells around the same volume of 
beer in Europe but almost all of this is in one country, the UK. 
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The major changes brought about through acquisitions have not been uniform across national 
markets. Companies such as Heineken (NL), Interbrew (Β), Carlsberg (DK) and Danone (F) 
have been particularly active in developing their European positions. Over the period 1984 to 
1996 Heineken's European sales have increased from around 12 mhl to 17 mill, with some 
12 mhl of this final volume in EU countries other than the Netherlands. In contrast the major 
brewers in the UK and Germany have been almost totally focused on sorting out their own 
national market structures. 
Looking at the leading European companies gives a revealing picture. As can be seen from Table 
A.5.2 below, the top ten brewers in Europe account for around 42% of the market. Against this, 
on average, the top three companies in each country (Germany excepted) account for between 
60%-75% of their own national markets. However, the total European market is starting to 
slowly concentrate as Heineken, Carlsberg and Interbrew develop their positions across national 
boundaries. It appears from our contact companies' perspectives that this trend seems likely to 
develop more rapidly. It may even start to show effects in Germany, up to now the most 
fragmented and isolated market in Europe. 
Table A.5.2. Production pattern by major firms 
Company 
Heineken 
Scottish Courage 
Danone 
Bass 
Guinness 
Interbrew 
Carlsberg 
Brau & Brunnen 
Maerz 
Whitbread 
EU output (mhl) 
17 
17 
15 
12.5 
12 
12 
12 
10.5 
9 
7 
EU share (%) 
5.8 
5.8 
5.1 
4.3 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
3.6 
3.1 
2.4 
% sold in 'own' 
market 
29 
94 
66 
92 
33 
66 
42 
86 
89 
93 
% sold outside 
'own' market 
71 
6 
34 
8 
67 
34 
58 
14 
11 
7 
Source: PIMS estimates. 
Trade and globalization 
The rationalization of national markets is beginning to have an impact on the ways in which 
global brands are managed, and the competition between large world players develops. The 
early stages of this process are illustrated by a comparison between Heineken, the largest 
European-based brewer, and Anheuser Bush (AB), the largest North American brewer. Unlike 
the chocolate or computer markets, the powerful American beer producer AB has been unable 
to use its production scale or know-how to build a strong position in Europe. 
Even as the largest world brewer with 100 mhl production in North America, AB has been 
unable to penetrate higher than brand position No. 20 in a major European country, or to do 
well in many non-US markets. Heineken, on the other hand, has put together a series of market 
Appendix A: Case studies on dynamic and external economies of scale 121 
positions and is much better placed to transfer know-how internationally. Either there are 
barriers to entry in the form of consumer tastes, access to distribution channels or strength of 
local competition which have kept the US companies out (but which some Europeans have 
overcome), or the US companies were doing too well at home to take Europe seriously. 
A.5.2. Overview of respondents' operations 
Our contact companies in this study, interviewed at director level, were a 'big five' company 
in the UK, and a leading premium beer company in Germany. They operate in very different 
market conditions, with different strategic objectives, but have interesting common views on 
the effects of the single market on scale economies. 
Location and scope 
Both of our contact companies had their main brewing activities concentrated in a single 
national market in 1995, as in 1980. In this sense the single market has not encouraged them to 
invest in production facilities across a wider spread of countries. The German firm, after 
focusing on developing a single site for many years, acquired an existing brewery in the east 
for complementary beers. It has doubled its output, roughly doubling the number of its 
employees at the same time. The UK firm has seen its production volume show marginal 
decline over the period, and its number of breweries halved from over ten to around five. Its 
number of UK employees in the same time has reduced by 33%, and the sales value of its 
output from brewing has increased only marginally. In both cases scale economies in 
production have been achieved, helping to absorb the impact of input cost increases. 
The UK firm has centralized procurement of materials, and also marketing, from former 
regional structures, but has not taken any similar steps with regard to recruitment and 
personnel development. The German firm, with expansion by acquisition into additional beer 
types and into soft drinks/mineral water, now has three operations in each of these areas where 
it formerly had one. 
The importance of these factors in the cost structure of typical firms has changed for both our 
respondents, with an increase in marketing expenses (advertising, promotion and selling) both 
per litre and as a proportion of the selling price. One firm reports that its costs, apart from 
production, include: 
Element 
Marketing/selling 
Distribution 
R&D 
% sales value 
12% 
6.5% 
0.8% 
Trend 
up from 8% 
down from 8% 
up from 0.5% 
The German respondent estimates that its advertising and selling costs have increased from 
6 ECU/hl to around 24 ECU/hl over the ten years. 'We have achieved substantial production 
scale economies, and virtually all these savings have gone into additional marketing to 
maintain growth of the business, and our differentiated premium position.' 
Nevi' market entries 
Distribution costs have fallen for our contact firms, and marketing costs increased, because of 
the fact that they now have supported brand positions in a wider range of markets, both in the 
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EU and elsewhere. For example, the UK firm has entered France and Spain, while the German 
firm now exports to most EU markets, and has also entered Eastern European countries in a 
major way. However, it has done so without forming its own sales organization in each 
country, relying on agents and partners on the ground. 
Mergers and acquisitions/strategic alliances 
Both companies have been involved in acquisitions - the German company by acquiring a 
firm in former East Germany, and bringing its marketing and commercial skills to bear on its 
output. The UK company has long been involved in acquisitions and mergers, some of whose 
brewing capacity has been closed in the period to achieve production scale economies. In 
addition, it has bought new beer brands where these are strong enough to stand up in an 
increasingly competitive and advertised branded market. 
As has become the practice in the UK market, acquisition of brands has been linked to long-
term supply arrangements with former 'tied house' outlets, which in other industries might be 
regarded as a form of strategic alliance. In the UK beer industry, however, the changes have 
been enforced by local competition policy which has required major breweries to divest large 
numbers of owned pubs. The effect of this change has been to make the market for branded 
beers more like the markets for other consumer non-durables. It has accelerated the pace of 
concentration in brewing and increased the advertising spend in the industry, and is currently 
being reconsidered because of its impact on choice and prices. 
A.5.3. Factors driving dynamic economies of scale 
Customer convergence 
There are few common distributor customers for beer across national boundaries. Bars and 
retailers have so far been predominantly national. However, major retailers and wholesalers 
are increasing their activity by sourcing internationally. This is not helped, however, by major 
differences between national markets in duty and tax, and by regulations concerning the 
supply and sale of alcohol. There have grown up, particularly in the UK, large differences in 
duty rates - more than trebling in the last ten years - which have induced large scale 'inward 
smuggling', disadvantaging local retailers as well as beer producers. 
Consumer taste differences, as a cumulative result of local tradition, climate, social practices 
and availability of materials, are still very significant in much of the EU. In the view of our 
German respondents, the market is still in the process of moving from local tastes and 
preferences to a national market with strong national brands. There is still relatively strong 
local brand loyalty among consumers, so Germany is not as open as other markets. However, 
German producers have found it easier to export, and the larger producers - including our 
respondent - are part of an international market in that sense. 
The increasing role of imported brands in every national market clearly shows that consumer 
tastes are moving together in some areas, particularly among younger drinkers who are more 
influenced by television advertising. Advertising programmes are used for some brands to 
present messages which are consistent across national boundaries; this is particularly true for 
international brands belonging to Heineken, Carlsberg and Interbrew. 
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'Lead ' markets-
There are no 'lead' markets for beer in the EU in the sense that innovations are launched 
predominantly in one country and then 'rolled out' elsewhere. New products are often 
borrowed from other markets rather than invented from scratch, although the newly arrived set 
of alcoholic cordial drinks aimed at younger drinkers - some of which qualify as brewed 
products - are genuinely new. Innovations of this type tend to come from the markets with the 
loosest regulation, often the UK, while the scope for 'borrowing' brands seems to be greatest 
from countries with the lightest beers. 
Innovation to meet the needs of retailers through new and high quality packaging approaches 
is probably best advanced in the UK. New bottle designs for supermarket brands and the 
development of high image glass packaging for exotic beers and ciders have both moved 
ahead faster in the UK than in other EU markets. 
Our UK respondent considered that the competitive rivalry in the UK was stronger than 
elsewhere in Europe, because there are still four large brewers who are competing on roughly 
equal terms for a large but declining market. He also considered that the structural changes 
imposed on the UK market had increased competitive intensity, because it had forced each of 
the major producers to set long-term strategic targets and go for them. The importance of 
innovation in this market to preserve market share, and the tendency for new ideas from 
outside Europe to be marketed here first because of shared language with the US, both have an 
effect. 
Movement of products and capital 
The movement of brewed products has certainly been aided by the development of trans-
European transport networks, as evidenced by the responses of both our companies on 
transport costs. There have been acquisitions involving transnational capital movements, 
including since 1991: 
(a) the acquisition of Cruzcampo (Spain) by Guinness (Ireland); 
(b) Heineken (Netherlands) purchases in France and Italy; 
(c) Interbrew (Belgium) acquisitions in the Netherlands and elsewhere. 
But the movements towards national concentration have been just as significant, including 
consolidation in Germany and the acquisitions between the former 'big six' brewers in the 
UK. So have acquisitions in the east, such as Interbrew's moves into Hungary and the former 
Yugoslavia. 
One of the factors inhibiting transnational investment - or any new investment - is the 
existence of overcapacity, estimated by our respondents as around 15% in excess of EU 
demand plus net exports. Such investment as there has been in higher capacity units, which are 
much more capital intensive than traditional brewing processes, has tended to make the 
overcapacity problem worse; and so links between companies have often attempted to seek 
mechanisms to use spare capacity, through mergers, alliances, or licensing arrangements. 
Brand licence arrangements have been more significant than the movement of products or 
capital. In many cases, within the EU and elsewhere, a brand is launched into a national 
market on the back of a local licence agreement for production, or for production and 
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marketing. The original brand owner is usually not required to find the capital to support its 
exploitation in a new market, but finds a local partner, with brewing capacity and access to 
local channels of distribution to do this for him. Our UK respondent has been involved in a 
number of arrangements like this, but the German firm has declined to license products -
either as licensor or as licensee - in order to retain its differentiated premium brand position. 
There are signs that this pattern of market entry is no longer the preferred route in all cases. 
For example, our UK respondent has launched English brands in France and Spain from UK 
production, and Anheuser Bush is in the process of switching its Budweiser operation in 
Europe from a licensed production approach to one where it takes over a brewery from a UK 
company. Movements of products and capital appear to be on the increase. The single market 
framework makes these new directions in company strategy possible, but does not of itself 
make them happen. 
It was also clear from one of our respondents that even the remaining influence of national 
governments over health, safety and information regulations is seen as waning. 'Up to now we 
have relied on national government contacts to influence what is going on in setting standards 
for the industry, but we can see that the people we really need to talk to are in Brussels.' 
Knowledge transfer 
Both of our respondent companies have adopted systems for the transfer of know-how within 
their operations in order to build competitive advantage. The UK firm adopted a common IT 
system to secure scale advantages in production as long as ten years ago, something which was 
not required in the German company until 1992. The UK firm used external consultants to 
centralize procurement, while the German firm used external advisors to boost marketing. 
But in both companies the overwhelming majority of work to transfer know-how on 
marketing, development, and production is done by internal staff. These areas give some scope 
for cost saving, but significantly more for additional value to be created. The truly 
international firms - Heineken, Danone, Guinness, Interbrew, and Carlsberg - are focusing on 
these areas, and setting the standard for others to meet. 
One interesting example quoted of knowledge transfer was in the area of managing brand 
positions in different markets. Some companies have discovered that in moving from one 
market to another, brands can be repositioned much more profitably. The case of Stella Artois, 
which is a standard product in Belgium but is marketed as a premium brand in the UK, using 
pan-European brand images, showed how lessons on brand introductions had been learned -
and then repeated in other markets. Whether this was in the consumer's interest was a good 
philosophical question! 
Benefits of scale economies realized 
Both respondents agreed that there had been benefits achieved via dynamic economies of 
scale, as a result of stronger competition. Apart from the expected - and agreed - benefits of 
cost reduction in procurement, production and distribution, both identified innovation as a 
gain which had come from greater scope of competition. The German firm also believed that 
quality benefits in marketing and production, as well as a number of other functional areas, 
could be substantiated. Because of its greater scale, and the need to compete in a more 
innovative market, the German respondent had invested in a small R&D brewery able to 
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produce short runs of production scale varieties, to increase the company's ability to introduce 
new products. In association with this, the transition to national competition across Germany 
had led to better and more professional marketing approaches to take advantage of new ideas. 
However, neither respondent was prepared to credit the single market with the achievement of 
these gains. They were seen as being part of the global development of the industry, and partly 
a natural evolution from the purely local competitive structures of 20 years ago. In Germany 
the major opportunities for growth were seen to have arisen from events in the east, and in the 
UK the major upheavals associated with the split of distribution from brewing were the most 
obvious driver of market change. 
Despite this it is arguable that German market liberalization through abolition of the 
'Deutsches Reinheitsgebof, even though penetration has been limited since it happened ten 
years ago, has had an impact on firm behaviour by encouraging German brewers to look at 
competitive structures in other markets. It is also very clear that the international strategic 
approach of Heineken, Danone, Carlsberg, Interbrew and Guinness is understood by those 
major brewers - in the UK, Germany and elsewhere - who are still focused on a single major 
domestic market. They expect structures in their markets to change in the not too distant future 
as a result of the international players, even if the past has been relatively stable. They 
recognize that their own strategies will need to adapt in order to meet this challenge. 
Diversity and scope of activities 
Both our respondent companies confirmed that the impact of a larger market had induced them 
to diversify the scope of their offer to customers, either through a broader product range, or 
through marketing via a more comprehensive range of distribution channels. Tailoring 
containers or delivery systems to customers' needs had made production somewhat more 
complex, and a greater range of IT and customer service skills was required from employees to 
meet new market needs. 
Our German respondent has retained a very focused approach to branding, attempting to 
maximize the impact of the brewery name and image - in effect, taking advantage of scale 
economies in advertising and promotion. It has altogether avoided blurring its distinctive 
position in the market, and has refused to become involved in production of store brand beers. 
But it has introduced to its range a dark beer, low alcohol beers, and a mineral water product. 
A.5.4. Influence of external economies of scale 
Both our respondents gave a surprisingly low rating to the importance of external economies 
relating to purchased materials. Since value added as a percentage of revenue is relatively high 
in the brewing sector, the costs of materials - which are in large part commodities - is less 
important than effective use of expensive plant or than achieving the right price position in the 
market. Input cost changes in the sector have not been excessive, and most producers continue 
to use mainly local materials. The German respondent commented that its own growth has 
given it more purchasing power, with benefits in its procurement process for materials and 
distribution services. Price increases have been limited by a larger potential supplier group. 
'But we already have close relationships with our suppliers, and our aim is to get the best 
quality from them - which they know how to give us.' There is a large incentive for a 
premium position business like this to avoid jeopardizing its quality reputation, and this has 
constrained the search for alternatives. 
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Α.5.5. Impact of the single market 
Although our respondents do not regard the single market as a determining factor in their own 
international development strategies, the freedom of movement for products and capital is 
starting to affect the way in which the brewing industry operates. Products, particularly 
premium brands of higher value, are travelling further as firms base market penetration 
strategies on own production. Investment in own capacity outside a company's domestic base 
is starting to be a preferred option to licensing of marketing operations and/or production. 
The growth of international brewers has accelerated markedly in the last five years, with 
Heineken, Danone, Interbrew, Guinness and Carlsberg all now having between 30% and 70% 
of their business activity outside their domestic markets. It is noticeable that none of these 
companies is based in the three biggest national markets for beer, suggesting that each of these 
companies has been forced to expand outside its domestic base to generate returns for its 
shareholders. The ability to move products and capital between EU national markets has 
facilitated this type of expansion, not caused it. The test of whether this process has genuinely 
improved the international competitive capability of EU brewing will be the success of these 
new international companies in extending their activities outside Europe, to compete in wider 
markets. 
There have been gains in procurement, in restraining prices for materials, but this is seen by 
our respondents as a second order benefit. The benefit which is noted as more substantial is 
the incentive for innovation which companies have experienced. In both the UK and Germany 
innovation has also been prompted by regulatory changes affecting domestic market 
organization. Disentangling the effects of these changes is at best difficult, particularly since 
the German regulatory change was implemented in order to meet requirement on movement of 
products. But it appears to be the case in the UK that radical changes in distribution structure 
have reinforced the pressures for innovation which the single market has brought. 
A.6. Motor vehicles 
A.6.1. Market context 1980-95 
EU manufacturers of motor vehicles are only now recovering from the worst recession in their 
industry since 1945. The drop in sales in 1993 alone was far worse than that induced by the oil 
crises of the early 1970s, and resulted in major layoffs across almost all Member States. 
Pressures to cut costs were felt all the way along the supply chain, and many businesses 
reorganized extensively in order to compete in the global marketplace. 1994 sales in the EU 
recovered to 11.2 million units, an increase of 4.6%, but the market is far from being fully 
restored.9 
Sector employment also dropped off in the early 1990s, from 1.23 million (1990) to 1.02 
million (1994). This decline has been faster than that in the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
and while falling demand was largely to blame, productivity improvements and industry 
rationalization/restructuring also contributed. 
European Commission [1996], Panorama of EC industry 1995/96. 
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The EU as a whole runs a consistent trade surplus in motor vehicles, which in 1994 amounted 
to 18.5 MECU. However, extra-EU imports have been rising faster than imports in recent 
years, reflecting the fact that the EU has now become the world's largest market for 
automobiles, and therefore the principal commercial battleground for the major global 
manufacturers. 
Competitive pressures have therefore forced the EU-based industry to adopt the lean 
production techniques with which Japanese firms in particular have been so successful. This 
re-engineering of the production process involves inter alia a more vertically fragmented 
industry, and a more co-ordinated approach to product and process design. This might 
therefore be expected to offer scope for the realization of dynamic and external economies of 
scale. Attributing this shift to the SM is questionable however, for while the re-engineered 
processes might be broadly characterized as 'European' in location, the competitive pressures 
are global. 
Indeed, the next few years may finally see the emergence of the 'world car' as global 
producers focus their resources on producing a variety of model types from key product 
platforms in their network. These platforms are in turn served by the globalizing automotive 
component industry on a just-in-time delivery basis. 
A.6.2. Overview of respondents' operations 
A full survey of the motor vehicle industry is beyond the scope of this case study, but we have 
sought the opinions of major industry leaders, notably the Chairman of Ford in the UK (and 
president of the UK motor vehicle trade association10) and Toyota Motor Europe, which is one 
of the 'transplant' industry leaders in lean production techniques. We also examine the 
changes made by Fiat, one of the EU's long-established carmakers, as reported in a parallel 
study on the effects of the SM on this sector." 
These firms represent a range of manufacturers in the motor vehicle sector. Ford is one of the 
oldest automotive businesses in the world, and one of the few approaching a genuinely global 
identity. Ford of Europe was established back in 1967, as even then the company recognized 
the value of a pan-regional identity. The company has a presence in five EU countries, 
including two major manufacturing sites in the UK, one in Germany, one in Belgium, one in 
Spain and a Portuguese factory that produces Ford's multi-purpose vehicle. 
In contrast, Toyota has only become a truly global manufacturer comparatively recently, but 
their arrival in the sector had an immediate impact, particularly in the US. It has now 
established a major manufacturing facility in Derbyshire, UK, and also has a spare parts 
distribution centre near Brussels, Belgium. As in the US, part of the rationale for establishing a 
manufacturing 'transplant' in the EU was to overcome the increasing antagonism that the high 
level of imports was causing in Toyota's major markets. 
The Society of Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT). 
European Commission [ 1997]. The Single Market Review. Vol. 1:6. Impact on manufacturing: Motor vehicles. 
The MPV is produced in collaboration with Volkswagen. 
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Fiat represent one of the EU's oldest established carmakers, who have had to restructure their 
operations significantly to respond to global competition. They have continued to maintain 
their core manufacturing in Italy, but have shifted some operations to the more southern 
regions of Potenza and Avellino, where costs are lower and where the company is eligible for 
a range of developmental assistance. Major new investments outside Italy have tended to be in 
emerging markets, such as Poland and Brazil, where Fiat sees future growth potential through 
the development of its 'world car', the Palio. 
A.6.3. Factors driving dynamic economies of scale 
According to Ford, globalization is leading to the exploitation of dynamic EOS with respect to 
R&D. The integration, through technology, of Ford's various research centres is leading to 
increased returns on R&D expenditure (measured in terms of new innovation) and a reduced 
time to market for new models. This is part of the Ford 2000 programme, which is gradually 
superseding the regional division of responsibility, represented by Ford of Europe. Essentially, 
Ford 2000 seeks to identify world-class expertise across the company wherever it is found, and 
project it onto Ford's global markets. This will lead, for example, to a concentration of R&D 
for smaller vehicles in Europe, which is perceived to be particularly strong in this respect, with 
the US taking responsibility for larger vehicles. 
Although these models are increasingly (although not entirely) the same across the world, Ford 
brands them and makes changes to the specifications for each national market. Consumers in 
each Member State of the EU are still viewed as having distinct requirements, and Ford still 
has to vary the product and marketing strategy to account for the different tastes and local 
competition. 
For their part, Fiat have extensively reorganized their operations in order to respond to the 
more competitive environment in the EU. The fabbrica integrata (integrated factory) project 
takes the Toyota model of lean production and attempts to apply it to Fiat's Italian operations 
through a functional integration of the various processes associated with production, in order 
to give greater flexibility, productivity and cost savings. 
In the experience of Fiat, advertising has become very much uniform throughout Europe 
allowing for some scale economies to be realized. Major institutional marketing (designed to 
raise and enhance the profile of the Fiat marque) is run from the Italian headquarters, but 
targets what is clearly seen as a European consumer. The emergence of this marketing identity 
is clearly a long-term phenomenon, on which the SM can have had only marginal impact. 
With respect to the distribution of motor vehicles throughout the EU, the Block Exemption 
under Article 85 of the EC Treaty was considered by Fiat executives to have favoured dealers 
ahead of producers and consumers. The new agreement allows multi-franchising with some 
restrictions: different brands must be kept in different showrooms under legally distinct 
corporate entities. Some cost savings are likely to be achieved by the economies of scale and 
scope possible through common servicing arrangements. 
The creation of Toyota's parts distribution centre in Belgium is in part a reflection of the fact 
that the SM allows free movement of automotive components, so that Toyota can provide 
European Commission [1997] op cit. 
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after-care to its dealerships from a central EU location in a way that would clearly not have 
been practicable from Japan. 
A.6.4. Factors driving external economies of scale 
There is a noticeable overlap between dynamic and external EOS in the automotive sector. For 
example, technology is enabling the re-engineering of business processes whereby key service 
inputs can also be externalized to an outside supplier as part of the lean production strategy 
identified above. The parent (assembly) firm still retains a close, symbiotic relationship with 
this specialized service supplier, which often has been spun-off from the parent firm, which 
recognizes that this new entity (the service supplier) is better able to supply these services as 
part of its core business, in a way the parent company never was. 
The best-known example of this phenomenon is the creation, development and subsequent 
disposal of EDS by General Motors in the US. EDS has since become a world leader in the 
provision of IT and consultancy services. In effect, internal economies of scope have been 
replaced by external economies of scale.14 Since almost 50% of the value of a vehicle now 
consists of bought-in products and services, this can lead to a significant reduction in overall 
costs.15 
In the continuing shake-out of the motor vehicle industry, it is also clear that even as firms de-
layer their own organizations, a new hierarchy is emerging in the wider industry. The leading 
assemblers have indicated a clear intent to reduce the number of suppliers they source from 
and then build up strategic, long-term partnerships with these firms. Fiat, for example, have 
reduced the number of suppliers they purchase from to 380 from around 1,200 in 1987. This 
has come about in spite of the increasing proportion of the total cost of the car accounted for 
by bought-in components. 
These so-called 'first tier' suppliers will in turn depend on 'second tier' manufacturers to 
provide components for sub-assembly into, for example, the engine, before this is delivered to 
the vehicle assembler. The traditional concept of external EOS, in which firms locate near to 
abundant labour and established sources of supply, no longer appears valid. The availability of 
low-cost labour remains an important issue, and provides the rationale for Ford's Portuguese 
plant, not least because such areas often qualify for development grants. However, the buying 
power of global motor vehicle assemblers is such that the suppliers will relocate near to them, 
if only to guarantee the just-in-time delivery of components. 
Other EAG research has noted the tendency of component suppliers to agglomerate around 
their major customers, the assemblers. This may in part be due to the outsourcing through 
disposal of some input functions, but it is also clear that new investment is attracted to the 
area.16 Scott identifies a circle whereby vertical disintegration (externalization) leads to 
14 Coffey and Bailey [1991]. 'Producer services and flexible production: an exploratory analysis',Growth & Change, Vol. 22. 
15 Rhys. G. in Johnson. P. [1993]. 
16 For example, the north-east of England after the Nissan investment and now southern Italy for Fiat's new production 
facilities. 
130 Economies of scale 
upstream agglomeration (geographic concentration of suppliers) which in turn encourages the 
ι n 
process of vertical disintegration. 
Strategic outsourcing goes beyond subcontracting a specified intermediate task in the 
production process, in that partner firms are expected to be creative and pro-active. This sort 
of partnering carries responsibilities on both sides: Fiat identify this process as crescita 
guidata (assisted growth) which they have employed since 1991. Toyota, too, have long been 
known for the specialist knowledge and problem-solving expertise they transfer to their 
strategic partners, in contrast to the more conventional practice of jealously guarding such 
crucial intellectual property. In terms of Porter's paradigm, the modern, global automotive 
1 R 
value chain is only as strong as its weakest link. 
In their traditional home market of Japan, Toyota's intellectual property would have been 
protected by the Keiretsu network of equity-crossholdings, which ensured that both supplier 
and assembler were dependent on each other, logistically and financially. In the EU however, 
where different market structures prevail, this has been more difficult to get off the ground, 
but is now clearly observable. 
A.6.5. Role of the single market 
Because of the motor vehicle sector's high political and economic profile, the creation of the 
SM was always going to be a delicate exercise. This is reflected in the various exemptions 
granted to automotive producers under various international trade agreements, including the 
GATT and the Treaty of Rome. 
As one long-time observer of the EU motor vehicle industry has noted: '... the motor industry 
was already one of the most European of industries and had done much to anticipate 1992. It 
has long regarded Europe as one market and already operates on this basis. It is not fanciful to 
say that a transnational company like Ford had achieved its own 1992 when it created Ford of 
Europe back in 1967.'19 
Nevertheless, some significant developments did occur as part of the SM programme. The 
major elements are as follows: 
(a) the reduction of fiscal trade barriers stemming from large intra-EU variations in indirect 
taxes; 
(b) the removal of physical non-tariff barriers which impede the free movement of motor 
vehicles (quotas, customs regulations, etc.); 
(c) the development of EU-wide technical standards and product specifications, such as the 
Whole Vehicle Type Approval (WVTA). 
It was generally expected that the benefit of these measures would be felt primarily in the 
production and distribution functions, and could potentially lead to unit cost reductions of 
17 Scott, A. [1986]. 'Industrial organization and location: division of labour, the firm and spatial process. Economic 
Geography, Vol. 62 
18 Porter, M. [1980], Competitive strategy. 
19 Rhys, G. [1993]. in Johnson op cit. 
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around 5%. The WVTA, for example, was thought to offer economies of scale through the 
standardization of vehicle specifications across the EU. 
Research has shown that the WVTA is indeed one of the most important ways in which the 
SM is contributing to cost savings for motor vehicle manufacturers through the realization of 
dynamic EOS. These come from reducing the number of testing procedures from 15 to one 
(which is then recognized by all other Member States), and the consequent reduction in the 
time to market. The direct saving has been valued at around ECU 1-1.5 million for each 
model launch, with further indirect savings of almost ECU 30 million. 
The evidence presented above suggests that upstream activities, such as R&D, testing 
procedures and supplier purchasing, are becoming more integrated and concentrated, thereby 
enabling some firms to realize dynamic economies of scale, but this process is not a result of 
the SM programme. However, opinions vary with respect to downstream activities such as 
marketing and advertising, which are still largely undertaken at the Member State level, 
although the after-market for service and parts has to some extent been regionalized. 
The automotive component industry is also responding to competitive pressures through 
globalization and concentration. Assuming key product segments remain competitive, external 
economies of scale are potentially realizable for assemblers of motor vehicles, as cost savings 
are passed on from their suppliers. Evidence as to whether this has actually happened is 
extremely difficult to find because pricing matters remain highly confidential within the 
industry. However, the removal of physical barriers to trade may have allowed more 
component suppliers to trade across the EU and thereby contributed to the scale of their 
operations. (The removal of such barriers was not considered important by the vehicle 
manufacturers in the case study, as they already made special provisions for customs 
clearance, etc.). 
As has been noted previously, earlier work on economies of scale did not directly address the 
issue of dynamic and external EOS. We have found both non-production EOS to be important 
in this sector, but the link with the SM is tenuous at best. The SM does not appear to have 
influenced downstream activity or the location of manufacturing operations. The EU motor 
vehicle industry has clearly intensified its co-operation at the regional level in a way which 
supports the exploitation of EOS, but this was never seen as an alternative to globalization in 
order to meet world-wide competitive challenges from more efficient producers in Japan and 
North America. 
A.7. Glass 
These case studies cover two applications sectors of the European glass industry, container 
glass and flat glass, and are based on interviews with leading companies in each. Only one 
major European company competes in a leading role in both sectors, and the two have 
different end-user and immediate customers, and different competitive pressures. For the most 
part, they will therefore be treated as separate case studies in this analysis. 
20 Emerson et al [1988b]. 
21 European Commission [1997], op cit. 
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The large producers, and their involvement in applications sectors, are as follows: 
Tableware Fibre Special 
** * 
sold * 
*** 
Company 
Saint-Gobain 
Pilkington 
Schott 
Glaverbel 
Waterford 
Gerresheimer 
Rockwool 
PLM 
SIV 
BSN 
Rockware 
United Glass 
Owens Corning 
PPG 
Approx 000 
employees 
96 
40 
18 
9 
8 
6 
5 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
Containers 
**** 
*** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
Fla) 
*** 
*** 
** 
* 
Cost structure, from international data 
There are enough observations on the glass industry in the PIMS database to draw some 
general conclusions - across segments - on the scale sensitivity of costs. Glass is an industrial 
sector in which manufacturing costs make up a relatively high proportion of sales revenue for 
the majority of businesses, reflecting the fact that most firms in the industry add a high 
proportion of value - and cost - to very basic raw materials. It is also a relatively fixed capital 
intensive sector. 
The available data suggests that sales, marketing and R&D costs in most businesses in the 
sector are low, but that: 
(a) there are significant production scale economies, measuring scale in terms of relative 
share; 
(b) it is the larger scale producers which appear to invest more heavily in product and 
process R&D, as well as in aspects of marketing; 
(c) larger scale producers tend to have higher process stocks, which may be related to their 
greater involvement in off-site processing (see Section B.2). 
A.7.1. Containers 
Market trends 1980-95 
Container glass amounts to around 15 million tonnes of the total EU glass output of 23 million 
tonnes. Its composition in terms of end use varies between national markets, but is composed 
mainly of wine bottles, beer and cider bottles, bottles for spirits and alcohol, food jars, cordials 
and mineral waters, toiletries and cosmetics, and in the UK, milk bottles. Some of these 
applications are in steady decline over the long term, and some - such as pharmaceutical 
containers - have now been almost completely substituted by PET. Soft drinks and larger beer 
bottles are now largely blown from PET, except for premium brands, and for applications 
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where hot sterilizing is required. Mineral water bottles are mostly substituted by PVC, and 
more recently by high quality PET whose superior finish makes it a further threat to glass. 
In the early 1980s glass container demand in Europe fell rapidly by around 5% p.a., as 
substitution by PVC, PET and cans took over many applications in beer, soft drinks and 
mineral water, and as cartons took over in milk. In the late 1980s total container demand 
stabilized, mainly because growth in spirits and premium beers was starting to compensate for 
continuing losses elsewhere. Since 1991 growth of around 2% p.a. has been achieved overall, 
but the pattern from year to year, and across national markets, has been irregular. 
For lower value glass containers there has been increasingly fierce competition from Eastern 
Europe, but there is still a small positive overall trade balance in tonnage terms. Much of the 
growth in EU value added has been in higher value products, in custom designed bottles for 
soft drinks and mineral waters, for premium beers and ciders, and in toiletries and cosmetics. 
The bulk of EU demand is satisfied by production relatively close to the point of filling, 
because the cost of transporting empty containers is high. The exceptions to this general rule 
are in higher value branded products, spirits and premium beers, where containers may travel 
farther. The only application in which there is a genuine European scale market for glass 
containers is in toiletries and cosmetics, where global brand owners of the final products buy 
on a European scale, and co-ordinate procurement, production and marketing at this level. 
Since the package is a vital part of the brand image for such products, innovation and design, 
consistency and guaranteed quality, and the ability when required to provide short runs and 
flexible service are crucial in this sector. 
Overview of production facilities 
Production economies of scale in glass containers exist at three levels: 
(a) the number of furnaces per factory, which permits sharing of overheads and logistics; 
(b) the size of glass furnace, which shows the normal 'cube rule' for process plant; 
(c) the size and number of bottle making machines on each furnace. 
Changes in technology over the period 1980 to 1995 have permitted two main developments. 
The maximum furnace size has increased from 400 tonnes per day (tpd) to 500. The maximum 
machine size has increased from '10 section double gob' which can make 20 bottles 
simultaneously, to '12 section quadruple gob' which can make 48. Most major producers now 
have at least one machine of maximum size, but not all have maximum furnace size. The 
maximum number of machines per furnace is five, limited by the problems of assembling and 
managing a varied order book. Clearly big machines are best suited to long runs of simple 
products, such as standard wine bottles or food jars, in single colours. 
Structural changes in the industry since 1980 have reflected the changes in plant scale: 
(a) In Italy a number of producers came together to form AVIR. 
(b) In France, BSN absorbed UMC, and Saint-Gobain and BSN took over much of the 
previously independent Spanish capacity. 
(c) In Germany, Weigan became part of Niewburger, and Testaur, Wistoff and 
Gerresheimer came together. 
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(d) In the UK, United Glass acquired CTG, and Rockware acquired the Co-operative 
business, before itself being acquired by BTR. PLM acquired Redfearn. 
BTR's view on acquiring Rockware (based on Australian experience) was that a single furnace 
plant, with 400 tpd furnace plant feeding two machines could compete effectively in the 
European market, but that the load it would require to compete was important. This is because 
such a high proportion of the plant labour cost is tied up in finishing and packaging, and 
outbound logistics. Only about 15% of plant labour cost is typically in the 'hot end' making 
bottles; the other 85% is in inspection, decoration, finishing, packaging, warehousing and 
despatch. But as 80% of capital assets are normally in the 'hot end', this is where management 
attention on technology focuses. 
Automation in finishing has also advanced over the last ten years, particularly as standards of 
inspection and product precision have tightened. Bottling plant speeds have increased 
substantially, putting greater strain on the product and leaving less room for flaws. In addition, 
final product liability has lessened the tolerance for foreign material in bottles - or of harmless 
discoloration in the glass. Automatic testing and handling has therefore become more 
important. 
Marketing and sales costs in the container sector typically account for less than 2% of sales 
revenue, because most sales organizations are focused on a single country. Producers have 
agents outside their domestic base, but the bulk of sales are to a relatively concentrated 
customer base in one national market. Distribution costs within a major market usually 
amount to 5% of sales revenue, and up to 10% for longer distances or a sea crossing. R&D for 
most producers is around 0.5% of sales revenue. 
Relatively few producers had sites in more than one country until the 1980s. Saint-Gobain and 
BSN's presence by acquisition in Spain started the trend, continued by PLM's acquisitions in 
the Netherlands and Germany, and of Redfearn in the UK. Australian ownership and influence 
over Rockware was the first 'outside' presence. Most major producers now have at least three 
or four production sites - more for St. Gobain, which is the world's largest glass container 
company. Where possible each site tends to specialize in a particular market segment or 
product type, in order to maximize the output of furnaces and machines, and to keep the 
problems of finishing and logistics manageable. 
There is still a role for smaller producers, left by the increasing scale of the larger plants. For 
example, in the UK Lax & Shaw have grown significantly - and profitably - as a small scale 
bottle maker, specializing in short runs and miniatures which are unsuited to large plants. And 
Rockware has 'spun off its toiletries and cosmetics plant, which it could not operate 
successfully within a large organization, to a small management buy-out which is better able 
to direct attention to quality and service. 
Factors driving dynamic economies of scale 
Competitive factors driving the glass container industry are much less European than those 
which are shaping the production of other packaging systems. Cans, PET bottles and cartons 
all have somewhat greater homogeneity in production systems, in the supply of technology and 
in applications across Europe than do glass containers. Bottles and jars tend to be related to 
more traditional products where national differences in taste persist, and there is less market 
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homogeneity. Ability to exploit scale economies depends to some extent on national 
differences in demand structure; high output machines are more likely to perform well where 
there is demand for long runs of standard products, such as wine bottles in France, or milk 
bottles in the UK. According to one of our respondents, who worked as a planning manager in 
a UK container company in the late 1980s, the pursuit of scale economies through volume by 
extending product range was undertaken by more than one company at that time, and turned 
out to be a major strategic error. 
Common customers are present across national boundaries in greater numbers now than in 
1981, as food and drink branded products companies become more international. Cosmetics 
companies have been international in this sense since the 1960s. Insofar as there are lead 
markets for innovation in glass containers, the UK leads for food and drink, while for 
cosmetics it is Italy/France. However, innovations in design, and in trends such as 
'lightweighting' the glass content of bottles to reduce costs and handling effort, tend to be 
copied across international boundaries relatively quickly. The R&D costs of keeping abreast of 
the product and process innovations which do occur, however, are increasing. This factor, 
which may also affect customers, may be one reason for the increasing tendency of packaged 
goods manufacturers to reduce the number of suppliers they use regularly. If they focus on a 
few bottle suppliers, they can develop closer relationships, speed up the process of producing 
new packaging solutions, and contain development costs. 
Factor cost differences between countries within the EU are not large enough to overcome 
transport cost barriers for many products, but labour costs in eastern Europe - and their likely 
levels over the next few years - are certainly low enough to influence investment decisions. 
Efficiency differences between countries are much more dependent on company know-how 
than they are on local factors. 
Know-how and inter-site learning certainly does occur in the industry, through a number of 
routes. Some companies have developed management approaches, for selection of business 
and management of the planning process, which appear to give them worthwhile cost and 
commercial advantages. There are also proprietary technologies, held by major glass 
companies and licensed to other producers. The application of such know-how in the glass 
industry reinforces the tendency for specialization in market segments, and is not specific to 
the container sector. For example, Pilkington's recent sale of its fibre business to Owens 
Corning - while unlikely to present opportunities in the short to medium term for production 
scale increases - has permitted the acquiring company to implement management and 
reporting improvements developed in other European plants, and in North America. 
There are also important intellectual property rights affecting the glass container industry held 
by the main suppliers of bottle-making machinery. Plant suppliers have an important role in 
transferring knowledge of what is going on in the industry, and determining the rate and 
direction of technological advance. At least one of them operates a 'benchmarking' 
information system, by which individual plants are able to plot their achievements in 
productivity against others world-wide. The two main plant manufacturers, Owens and 
Emhart, are both American-owned. 
Benefits from dynamic scale economies in the glass container industry are almost entirely 
attributable to gains from transfer of operational know-how, and they owe relatively little to 
the single market. The gains certainly exist - but they are identified only through internal 
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studies undertaken by companies in the industry to track differences in productivity and plant 
performance. Most of the benefits have been realized by in-country mergers (in Germany, Italy 
and the UK). The notable exceptions are Saint-Gobain's move into Spain, and PLM's 
presence in Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK - built up before 
Sweden's entry to the EU. 
Scale benefits are reported in one of our responding companies as a direct result of acquisition 
within its domestic base, both through improved labour productivity and increased capital 
productivity. The arrival of Australian management know-how with BTR's entry via 
acquisition in the UK market is also reported to have provided the framework for significant 
reductions in overhead costs. 
Marketing gains are limited by the heterogeneity of market demand between countries, due to 
the fact that there is still a large base of container users who operate only in one national 
market, and by the transport costs of empty containers. For Saint-Gobain, the market leader, 
the achievement of marketing economies is also perceived by competitors to have been slowed 
by the vertical split between production and marketing which existed in the organization for 
much of the period. 
Influence of external economies of scale 
While container suppliers provide external scale economies to their customers by closer 
relationships and shared development costs, the scope to do this in the glass industry is very 
limited. Most of the raw materials are straight commodities. They are affected by issues of 
quality control, but the main focus is on price and delivery. As a respondent said, 'We can buy 
these materials from a range of suppliers, except for soda ash where in most European 
countries there is one local monopoly supplier - but it still isn't worth the cost of importing'. 
The main external scale economy in this industry is in plant development, where virtually all 
producers benefit from the process control advances of two plant manufacturers. However, the 
framework within which this happens is world-wide rather than European. Owens technology 
is used by United Glass, Gerresheimer, BSN and BTR/Rockware, while Emhart technology, 
which is somewhat less capital intensive, is used by Saint-Gobain. Development and 
comparison learning tends to occur within these groups - and their international partners -
rather than between them. 
Role of the single market 
In terms of the main dynamic cost elements, it is clear that the impact of the single market on 
the glass container industry has been limited. While cross-European competition has been 
much more evident in other packaging media, three factors have tended to keep market 
boundaries relatively local for glass: the relative conservatism of much of end-user demand, 
the short geographical range of individual plants, and possibly the burdens imposed on 
producers by process capital intensity. 
The most international producer, PLM, which has a manufacturing presence in five European 
countries, is not the largest container producer in Europe, nor is it the largest producer in the 
majority of its market - only in Scandinavia is it a clear leader. However, this entire position 
was built up in advance of the accession of PLM's home country to the European Community, 
and it is difficult to argue that the single market has a strong influence on behaviour. 
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A.7.2. Flat glass 
Market trends 1980-95 
Flat glass has shown significant increase in EU consumption and production over the period, 
driven by the demands of the construction and automotive industries. Since construction is a 
commercial investment market, and automotive demand is strongly related to consumer 
confidence, both applications are cyclical. Sustained growth in demand throughout the 1980s 
was halted by the 1989-92 recession, with production falling in 1991. Since then, there has 
been some recovery in market demand. 
The two main areas of the market are radically different in the way that purchasers behave. 
The automotive sector is global, with customers who seek to buy at least on a European level, 
possibly wider. The major customer's R&D effort in automotive is led from North America, 
and manufacturers' strategies have attempted in most cases to add value - to deliver to 
automotive customers a complete module ready for the assembly line. Building, on the other 
hand, is primarily a set of national markets. Glass sheet is made at float plants, fabricated into 
double glazed units by processor/distributors, then sold to builders. 
Today's European market demand is around 4.6 mtpa for building, and 5.7 mtpa for 
automotive, but average auto prices are significantly higher than for building glass. Shares of 
the major suppliers across Europe are roughly similar in each segment. 
Market growth has partly been boosted by EU regulations, particularly those on energy 
efficient buildings (see Appendix C). Double glazing is now mandatory under building 
regulations in many countries, which has increased glass demand, and also the market for 
glass processing. 
Overview of production operations 
According to the managing director of one of the major European producers, who was 
involved in technology development at the beginning of our review period, the basic 
technology has not changed significantly in 15 years. There have been improvements in 
refractories and process control, but the physics of heat removal from floating glass, and 
laminar flow, impose limits on maximum plant size which have not altered. The optimal plant 
has two lines, each consisting of furnace and float tank of around 5,000 tonnes per week; there 
are no real economies in common furnaces as there are for glass containers. However, the 
refractory and process improvements have lengthened the life of furnaces, as much as halving 
the depreciation charge per tonne of glass produced. 
The real limits on plant scale economies are in logistics. Firstly, transport costs are significant, 
as transport costs are around ECU 0.1 per km. 500 km is the normal 'catchment' area of a float 
plant, and beyond 1,000 km it becomes impossible even to cover variable costs, with today's 
price/cost structure. Secondly, the complexity of the order book has a major influence, and 
here there have been major changes. 
In 1980 it was normal for a float plan to finish most of its glass on site, to cut to size, polish 
and fabricate products sold to the builder or auto manufacturer. Now much of this work is 
done off site, either by the producer or in the market by independent finishers. Under this 
arrangement standard sizes are shipped out of the float plant, using in-plant packaging. Capital 
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requirements at the plant are significantly reduced by the removal of on-site finishing, as well 
as the number of employees and the complexity of the operation. But it has required 
investment in intelligent cutting machines in local finishing/distribution centres. 
The economic effect of remote processing is significant, because it has led most major 
producers to take significant downstream stakes. Rather than sell unprocessed glass to 
processor/distributors, Saint-Gobain processes/distributes over 80% of its output in France, 
while Pilkington processes between 50% and 70% in the major markets of Germany and the 
UK, and PPG and Guardian are also involved in distribution. This trend has also made the 
market more accessible to imports of unworked glass from third countries. 
There are some areas of downstream processing, particularly in the automotive sector, which 
generate enough value added to justify significant transport costs and plant specialization. For 
example, the manufacture of windshield modules is undertaken at a processing plant in 
Sagunto, northern Spain, using unworked glass imported from the UK. This is then sent in 
bulk each day to Opel in Germany. Similarly, Pilkington have a plant in Finland which 
specializes in replacement windshield units, and which supplies the whole of Europe. 
Pilkington's pattern of float plants across Europe has changed little in the last ten years, except 
for the 1995 acquisition/integration of SIV in Italy, and the replacement of major lines in the 
UK. It now has 11 lines in five countries, with the main concentrations in the UK, Italy and 
Germany, but no presence in France or Spain. Saint-Gobain is present as a float producer in 
most major markets except the UK and Scandinavia. All main producers have float plants in 
Benelux/Germany, or at least within range of the major part of these markets. Both major 
producers, Saint-Gobain and Pilkington, have processing plants in almost every national 
market in Europe. Pilkington have entered Spain (1980), then France (1988-91) in this way. 
The objective of most producers in penetrating markets is to build up a base load through 
processing plants which can eventually be used to support a float plant. 
Float plants are now beginning to be considered in Eastern Europe as economical suppliers to 
the EU markets. Poland in particular is attracting investment because its wage rates are 10% of 
those in neighbouring Germany, and it has both a strong local skill base in glass technology, 
and relative political stability. Some investment projects are underway, in the knowledge that 
sooner or later a significant part of the output of the plants will come back to compete with EU 
producers. 
Factors driving dynamic economies of scale 
Our respondent rated three factors as most important in determining the exploitation of scale 
economies in process and product development, and in marketing: 
(a) the increasingly homogeneous character of customer requirements, especially in the 
automotive sector; 
(b) the 'balance of power' which requires major producers to be active in all markets in 
order to service Europe-wide customers and retain parity of market presence; 
(c) the need to be abreast of developments which take place in the most advanced markets, 
and to transfer them to others. 
In addition, the increasing imbalance of factor costs in Germany, which can add as much as 60 
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ECU/tonne to the labour cost of glass production there, is beginning to force all producers to 
look carefully at their Europe-wide production pattern. 
Homogeneous customer needs have the strongest impact in the automotive sector. The largest 
auto customers in Europe are strongly influenced from North America, and Saint Gobain has 
suffered strategically from not being present in this market. At the time of writing it was 
negotiating for the purchase of Ford America's ageing glass plant to fill the gap. Within 
Europe, the lead markets tend to be Germany and Benelux, which have a concentration of 
sophisticated car makers. All glass producers approach the automotive market through key 
account sales organizations, at a European level. 
In building products the markets were almost entirely nationally defined until 1994. For most 
producers selling is still organized on country lines, but converging demands by building 
companies have prompted at least one company to develop products aimed at specific 
segments, rather than tailored for national markets. The commercial aim of the strongest 
companies is to develop differentiated solutions for target segments of the markets, as well as 
to contain costs. Harmonization of building regulations, and the increasing importance of 
international construction companies have brought about the change. 
Co-ordination and knowledge transfer are becoming increasingly important in the flat glass 
industry. One respondent company now has internal European co-ordination for procurement 
of raw materials - until recently a purely local activity - as well as for plant loading and 
logistics. In addition it has a world-wide manufacturing board, since the scope for learning is 
global. 
The same company also has a marketing database to cover the Europe-wide requirements of 
its customers in the building sector - where sales activities are still predominantly national. 
Development work for the automotive sector can only be structured on a world-wide basis, 
with lead customers. In the building market, development activity takes place under the 
guidance of a group co-ordinating committee, in order to ensure focus on target segments. 
Development in the company is led from a US base for automotive products, from the UK for 
melting and coating, and from Germany for building products. Its personnel and training 
activities are mainly national, except for a cadre of managers identified as top management 
potential, who are trained and planned on a world-wide level. 
Benefits from scale, or knowledge transfer across European markets are acknowledged by 
respondents. Cost reductions are claimed through co-ordinated procurement, through 
distribution planning between float plants and processing centres on a European basis, and on 
marketing. Overall sales and marketing costs have declined from around 6% of sales value in 
the early 1980s to around 4.5% today, over which period the selling price per tonne of the 
products has hardly changed. R&D costs, on the other hand, have increased over the period 
from around 2% to about 2.5%. In one major company the incentive for national organizations 
to take full advantage of shared R&D is maintained by ensuring that each pays a standard 
'levy' towards group effort, and is encouraged to access results without further cost. It reports 
several instances in which solutions to problems in one market had been easily transferred to 
others. 
The effects of scale economies are difficult to disentangle from the impact of general 
efficiency improvements, but taken together they have been substantial. Despite the doubling 
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of labour costs, increases in silica and soda ash costs, and the volatility of energy prices, 
producers have managed to live with virtually static money prices. To achieve this they have 
doubled output per employee, improved material yield from 60% to 80%, and doubled thermal 
efficiency from 100 therms/tonne to around 50 therms/tonne. 
Influence of external economies of scale 
Scope for external economies in materials supply has been relatively limited over the period. 
Most inputs, as in the case of glass containers, are bought commodities whose prices are 
determined in national or local markets. The only significant exception is lamination material 
for windscreens, where one major glass producer has selected a single strategic partner to help 
it meet the development needs of the auto manufacturers. 
External economies in marketing and distribution are an essential part of the change which has 
taken place, described in the section above. Finishing operations remote from the float plants 
have permitted operations to be greatly simplified, and reduced the costs incurred in 
production. However, this has only been possible because of reliable, relatively cheap 
transport links between float plants and finishing plants. And while the description focused on 
the in-house remote finishing operations of the major companies, the independent glass 
finishers and distributors have benefited from the same type of investment in intelligent 
cutting machines. In the view of one respondent, the effort needed to set up the logistics and 
co-ordination to match float and independent finishing operations often represents investment 
in a strategic partnership. 
Role of the single market 
Just how much internationalization of the European flat glass industry would have taken place 
without single market measures is debatable. The industry in the EU is dominated by two 
strong European firms, with a positive impact on net trade. Both have become increasingly 
European in their approach to marketing, development and planning, and both now have 
finishing operations in each national market. The pattern of float plant centres and finishing 
operations which has been created across Europe certainly relies on the permanence of access 
to all national markets, but that access predates the single market measures in most cases. 
Harmonization of building regulations has probably had the greatest positive impact on the 
process. Without this it would have been more difficult to simplify production patterns at float 
glass plants, because the number of sizes and specifications for the building sector could not 
have been reduced. It would also have been more difficult to organize logistics if product 
standards for the output of finishing plants had not become compatible across national 
boundaries. 
Standardization of products, and a European approach to float production and finishing, would 
probably have occurred even without single market measures - given that the automotive 
industry had established itself on a European scale in response to global competition. 
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A.8. Clothing 
A.8.1. Market context 
In general, Italian textile and clothing (TC) companies would appear increasingly European 
minded, i.e. more inclined to take advantage of new opportunities offered by the EU market. 
This is confirmed by the high level of exports towards the EU: in 1994 EU TC exports was 
58% of total exports, 66% when also including EFTA countries; conversely, in the Italian 
manufacturing sectors as a whole the corresponding shares were 51% and 60% [Ice, 1995]. 
Due to the development of big pan-European distributors, the degree of concentration in the 
distribution channels is going to increase [Steele, 1995]. This evolution will mainly affect 
Italy, where the concentration degree of retailing is lower than in the EU as a whole: in Italy 
only 10% of TC sales comes from big distributors, whereas about 50% of exports are towards 
big retailers. 
This implies, on the one hand, a greater attention among Italian exporters towards big pan-
European distributors, and on the other hand, more opportunities to export for SMEs without a 
direct distribution chain. The first opportunity has been exploited by Golden Lady (774 
employees and LIT 301 bn sales in 1994), where large retailers account for 70% of exports to 
France and 50% to Germany. 
One of the SMEs that exploit the second opportunity is Igeat (LIT 10 bn sales in 1994), which 
deals with Galeries Lafayette, Printemps, etc.; Igeat's first market is not Italy but France, and 
the second is Germany. To avoid the competition coming from extra-EU imports Igeat 
produces fashion, customized and creative products, and proposes a different collection to 
each big customer, in order to give them the idea of exclusiveness and customization. 
The Italian firms that try to pursue this strategy are making huge investments in high 
technology plants, based on CAD-CAM systems, automated cutting lines, automated 
warehouse, etc., in order to design and prototype such a very wide range of collections. 
Another notable example is the Bic Puglia Sprint consortium in Bari which exports to large 
EU distributors. EU funds were used to subsidize international services to ten SMEs to export 
to EU markets using a common trade mark (named F. Ranieri) throughout the product range 
[Largo Consumo, 1995]. 
The opportunity to deal with pan-EU distributors is enforced by the penetration of big foreign 
retailers within the Italian market. The arrivals of Auchan, Continent, Markant and Carrefour 
enable SMEs to have contacts with EU retailers in their own city or country (without travelling 
abroad, shipping sample collections, visiting fairs, etc.). 
Unlike the upstream relationships, large companies stand to benefit from the concentration of 
EU retailing. Of course, the weight of this distribution channel is relatively lower in big 
groups: Gft (1,492 bn sales 1994) and Marzotto (2,430 bn sales 1994) trade with Marks & 
Spencer for a low percentage of their total revenues. They prefer to control the demand 
evolution using their own direct distribution chain in the EU. 
The relationship between SM completion and retailing concentration implies a new definition 
of 'ideal EU product', as the EU consumer's taste and, especially, EU distribution needs are 
different from those in Italy. 
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Firstly, big EU retailers need exclusive collections, such as Gft provides for Marks & Spencer 
in the high segments, or customized products, as Igeat (10 bn sales 1994) for Printemps (F) 
and Tamigi (20 bn sales) for El Corte Ingles (E) do in the medium-low segment. 
Secondly, big EU retailers ask for big orders and delivery schedules: large companies and 
SMEs use outward production also for this scale (Igeat has 12 direct and 100 indirect 
employees). 
Thirdly, the ideal product for big EU retailers is medium-high quality, but not the very high 
quality product usually destined for boutiques. According to this evolution some big groups 
are going to substitute brands having status symbol with brands having quality-and-reliability 
symbol. The goal is to maintain the same high unit margins in a lower price item. 
Fourthly, big EU retailers require a lesser number of versions of the same collection than the 
usual mix asked by the Italian market. For example, Lubiam (LIT 60 bn sales in 1994) has 150 
different sizes for each model; Gft had reduced that production complexity only a few years 
ago. The reduction of production complexity is a good economy, if we consider the high cost 
of design and prototype process: roughly 5-10% of total sales. 
A.8.2. Overview of respondents' operations 
During the last decade the foreign direct investments (FDI) of Italian companies have been 
increasing, in terms of number of plants and number of firms involved. During the 1990s even 
SMEs were involved in FDI abroad [Cominotti, Mariotti, 1994]. The aggregate data confirm 
this evolution: the stock of foreign employees in the 1991-93 period increased by 30% in the 
apparel industry and 11% in textiles; on the contrary the total industry average was 6%. The 
share of foreign employees out of the total TC employees doubled from 4% to 9% over the 
same period. 
The corporate data show a similar pattern: Marzotto had no foreign employees in 1989 and 
23% in 1993, and Gft increased from 23% to 36%. Within that trend, the importance of TC 
foreign employees located in Central and Eastern Europe has been increasing from about zero 
(early 1980s) to 40% (1993). The share of the total Italian industry accounts for 17% 
[Cominotti, Mariotti, 1994]. 
However, FDI in the EU was highly relevant in the 1980s, but has become far less important 
in the 1990s. Thanks to the abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the EU is a domestic 
market for large companies, and a quasi-domestic market for SMEs. 
The location factors for Italian FDI in Europe were: 
(a) labour costs in southern Europe, such as Spain (Zegna, Miroglio, Benetton, Gft), 
Portugal (La Perla) and Greece (Miroglio); 
(b) product-distribution relationships (i.e. Benetton in France, or Miroglio in Germany); 
(c) EU common trade marks (i.e. Marzotto and Gft in Germany); 
(d) good raw materials (i.e. Benetton in Scotland); 
(e) tailoring-skilled blue collars (i.e. Zegna in Switzerland). 
The reduced importance of the EU within Italian FDI is confirmed by the aggregated data. In 
1991 the foreign apparel employees in the EU and EFTA declined to 48% of the total foreign 
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employees, and 52% in the textile industry; in 1994 the same percentages reduce to 28% in 
both sectors [Cominotti, Mariotti, 1994]. 
Another aspect very close to the SM completion is the penetration of foreign firms within the 
Italian manufacturing system. It is noteworthy to consider the role of extra-EU companies, that 
usually acquire an EU firm in order to take advantage from the SM programme. Within the TC 
Italian industry there are very few cases of US and Japanese-owned firms. 
The completion of the SM, the higher European competition and the new commercial 
agreements with CEECs (Central and East European Countries) are going to increase the 
Italian outward processing trade (OPT) with Asian countries and, especially, with CEECs: 
Italian share of EU OPT was 6% in 1988 and 15% in 1993; the OPT counted for a mere 1% of 
total TC imports in 1988, but 10% in 1993. 
We have to consider that international sourcing is likely to be used in standardized contracts, 
big consignments, and programmed orders (10-12 months in advance). This is why larger 
European distributors are going to be increasing their use of international sourcing. 
The completion of the SM is likely to affect the product-country specialization of Italian 
sourcing, as follows: 
(a) Asian countries, as far as low quality, big shipments, long noticed orders are concerned 
(higher quality could be obtained using Japanese high price tissues); 
(b) Mediterranean Rim, as far as products using Italian tissues, small consignments, quick 
orders are concerned (higher quality is obtained using Italian technicians travelling 
abroad); 
(c) CEECs are in the middle of these situations (higher quality is obtained using Italian 
technicians locally resident) even if some cases of 12 days' orders have been registered 
in Romania [Tecnica della Confezione, 1995]. 
The level of international sourcing in the Italian TC industry as a whole is not dramatic: only 
14% of the apparel and knitwear production [ModaMarketing, 1995]. Of course, in labour 
intensive production that share is higher (apparel 24%, shirt 22%) and in the highly automated 
sectors it is lower (knitwear 6%, stocking 1%). In another study the international sourcing in 
the total TC and footwear industry is less than 10% [Brusco, 1995]. 
The devaluation of the Lira has induced a slackening in international sourcing. In 1995 Simint 
(LIT 202 bn sales in 1994) of the Armani group relocated in Italy 90% of its former foreign 
production. Miroglio (1,400 bn sales 1994) is going to build a 400-employee plant in Taranto; 
in 1995 Benetton (2,751 bn sales 1993) doubled the production capacity of Castrette plant; 
Polli is building a new plant in the 'Mezzogiorno' area. 
Economies of scale are more important in the downstream relationships than in the upstream 
or horizontal ones. The case of horizontal inputs reflects the absence of strategic alliances in 
the Italian TC industry. 
Over the period 1985-94 the external growth in the TC industry was mainly based on non-
equity agreements (45% of total operations), followed by majority acquisitions (30%), joint 
venture (15%), and minority acquisitions (10%) [Osservatorio acquisizioni e alleanze, 1995]. 
The main characteristic of these operations is the role of non-TC companies as partners of TC 
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firms involved in agreements and joint ventures. Within the TC industry the cases of 
horizontal alliances between competitors in the same product are rare and not significant for 
the company's growth strategy. The attitude towards co-operation with non-competitor 
partners derives mainly from the small entrepreneur's culture, very suspicious of competitors' 
behaviour. Even in the TC industrial districts this seems to have happened when the 
relationships are not intermediated by local institutions, such as consortia, chambers of 
commerce, etc. On the whole SMEs try to increase their vertical integration in an indirect way, 
using non-equity agreements in order to save financial efforts. 
A.8.3. Factors driving economies of scale 
As a result of the increased competition prompted in part by the SM programme, Italian TC 
companies have reinforced their investment efforts in relation to the control of distribution 
channels and the relationships between producer and retailer. 
(Other typical endogenous sunk costs, such as advertisement and R&D are not considered 
here: the data on advertising show a clear relationship with the economic cycle, and not with 
the structural data of the internationalization process; the data on R&D are affected by design 
and prototyping efforts, considered in the firm's accounting schemes as R&D investments.) 
As far as the new relationships between producer and distribution channel are concerned, it is 
notable that producers' main efforts are aimed at reducing the market power of distribution 
channels. In this context, Italian manufacturers are making big investments in product-service 
relations, i.e. in the content of service within the manufactured goods. These investments are 
directed to: 
(a) changes in the production cycle, in order to reduce time-to-market. Using information 
technology firms can substitute serial stages by parallel stages, and reduce time-to-
market for designing and prototyping suits from 26 weeks to 19 weeks [Texco, 1991]; 
(b) increase the quick response production (10-15 days), at the expense of the traditionally 
planned production. For example, Lubiam ships only 50% of its total orders at the 
beginning of the season, and the remaining according to the sales cycle; 
(c) just-in-time service for retailers (for example, Lubiam has a 48-hour consignment from a 
2,000-products catalogue); 
(d) increase out-of-season orders: due to the high volatility of modern demand, retailers 
place a minimum order at the beginning of the season waiting for the best kind of article 
in comparison with the demand. In response to this, manufacturers have to replay to 
short notice orders of 2-3 weeks [Largo Consumo, 1995]; 
(e) implement information technologies that link producer/distributor organizations. Thanks 
to Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) all the daily sales are transmitted from retailer to 
manufacturer, in order to plan shipments just-in-time. EDI is present in Lubiam, Max 
Mara, Gft and Benetton, among others; 
(f) provide information service to the retailer, using free-phone numbers, selling-out 
training, consulting for window dressing, etc. [Confezione, 1995]; 
(g) service the final client through the retailer: for example, in two weeks Zegna provides a 
suit to measure (fitted at home, in the office or in the shop), and the price includes 
season washings, tailoring modifications (up until one year from purchase), and 
insurance against theft or loss. The customized suit by Lubiam is made up in two weeks, 
and represents 5% of total sales [Confezione, 1995]; 
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(h) provide financial service to retailers, organized by big groups with a strong financial 
position: for example, during the economic recession of 1991-93 Benetton granted 
deferment payment to retailers; Miroglio is now organizing a weekly payment on the 
basis of the weekly units sold, that allows the retailer to balance cash-flow [Tecnica 
della confezione, 1995]. 
If high quality production has greater opportunities to face EU competition and extra-EU 
imports, the future of Italian high quality firms is to increase the worker's skills by a 
continuous training effort. 
Even though the relationships between product performance and skilled workers are clear, we 
do not find such training efforts in the Italian firms. Neither in the big groups nor in the SMEs 
does training play an important role. 
In a (biased) sample of 37 TC firms, only 14 among them trained some workers in 1994. 
Several companies organize training meetings with franchisee vendors, and with the 
employees in the direct-owned shops. Max Mara and Lubiam are good examples of this 
attitude. The blue-collar workers were relatively less involved in training than white-collar 
workers: the former account for 31% of the number of trained people, the latter for 62%; the 
former account for 20% of the number of trained hours, the latter for 70%. The top 
management accounts for the residual share. 
The evolution of firm organization at manufacturing plants or distribution channels affects the 
recruitment policy too: instead of looking for skills derived from experience, acquired in other 
companies, the interviewed companies are interested in open-minded workers, i.e. in persons 
having the right flexible mind for adapting themselves to the different production stages, to 
sustain the hard stress of quick response production, to work in teams, and to learn to use 
different machines and plants in a short time. In general, firms train new workers for a two-
week period, but this period is considered too short by employees [Sda-Bocconi, 1995]. 
The strong competition between EU companies has also affected Italian industrial relations. In 
the last (1995) collective wage agreement, trade unions agreed to a very flexible working time 
organization. The TC firms can choose two different kinds of working time, according to 
production needs: the first one is a 6 hour-6 day organization, where three or four turns can be 
done; the second one is based on 8 hours-5 days, with a shifting idle day (Sunday is a fixed 
idle day) and six full days of production using two or three turns. 
As far as the degree of the producer's power on the distribution channel is concerned, on the 
basis of our interviews several strategies appear to be possible: 
(a) some companies invest in direct distribution channels, or in franchising channels, both 
in Italy or abroad (see Table A.8.1); 
(b) some companies predominantly use agents, who put them in touch with boutiques, small 
retailers or wholesalers: for example, Gft (250 agents that determine 99% of total sales), 
Marzotto (where agents account for 80% of total sales), and Golden Lady (50% of total 
sales); 
(c) some SMEs deal with big distributors, using private label production, or with big 
department stores, opening small corners. The share accounted for by this channel is 
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more than 90% in Mantel (LIT 11 bn sales), Maglificio Morga (26 bn sales), Igeat (10 
bn sales). 
Table A.8.1. Ownership of distribution channels 
Selected Italian manufacturers 
Company 
Benetton 
Stefanel 
Max Mara 
La Perla 
Prenatal (Chicco Group) 
Zegna 
Irge 
Sales (bn LIT) 
-
508 (in 1993) 
1,043 (in 1994) 
379 
260 
250 
32 
Franchising outlets 
7.000 
1,026 
130 
100 
160 
-
92 
Directly owned outlets 
40 
124 
58 
-
180 
46 (23 corners. 
60 shop-in-shop) 
20 
The selling strategies are composed of a mix of different channels, according to the market 
characteristics. In the US, where department stores and big distributors determine three-
quarters of total sales, all the interviewed companies have relationships with these channels, 
from which they acquire corners or shops-in-the-shop; but even in the US market, Italian firms 
usually pursue traditional strategies, opening directly-owned boutiques. In Japan, Italian firms 
are usually in touch with local trading companies, even when they try to open directly-owned 
points of sales. 
A.8.4. Influence of external economies of scale 
The Italian sourcing process is mainly organized within national boundaries. Conversely, in 
the other European textile and clothing (TC) industries, the sourcing process refers to the 
international level; with outward processing trade (OPT) and derealization sourcing in the 
CEEC (Germany) or Asia (UK) or the Mediterranean Rim (France) [see Textile Outlook 
International, 1994]. 
In the Italian case we can find three different kinds of sourcing: within the 'district', at the 
north-south level, and as part of the relationship between small and large firms. 
In the first case, the area of sourcing is so limited that relevant external economies are born: 
the industrial districts of Carpi (13,100 employees in TC industry in 1991), Prato (48,000), 
Como (17,300) and Biella (29,000) derived by strong relationships between customers and 
suppliers of the same filiere [Brusco, 1995]. 
The second and the third case are based on the high gap in the salary and in the flexibility of 
labour existing in the dual Italian economy. Some data confirm this: 
(a) in the Italian TC industry as a whole, the blue-collar labour cost of a less-than-10-
employees firm is 78% ofthat of a more-than-500-employees company; 
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(b) if we compare northern and southern firms of the same size, the gap is higher: the labour 
cost in the southern SMEs is 66% ofthat in the northern company [Brusco, 1995]. 
The characteristics of the Italian dual economy affect the role of the SM programme within the 
TC industry in several ways. 
Firstly, the salary gap is higher in TC than in the other Italian industries, because of the 
diffusion of 'black jobs' in the TC filiere [Politica ed Economia, No. 5, 1995]: the 'black 
economy* accounts for 10% of total TC employment [// Sole 24 Ore, 1995]. 
Secondly, due to the high quality of Italian production, there is a high weight of labour cost in 
TC firms: in the 352-firm sample by Centrale dei Bilanci [1995], labour cost is 68% of value 
added of the apparel and footwear industry and 18% of total sales over the period 1982-93. 
The importance of labour cost gives priority to labour savings. 
Thirdly, the 1992 Lira devaluation has increased the competitiveness of Italian production. 
Northern large companies now also base their operation on outsourcing towards southern 
small firms. 
Within the Italian industry, the most important case of external EOS is likely in relation to 
downstream input, and refers to the transaction costs. On the basis of our interviews we can 
estimate cost savings due to a higher concentration in distribution channels, from which higher 
orders and higher shipments follow. All the interviewed companies declared that orders 
coming from pan-European distributors are, on average, six to ten times bigger than the 
average order from Italian customers. 
The savings are likely to be realized in the following ways: 
(a) cost saving in the acquiring of raw materials, due to the quantity of unit consignments 
and the early time of orders that the planned organization of big distributors permits: less 
20% of raw material costs; 
(b) cost saving in the outward and inward production thanks to the reduction of complexity 
and volatility of production, and the bigger orders: less 20% of direct manufacturing 
costs. The complexity of production affects not only the workshop, but also the design 
and prototype process (the latter costs account for 5-10% of total sales); 
(c) cost saving in the distribution channel, due to reduction in the number of agents, number 
of contacts with distributors and advertising: less 30% of selling costs (we have to 
remember that the agent's profit is 10% in retailing and 5% in wholesale contacts); 
(d) cost saving in financial costs, thanks to the higher credit rate of big distributors within 
the credit bank discount, and to the lower client failures (irrecoverable credits): less 25% 
of financial costs on commercial credits and 90% of irrecoverable credits; 
(e) cost saving in general costs: we have received no estimations from the interviewed firms 
because of the difficulty of analysis (in any case, it is a minor percentage). 
According to the distribution of costs, where raw materials' share is roughly 30% of total 
sales, manufacturing is 30%, selling is 25% and financial cost and irrecoverable credits are 
7%, we could estimate a cost reduction of roughly 25% of total sales. If we compare the cost 
saving with the discount in price that big distributor usually claims, less 10-15%, the final 
result is an economy of at least 10-15% of the total sales. 
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As far as the role of big retailers in Italy is concerned, it is important to note that: 
(a) big retailers have taken a rising share of Italian TC sales in recent years, from 9% in 
1988 to 14% in 1993; 
(b) big retailers are giving more importance to TC sales within their consumer goods: in 
specialized supermarkets, TC is 80% of total sales of Coin and 70% of Rinascente; in 
popular supermarkets, TC is 50% in Upim and 16% in Standa; in hypermarkets, TC is 
10% in Continente, 8% in Coop and Città Mercato-Sma, 14% in Euromereato, and 7% 
in Auchan [Largo Consumo, 1995]; 
(c) within those shares, the weight of private label is massive: 90% in Coin (it owns Sirema, 
a manufacturing TC firm with LIT 43 bn sales 1993), 80% in Rinascente, 85% in 
Standa, and 95% in Upim; 
(d) a special characteristic of the Italian system is that only 26% of the total private label 
comes from extra-EU imports, chiefly from Asia. On the contrary, in the EU this share is 
significantly higher [Ginzburg, Simonazzi, 1995]; 
(e) although the share of total sales directed to big distributors has been increasing in the 
last decade, it has still only reached a low level: at Marzotto it increased from 0% in 
1985 to 20% in 1995, at Gft from 0% to 1%, and at Golden Lady from 10% to 35%. The 
1995 share at Maglificio Bellia is 10%, at Lovable 15%, at Garda 10%, and at Zegna 
10%. 
A.8.5. Role of the single market 
The completion of the SM programme affects the following aspects of the growth strategies of 
Italian firms: the role of suppliers, at national and international level; the role of EU markets, 
as far as product characteristics and distribution chains are concerned; and the role of human 
resources. 
Within these aspects the important impacts are on: 
(a) the external economies of scale, that could be exploited upstream, in connection with big 
suppliers, or downstream, in connection with big pan-European distributors, or by 
horizontal relationships in strategic alliances; 
(b) the investment efforts of Italian firms, mainly those having the characteristics of 
endogenous sunk costs and the goal of facing European competition. 
The SM has affected the traditional growth strategy pursued by Italian TC companies and 
favoured a high level of investments. 
The main investment needs stressed by the firms we have interviewed are the following: 
(a) Inward production: the new Italian plants that Miroglio, Benetton and Polli are going to 
build indicate good expectations in the TC future and in the SM programme. 
(b) National outward production: the increase in the north-south links has been possible 
thanks to new forms of organizations, both in the north and in the south. In the northern 
companies, the main effort of the network company is in CAD-CAM systems, 
automated cutting lines, automated warehousing, etc., in order to design and prototype a 
very wide range of sample collections and to control the outward laboratories' outputs. 
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In the southern firms, the main investments are in new production capacity, machines 
and skilled workers. 
(c) International outward production: in the effort to invest in CEECs, SMEs try to use 
indirect controlling forms as non-equity agreements, and low levels of invested capital. 
This aspect implies a greater use of OPT. 
(d) The new relationships between small subcontractors and main producers, or between small 
producers and big retailers, force firms to invest in information technology systems, such 
as EDI, and in just-in-time organization. 
(e) The relationships between SMEs and pan-EU distributors force firms to invest in export 
consortia, trade marks, and quality management systems. 
(f) The changes in the production cycle force firms to invest in the reduction of the time-to-
market process, using information technology firms that substitute serial stages by parallel 
stages of design. 
(g) The increased importance for promotion and corporate advertising force firms to have free-
phone numbers, and to provide other services to final clients or retailers (such as selling-
out training, consulting for window display, etc.). 
(h) In order to improve the producer's control of the distribution channel, a large number of 
companies make huge investments in direct-owned points of sale or in franchising 
channels, both in Italy and abroad. 
Although our evidence is by no means conclusive, the completion of the SM may pave the 
way for bulk outsourcing, both at national and international level. On the basis of our 
interviews, we found several 'hollow companies' in the apparel filiere, such as Diesel (LIT 
550 bn sales in 1994), Stefanel (316 bn sales), Belfe (125 bn sales) or Textura (71 bn sales), 
that design the product, acquire and cut the material, and organize the 'kit' to be assembled by 
external and small (<10 employees) laboratories. The distribution chain is, of course, 
controlled by the 'hollow company'. 
The aggregated data suggest this evolution: the outward production increased from 59% in 
1983 to 72% in 1992, and a low part of the latter (8%) is at the international level [Brusco, 
1995]. 
As far as the SM impact on national sourcing is concerned, we could say that the higher 
competition induced by the SM has increased north-south sourcing - the new employment 
created in the southern TC industry in 1987-91 is higher than the new employment created in 
the remaining southern manufacturing system [Birindelli, 1995] - and has shaped a new 
organization. Usually, the northern company (e.g. Versace, 146 bn sales 1994) has no 
relationships with local southern SMEs, but only with its main subcontractor (e.g. Manifatture 
Ittierre, 329 bn sales). Also Tamigi (20 bn sales) has no relationships with Albany's SMEs that 
produce for Tamigi's main subcontractor in Puglias. This means that a new kind of firm is 
becoming more and more important: the intermediary firm that puts in place the so-called 
hollow company and the manufacturing system (even at the international level). 
The structure of southern industry is going to be shaped according to the northern needs: high 
level of blue-collar labour, as the manufacturing aspects are more important than design and 
distribution; low level of exports, as the international relationships are a northern prerogative 
(except the links between Puglias and Albany). 
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Another aspect of the SM impact is the new opportunities for SMEs to become suppliers to 
European producers or, more likely, big pan-European distributors (today only 5% of TC 
SMEs have international customers) [Tecnica della confezione, 1995]. 
By contrast, the opportunities for large companies to find new suppliers in the EU industrial 
system are less important. Even if large companies could gain lower transactional costs 
through a reduced number of suppliers, we have to remember the low level of sourcing or 
acquiring of semi-finished product in the EU: that process mostly involves extra-EU countries 
or southern Italian firms. The main relationships between Italian and EU industry are 
undoubtedly within the downstream area, rather than upstream. 
Other research on the impact of the SM on distribution channels predicts an increase in the 
degree of concentration, through the development of big pan-European distributors [Steele, 
1995]. This forecast is overwhelmingly true in Italy's case, where the distribution system is 
very fragmentary: 
(a) in 1992 Italy had 30% of EU points of sale but only 24% of total TC consumption 
[Texco International-Roland Berger & Partner, 1991; Federtessile, 1995]; 
(b) the small retailing sub-sector has a strong importance (67,000 points of sales in the TC), 
but a decreasing trend: it represented 79% of total TC sales in 1988, 70% in 1990 and 
68% in 1993; 
(c) even the wholesale sub-sector is composed of relatively small and inefficient firms 
(6,000). This channel accounted for 45% of total sales in 1993; 
(d) large retailers account for 14% of total TC sales, where the EU average is more than 
30% [Federtessile, 1995]. 
The completion of the SM is going to shape Italian distribution according to the EU model: on 
one hand, the big Italian retailers (such as Coin) are becoming bigger and bigger; and on the 
other hand, the entry of foreign big retailers (Continent, Auchan, etc.) in the Italian market will 
change consumer and producer habits, and reduce the protection of the Italian market. 
A.9. Insurance 
A.9.1. Demand trends 
The insurance industries of EU countries differ considerably in many respects. Those in the 
Mediterranean countries have generally been growing much faster than in the northern 
Member States, although premium per capita is much higher in the north. National markets 
differ in their structure as well and, with the exception of reinsurance, remain largely national 
in the scope of their operations. Nevertheless, there are a number of trends common to the 
industries of all countries. 
The EU Insurance Directives have resulted in the insurance industries of most EU countries 
readjusting to a more openly competitive environment. Insurers in those countries that 
formerly regulated premiums and contracts can no longer rely on selling standardized products 
at prices set at levels which support inefficient producers, with competition based solely on 
service and the control of distribution channels. 
A major social change currently taking place within Western society which will have a 
significant impact on the insurance industry is that the dependency ratio (i.e. the proportion of 
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the population of working age to those too young or too old to work) is rising, and will 
continue to do so over the next 20 years. Expectations of living standards in old age are also 
changing while the traditional family unit is increasingly breaking down. Changes in the 
dependency ratio and the resulting pressures on the Welfare State in Europe will provide a 
long-term stimulus to personal savings, which increasingly comes in the form of insurance 
(such as pensions policies). 
Expenditure on insurance tends to increase at a faster rate than GDP and as GDP is growing, 
expenditure on insurance should rise faster. These economic features are similar across 
Europe. Furthermore, continuing deregulation and harmonization of the EU market is 
expected to provide opportunities for increased cross-border trade in insurance. 
While consumers have historically spent more money on insurance as GDP grows, they are 
also putting increasing pressure on insurance companies to provide them with better value 
products and higher standards of service. The consumer is partly responding to changes in the 
marketplace and partly driving those changes. Over the last ten years the market has been 
stimulated by the development of new forms of competition, including the following: 
(a) Direct writers (i.e. those not using intermediaries) have demonstrated that they can 
achieve considerable competitive advantage by adopting a new approach to the market. 
In the UK they have 25% of the personal motor insurance market and a growing share of 
the household insurance market, and have begun to sell basic life and savings products. 
(b) Banks and building societies have tended to concentrate on the life sector. In the UK 
their market share has grown from 7% to 19% over the last five years. The 
bancassurance concept is based on the extensive contact that these organizations have 
with the public; salespeople should be more productive because they operate from 
'warm leads'. Dramatic growth, however, has come largely from banks and building 
societies breaking ties with insurance companies and establishing their own operations 
(see Figure A.9.1). Bancassurers have so far shown limited interest in underwriting 
general insurance business, although they are important distributors of these products. 
(c) The last few years has also seen non-financial services companies entering the market, 
either with a retailing or consumer brands background. Their marketing and customer 
service expertise in the insurance sector is expected to influence the market's character. 
The rapid emergence of direct writers over the last five years has forced general insurance 
companies to examine their approaches. Many established companies have started their own 
direct writing operations, but they are also transforming their intermediary-based operations. 
Duplication is being eliminated by the development of 'preferred partners' and the creation of 
networks fully automating data transfer. 
Life companies are also examining new distribution techniques with the aim of boosting 
productivity. Remuneration structures for sales forces are being overhauled and companies are 
focusing on their core strengths and eliminating peripheral distribution outlets and products. 
The brokerage sector is also experiencing enormous change, with a move away from 
commissions to fee-based advice. Some larger commercial brokers have disclosed that almost 
half their business now takes this form. Fees bring with them greater focus on value added. 
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Many insurance companies and intermediaries now face the need to rationalize activities and 
concentrate on chosen markets to generate higher productivity and simplify administration. 
This will still allow a diversity of approaches ranging from the supermarket approach and one-
stop shopping, to large specialist providers and niche companies. The successful companies 
will be those which match their product and distribution strategies to customer needs and 
preferences. 
The potential market for long-term care, health insurance and income protection products is 
enormous. Similar opportunities exist across Europe which, alongside the continuing 
deregulation of the market, will provide further opportunities for strong insurance companies. 
However, harmonization of tax, marketing practice contract and road traffic legislation are still 
many years away. The Third Life (92/96/EEC) and Non-Life (92/49/EEC) Directives merely 
mark the start of a single market in insurance. 
A.9.2. Concentration 
Over the ten years 1982-92 there has been a trend in the EU towards greater premium income 
in life business compared with non-life business. In 1982 life had 40% and non-life 60%, but 
in 1992 this had changed to 49% life, 51% non-life [CEA, 1993]. 
Concentration in the life market has not been high over the past decade; in certain cases 
(Spain, Ireland, Italy, Greece, UK), the opposite trend has occurred, as illustrated in the table 
below. 
Table A.9.1. Market share of the five largest life insurance companies, 1989 and 1994 
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1989 
56.0 
62.4 
47.4 
33.3 
76.1 
70.0 
64.5 
52.9 
45.7 
58.3 
36.1 
1994 
55.4 
70.0 
47.6 
30.9 
68.2 
55.7 
46.1 
55.7* 
53.0 
46.6 
28.0 
% change 
-0.6 
7.6 
0.2 
-2.4 
-7.9 
-14.3 
-18.4 
2.8 
8.7 
-11.7 
-8.1 
* 1993. 
Source: CEGOS. 
In contrast, the non-life market shows significant concentration trends, notably in the northern 
European markets (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland), as the following table shows: 
Appendix A: Case studies on dynamic and external economies of scale 153 
Table A.9.2. Market share of the five largest non-life insurance companies, 1989 and 
1994 
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1989 
32.0 
47.2 
41.5 
24.4 
51.4 
49.1 
36.2 
31.8 
55.8 
19.5 
51.9 
1994 
39.0 
60.0 
40.8 
23.5 
38.7 
50.5 
33.8 
44.0* 
53.7 
19.7 
28.7 
% change 
7.0 
12.8 
-0.7 
0.9 
-12.7 
1.4 
-2.4 
12.2 
-2.1 
0.2 
-23.2 
* 1993. 
Source: CEGOS. 
A.9.3. Mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances 
Most of the M&A activity, as well as the purchase of minority interests and strategic alliances, 
has involved the larger European insurance players. A prime example is Germany's Allianz 
which has made the following acquisitions: Deutsche Versicherung (the former East German 
state monopoly), the UK's Cornhill, 25% of Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft, 
Rhin et Moselle (France), Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà (Italy), and companies in Spain, 
Hungary and the US. In 1991 it became the first European insurer to be authorized to form a 
subsidiary in the non-life sector in Japan. Generali of Italy is also an acquirer of foreign firms 
due to the fact that its domestic expansion in Italy is constrained. 
Over the past decade British companies have been takeover targets because of the relative ease 
of acquisition in the UK. The following are some examples: 
(a) Cornhill by Allianz ( 1986), 
(b) Equity & Law by Axa-Midi (1987), 
(c) Sentry by AGF (1988), 
(d) Chandos by Sirius (1989), 
(e) National Insurance & Guarantee by Skandia (1989), 
(f) Prolific Life by Hafnia ( 1989), 
(g) Pioneer Life by Swiss Life (1989), 
(h) Victory Re by Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep (1990). 
Other major alliances include: 
(a) Marketing agreement between Allianz and Dresdner Bank (1992), 
(b) J Rothschild Intl. acquired by Scottish Amicable (1994), 
(c) Anglo-American acquired by Zurich Re (UK) (1994), 
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(d) Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society acquired by Lloyds Bank (1994), 
(e) Groupe Victoire acquired by Commercial Union (1994), 
(f) Provincial Insurance acquired by UAP (1994), 
(g) Swiss Re's European direct insurance acquired by Allianz (1994), 
(h) Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance unveiled a £6 bn merger to form the largest composite 
insurance company in the UK, the first such merger in more than a decade (1996). 
Mergers are often less expensive than acquisitions. The Netherlands' fourth largest life 
insurer, Amev, merged with its biggest savings bank, VSP Groep. One of Europe's biggest 
bank insurers was created in the Netherlands in 1991 with the merger between Nationale 
Nederlanden and Postbank. Share swapping is also used. In France, the largest insurer, UAP, 
swapped 10% of its shares with BNP. 
Joint ventures are also common in the EU. In the UK, Commercial Union and Midland Bank 
formed a joint life-assurance undertaking, while NatWest formed a joint venture with Clerical 
Medical. Scottish Equitable is linked to the Royal Bank of Scotland. Standard Life bought 
35% of the Bank of Scotland in 1986 and has a tied agency with the Halifax Building Society. 
In fact, insurers have links with eight of the top ten building societies. In Italy, TSB Life and 
France's Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance set up a joint venture with Cariplo, the largest Italian 
savings bank. 
Some of the smaller companies in Europe sought to protect themselves from hostile takeover 
by seeking mergers with companies established in other EU states. This had the additional 
benefit of extending the geographic scope of their activities and thereby providing better 
European service for their commercial policyholders. Other companies entered into more 
formal groupings, setting up joint-venture companies as the vehicle for expansion of their 
European operations. In addition, co-operation agreements were arranged between national 
agricultural mutual companies and co-operative movement companies to provide local 
servicing arrangements for clients throughout the EU. 
The pace of such restructuring activity has now slowed down, and some groups are 
rationalizing their European operations by withdrawing from markets where they feel that 
either they do not possess a critical mass, or their long-term prospects are poor. Nevertheless, 
the restructuring of national industries can be expected to continue, with the major pan-
European groups increasing their market shares and many of the smaller companies ceasing to 
exist as independent entities. The industry will enter the 21st century concentrated on fewer 
companies overall, and with a small number of large groups represented in most Member 
States. 
A.9.4. Trade 
There has generally been a movement away from trade restriction since the mid-1980s towards 
trade liberalization on both regional (EU) and global levels. That movement culminated in the 
conclusion in December 1993 of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which for the first time 
embraced trade in services, including insurance and reinsurance. 
Although the basic framework is now in place, the creation of a true single market has been 
delayed by differences in tax regimes, judicial systems, road traffic and other legislation, 
culture, market practices and language barriers. Acquisition of local companies therefore 
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remains the most practical approach for many in the short term. Others, such as direct writers, 
are establishing new operations through which they can apply their expertise, but in a form 
which they hope will be attractive to foreign markets. Some insurers have found that certain 
functions can be performed in their home country (such as claims processing and risk 
assessment) but that certain other functions require some local representation (such as claims 
handling). This poses some limitations to the full exploitation of scale economies (discussed 
below). 
During the 1980s the introduction of mini- and micro-computers with links to a central 
computer enabled insurance companies to distribute to their branch offices first routine 
administrative work and later more complex tasks, and to supply them with ready access to 
customer and other information. Companies then extended their networks to independent 
intermediaries and tied agents, which, besides providing them with full functional support, 
also presented opportunities for cost savings by the elimination of tasks being performed by 
both the company and its intermediaries. 
Work being undertaken by a joint task force set up by LIMNET (a UK market network), 
RINET (a Brussels-based reinsurance network) and two American bodies, Brokers and 
Reinsurance Markets Association (BRMA) and the Reinsurance Association of America 
(RAA), could lead to a global network connecting brokers and insurers/reinsurers world-wide 
within the next decade. Although purely screen-based trading is unlikely to replace physical 
face-to-face contact between brokers and underwriters for the placing of large, complex 
insurance and reinsurance contracts within the foreseeable future, screen-based trading does 
have important implications for the structure of European markets. It will facilitate the placing 
of risks across national frontiers with insurers or reinsurers located anywhere within the EU. 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are also gradually opening up to 
foreign brokers and direct insurers. More recently the focus of attention has moved to Asia, 
which has enormous potential in terms of population and economic activity. The eventual 
opening of China and Vietnam to London-based and other western insurers is being 
anticipated by the establishment of representative offices by several companies and brokers. 
Another vast market, India, is also expected to be reopened when the process of insurance 
denationalization is completed. Figure A.9.2 shows how UK general insurers have changed 
the distribution of their overseas business. 
A.9.5. Overview of respondents' operations 
There were five respondents in this case study: a trade association, three insurance companies 
(two composites and one non-life company - all three are among the largest British insurers) 
and a health insurance company. All are UK organizations. 
One of the composites and the non-life company have non-life operations in many EU 
Member States. These foreign operations have responsibility for claims processing, marketing, 
new product development, and training and recruitment. Despite the fact that it has operations 
in seven states, the non-life company has not entered into any new EU markets between 1981 
and 1995. 
The composite company has life operations in five Member States (Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands and Spain). This company also moved aggressively into Scandinavia in the 1990s. 
The company's direct and retail business made a greenfield investment in Germany in 1995; it 
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also acquired a French direct insurer that year. Most of the company's underwriting and claims 
handling is done in local markets, which is now possible on a branch rather than subsidiary 
company basis. This means less export of capital is needed for market entry. The company has 
been aiming for less centralization, to establish stand-alone, self-sustaining operations in each 
of its markets. The company has partnerships with intermediaries in the area of personal direct 
insurance. It is also pursuing opportunities in direct insurance in Germany and France which 
are not as advanced in this area as the UK or the US. 
The other composite insurer's life business operates in just two EU Member States, with two 
sites in the UK and more recently (the early 1990s) one in the Netherlands. Both sites 
undertake claims processing, marketing, new product development, and training and 
recruitment. The company's non-life business (just over one-tenth as large as its life business) 
has two sites in the UK which have responsibility for the four main functions. It has not 
opened any new business in any other EU Member State. 
The health insurance company has two European sites responsible for claims processing, 
marketing strategy, new product development, and training and recruitment. The sites include 
one in the UK and one in Spain set up by acquisition in the late 1980s. 
A.9.6. Factors driving economies of scale 
The respondents unanimously said that the opportunity to exploit new economies of scale, 
either through entry to new EU markets or geographic concentration of activity, were not due 
to single market factors; although one composite insurer said that concentration was facilitated 
by the free movement of people and capital. 
In the cases where insurance companies have been able to reap greater scale economies, the 
factors they designated as most important were a convergence of consumer demand in Europe, 
closer focus on the customer (niche strategies), a need to be more cost-efficient and a need to 
be more business development driven. 
For the non-life insurer, common approaches in marketing and training and recruitment were 
developed in the early 1990s. The group reorganized along regional structural lines with two 
European divisions: UK and Ireland, and continental Europe. Increasingly broad policy issues 
and strategic initiatives, especially in marketing and IT, are now considered at regional level 
and validated at group level rather than locally. This has not been influenced by the single 
market as such but more by the expected convergence of consumer demand in Europe. 
This company has increased the range of marketing approaches and channels it uses over the 
past decade, including direct distribution in the UK and Ireland. It says this was done as a 
result of a closer focus on the customer. There has been a narrowing of focus in the diversity 
and range of products/services offered. Again this has not been driven by the single market but 
as a result of greater focus and niche strategies, mainly local rather than regional. There has 
been no change in the range of skills of newly-trained staff, but the company does anticipate 
multi-tasking in future. 
The company has achieved dynamic scale economies in the area of claims processing in terms 
of better service quality and greater innovation. In its marketing strategy benefits have come in 
the form of cost reduction; and in the area of new product development, benefits have arisen in 
Appendix A: Case studies on dynamic and external economies of scale 157 
cost reduction, better service quality and greater innovation. The company said that further 
improvements will arise from best practice transfer into and between local operations. 
In one of the composite's life operations, common approaches in IT systems have been 
implemented in the Netherlands in the areas of claims processing and training and recruitment; 
but it said that the single market had not significantly influenced any of these introductions. 
Where changes have occurred for the other composite's life operations, the most important 
driver of the increase in its range of marketing approaches has been common strategic 
approaches. In the area of product and service development the driver has been common 
customers. The respondent said that his company had taken standard UK products and made 
them available to EU clients. 
There has been an increase in the range of marketing approaches and channels used as the 
company has moved from broker distribution to include direct distribution in the UK. It has 
also utilized some EU (non-UK) brokers in addition to UK brokers. This strategy, the 
respondent said, was not driven by the single market. There has also been an increase in the 
range of products and services the company offers. Retail financial products have been 
introduced into the UK, and new UK products are being sold outside Europe. Lastly, there has 
been an increase in the range of skills of new or newly-trained staff due to a re-engineering of 
UK processing to its present single point of contact for customers. 
The benefits derived from dynamic economies of scale for this company have been in the 
areas of claims processing, new product development and training and recruitment. They have 
come in the forms of cost reduction, better service quality and greater innovation. 
The company has moved from being cost conscious in the late 1980s to becoming more profit 
oriented in the early 1990s - or business development driven. In non-life operations, strategic 
marketing is now given much more emphasis largely due to business process re-engineering. 
The health insurance company said that in the areas of claims processing and training and 
recruitment, IT harmonization has taken place between the company's UK and Spanish sites 
with provider policies in the area of claims processing and human resources. The company's 
respondent said that more input has been derived from non-European sources than from all 
interchanges within the EU. 
There has been an increase in the range of skills of new or newly trained staff in that the single 
market has provided for greater opportunities for UK/Spanish cross-training. This change has 
been driven by a common strategic approach. The company has not seen any evidence of 
significant increases in economies of scale except the possibility of economies in the area of 
IT, but it anticipates these will not be specifically European. 
A.9.7. Influence of external economies of scale 
Both the non-life company and one of the composite insurers (in both its life and non-life 
operations) said that with regard to drivers of input costs, they believe that increased 
competition among agents and brokers has been influential in changing unit costs over the 
period 1986-91, despite the fact that they did not reveal whether unit costs had increased or 
decreased. 
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For the life business of another composite, changes in costs of agents and brokers increased by 
5% between the early and late 1980s, and increased by another 5% between the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In contrast, changes in labour costs declined by 20% between the first and second 
periods and declined by a further 25% between the second and third periods. They attributed 
labour cost reduction to process re-engineering. Increased scale and buying power in the 
company's operations, and increased contracting-out of certain operations, have been of only 
minor influence. The company believes that neither cost changes were driven by the single 
market. 
Over the period 1986-91, the company's external relationships have had a high impact on cost 
reduction. They have also had significant impacts on product/service quality, product/ 
service/process innovation and market penetration. They have had no impact on the 
geographic location of activity. The company representative said that external economies of 
scale relate to the expense problem in the insurance industry generally, and that to address this 
the company was outsourcing its mainframe application. He also believes that there are no 
external economies of scale to be had through labour supply in terms of country divisions, but 
perhaps in regional locations within countries; e.g. outside Dusseldorf there is a light industrial 
estate and a local educated, flexible workforce for direct selling. 
The health insurance company said that with regard to labour input, there has been a move 
toward lower managerial staffing since the mid-1980s. The company has found that an 
increased concentration of scale and buying power in its operations had been quite influential 
in changing unit costs over the late 1980s. Increased contracting out has also had some 
influence. 
A.9.8. Role of the single market 
The Association of British Insurers noted that the free movement of products and services and 
also people and skills have been highly significant factors in permitting a 'single business' 
structure in the EU in commercial lines. The free movement of capital has also been 
significant in both personal and commercial lines. Harmonized technical standards have been 
only a moderate factor in personal lines and a rather low factor in commercial lines. Public 
procurement liberalization has not been a great factor in either area. 
The non-life insurer found there to be little impact of the SM programme on either marketing, 
or product or service development. However, EU insurance directives, it believes, will drive 
changes in training and recruitment in future as the company anticipates multi-tasking. 
One of the composite insurers said that the SM programme has had no impact whatsoever on 
the possibility of gaining greater scale economies. The other composite insurer said that the 
SM programme had minimal impact on 'best practice' but that underwriting and claims 
handling is now done in local markets on a branch basis (rather than subsidiary companies) 
due largely to the second Directive. The SM has facilitated (but not driven) decentralization 
that allows for movement of people. In addition, greater opportunities were opening up in 
Germany as the insurance directives would lead to greater price differentiation in the non-life 
area, which would have the effect of breaking the German insurance industry's former de facto 
cartel. 
The health insurance company said it believes that common technical standards will drive 
changes in product/service development in future. EU insurance directives will impact the 
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three areas of marketing, product/service development, and training/recruitment only with 
regard to national implementation in Spain. It believes a side-effect of these directives will be 
the squeezing of smaller Spanish competitors. 
The company representative said that the SM has not brought economies of scale to the health 
insurance sector, and nor have reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade been influential in 
changing unit costs over the period 1986-91. Health insurance tends to complement state 
health finance, which is vastly different in each EU country. There is therefore little 
transferability of product design or service experience. Ideas are freely exchanged at European 
trade association level, but no significant cross-border businesses have yet been built on them. 
The 'single passport' opportunities introduced by the Third Directive are less applicable to 
health insurance, because health policies and claims are market-sensitive to local language, 
and the necessary cost containment pressures on local institutions can only really be sourced 
from local establishments. 
The company has had an opportunity to establish business in another EU country, but that 
country's failure to implement the 'freedom of product design' permitted in the Third 
Directive has frustrated their attempt. Furthermore, it believes its market share is now under 
threat from continental bancassurers who might be able to loss-lead in the health sector via 
their UK acquisitions. 
In summary, most of the respondent insurers did not believe that their companies had achieved 
significant economies of scale, either due to dynamic factors or to input cost factors. Where 
any economies were achieved they did not attribute them to the European Commission's 
insurance directives (though in some cases they did facilitate change). It is likely that 
insurance will continue to be written locally by agents or subsidiaries of insurers in the other 
country, because a local presence is necessary in order to inspire confidence in claims-paying 
ability. Furthermore, access to an efficient distribution network is vital; in practice this means 
the branches of banks and/or building societies. Hence, insurers will continue to form joint 
ventures or mergers with banks and building societies in order to grow. Bancassurance would 
have happened without the fonnation of a single European market, and this convergence of the 
money management business is the crucial development. The respondent companies share the 
view that the single market by itself is unlikely to produce dramatic effects on the growth of 
their companies, nor on their ability to reap greater dynamic or external economies of scale. 
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Figure A.9.1. Sector shares of the UK insurance market 
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Figure A.9.2. Overseas general business net written premiums by territory 
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A.10. Retailing 
A. 10.1. Market trends 
Demand trends 
The period has seen substantial change in the structure of the retail sector in many EU 
countries. The industry still accounts for the overwhelming majority of the number of 
enterprises in the EU, and in every individual country market, as well as for the largest single 
employment contribution of any sector. In all countries where reliable statistics exist, the 
numbers employed in retailing increased throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, even 
in those national markets where firms in the sector had invested most heavily in automation. 
Retail sales growth has been less steady than employment. Retail turnover has shown at least 
one year-on-year downturn in real volume in each of the national markets except the 
Netherlands and France since 1985. In 1993 the weighted average volume retail sales index for 
the EU as a whole declined. Despite growth in the period, and strong investment in the sector, 
retailing has not been a low risk area for participating firms. 
Almost by definition, store retailing is a local activity, whose outlets exist to serve customers 
in a specific area. The impact of single market measures on shop operations is, therefore, 
limited by local constraints. In this analysis we aim to examine the changes which have taken 
place for retailers in the EU in product specification and purchasing, in distribution, and in the 
operation of retail premises themselves. In each area we shall see that differences in market 
environment due to geography, to consumer tastes and behaviour, to ownership structure and 
firms' strategy play a major part in determining the realization of available scale economies. 
Technology impact 
At the level of the individual retail outlet there has been a major and continuing shift to larger 
units, both in grocery and other convenience shops, and in some areas of comparison 
shopping, with supermarkets, hypermarkets and cash & carry units replacing small traditional 
units. In part this shift has been driven by technology change with the automation of till 
operation, including scanning systems, increasing both the maximum selling capacity of shop 
units and ability to replenish them through an integrated warehousing and distribution system. 
The scope to take advantage of unit scale advantages depends on a large number of locally 
determined factors, including planning regulations, population density and the willingness of 
shoppers to travel. These vary enormously from country to country. 
In distribution and warehousing the scope to realize economies of scale is influenced by 
available technology, and by the quality of transport networks. In both areas there have been 
changes which have tended to increase the scale of individual operations. The costs associated 
with warehouse operation, and with the information technology linking stores, warehouses and 
the purchasing operation, represent fixed costs and sunk costs respectively which benefit from 
being spread over a greater volume. A significant driver of business performance in this sector 
over the period has been the ability of businesses, through the use of technology, to increase 
the rate of stock turnover, both through stores and through warehouses. By better availability 
and analysis of consumer data, firms are able to predict purchasing patterns more accurately, 
reducing the need to carry stock and the degree of wastage; this type of advance often also 
increases the capacity of warehousing systems. 
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In the firms we have spoken to, a typical warehouse supports around 50 to 70 stores, normally 
within a geographically limited region. However, as transport links have improved it has been 
possible for firms to support stores which are further removed from their home region -
including, within our respondent group, distances of over 800 km. For firms which operate the 
warehouse/superstore model, however, it is usually uneconomic for more than a small number 
of stores to be supported in remote sites; there are therefore barriers to entry for a retailer 
building up a critical mass of stores in a new country/region to support a new warehouse. The 
hypermarket and cash & carry models, on the other hand, where producers deliver direct to 
store, are in principle more readily transferable. 
Purchasing arrangements have changed over the period for many of the large retailers. 
Improved transport links, and harmonization of product regulations, have provided more scope 
to purchase across national borders. There has also been a technological shift towards closer 
links between retailers and their larger manufacturing suppliers. Integration of store and 
warehouse IT systems with manufacturers' order processing, designed to improve utilization 
of stocks and of capacity, has tended to limit the number of suppliers to those prepared to 
make additional fixed cost investment. 
In parallel with this cost effect, there has also been an increasing tendency for retailers to 
examine more critically the profitability of each metre of shelf space, and to reduce numbers 
of brands on offer. The ultimate example of this process is a store such as Aldi, which carries 
a limited number of manufacturers' brands alongside its own in order to maximize the 
productivity of its space. This trend - prompted both by technology and by competitive 
pressures - may reduce the costs of products for trading, but at the expense of consumer 
choice. 
Our respondents in this case study include directors from two firms involved in the grocery 
trade, one a retailer and the other responsible for distributor relations for a pan-European 
supplier, and from the comparison goods sector which operate in more than one EU country. 
Two of the firms have extended the scope of their international activities in the last ten years, 
but in a relatively limited way, and are still overwhelmingly based in a single country. 
Structural differences - and changes 
The birth of global retailing, which has been heralded in some reports, is still very much a 
minority interest. In considering it, one must not confuse ownership with co-operation or the 
sharing of experience. One of the earliest examples of a multinational retailer, BAT, owned 
comparison goods stores of different formats in at least three different countries, and did not 
encourage them to co-operate or learn from each other. Each was treated as a free-standing 
investment, to which the corporate organization added very little value, and all were 
eventually divested as independent entities. In Associate Marketing Services (AMS) by 
contrast, the collaborative purchasing and learning venture between Ahold, Casino and 
Safeway, a mutual shareholding was considered a useful declaration of intent when setting up 
in 1989. However, by 1995 the benefits of intercompany learning were seen as sufficiently 
strong for the firms to dissolve the shareholding links without putting the collaboration at risk. 
Transnational ownership of major grocery and comparison goods retailers has so far been 
limited. Acquisitions in Eastern Europe have been more common than purchases of retail 
networks - or the creation of new networks - across intra-EU boundaries. There have been 
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some high profile exceptions (e.g. Marks & Spencer, Laura Ashley) but these have tended to 
focus on specific product areas and customer groups. 
Opinion among our respondents is divided as to whether the current bid by UK-based Teseo 
for Docks de France will 'break the log jam' and begin a process of transnational 
concentration, but they are agreed as to why so many previous attempts to build international 
retail businesses have had limited success. Retailers have found it difficult to replicate in non-
domestic markets their ability to predict the changing pattern of customer needs, and to 
manage their offering to meet customer expectations. These two factors are critical to 
competitive success. 
However, there has been concentration in the pattern of retail supply in almost all EU 
countries over the last 15 years, both as a result of acquisitions and via the construction by a 
relatively small number of firms of large retail units, either large superstores (shops over 
2,500 m2 supplied via warehouses) or hypermarkets (large stores big enough for supply direct 
from manufacturers). The impact has been determined by differences in national planning and 
licensing regulations governing the building of new stores. The range of supply patterns by 
country is illustrated in Table A. 10.1, showing concentration (top three firms) in grocery, and 
the proportion of trade by type and size of outlet. 
Table A.10.1. Concentration and pattern of grocery supply, 1993 
Country 
Sweden 
Finland 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Austria 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Ireland 
UK 
Portugal 
France 
Spain 
Greece 
Italy 
Grocery share of 
top three firms 
95% 
80% 
77% 
58% 
56% 
47% 
46% 
43% 
43% 
41% 
38% 
20% 
17% 
11% 
% via hypermkts & 
large supermkts 
38 
36 
37 
56 
26 
31 
40 
53 
70 
43 
76 
35 
na. 
26 
% via small 
supermkts * 
34 
32 
31 
29 
34 
55 
33 
16 
12 
11 
15 
13 
n a. 
22 
% via other outlets 
27 
32 
32 
14 
40 
15 
27 
31 
18 
46 
8 
52 
na. 
52 
* 'Small' supermarkets are under 1.000 nr. 
Source: Nielsen. 
This pattern illustrates the very different structure between four main groups of countries. 
Scandinavia shows a very concentrated ownership structure, but a relatively strong smaller 
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shop sector, reflecting both the dispersion of population and a strong social commitment to 
equality of access and national average pricing. Norway, outside the EU, fits the same pattern. 
Austria shares some of these characteristics, but the ownership pattern is not yet so 
concentrated. 
Germany and Belgium have a somewhat higher proportion of trade through large outlets, and a 
lower firm concentration ratio. The number three retailer in each country is Aldi - so far the 
only example of a strong share company in more than one national market. The Netherlands 
has an intermediate firm share structure, but its proportion of smaller stores is affected by 
short journey shopping, much of it by cycle. 
The UK and France have the highest proportion of sales via large stores - although in France 
the proportion of hypermarkets is larger. This reflects a less restricted planning system during 
the 1970s and 1980s, which is now becoming more regulated with fewer opportunities for new 
large out-of-town stores. 
Portugal, Spain and Italy (and Greece) have a much higher proportion of small stores than the 
other markets, reflecting a more fragmented retailing and distribution pattern, and different 
consumer behaviour. In Spain and Italy firm concentration is also low, although acquisitions 
by French retailers and developments by local firms have made a significant impact. 
The distribution of grocery retail firm activity across EU, and adjacent, markets is shown in 
Table A. 10.2. Some of the firms are co-operatives, consortia or franchise operations, with 
ownership structures which affect their ability to compete in particular ways. For example, in 
many of the franchise operations, including Spar, separately owned shops retain the right to 
choose stock items for stores independently, which limits their ability to take advantage of 
technology for automatic replenishment. This type of arrangement extends into some relatively 
large retail brands including some in both Germany and France, and it limits the ability of 
retail networks to take advantage of both operational scale economies, and marketing 
economies. In the other large and developed market in the UK, on the other hand, most of the 
main retail brands are owned by quoted companies, which are run as single entities. 
The retailer activity pattern shown in Table A. 10.2 emphasizes the different position in the 
more fragmented markets of Portugal and Spain. None of the retailers shown is among the top 
three firms in any of these countries; for example, despite the presence of major French firms 
in Spain, their market position there is not yet strong. These markets are led by local retailers 
which operate almost exclusively within the country, and have some way to go to develop the 
benefits of scale. Also in Ireland, which is a relatively concentrated market with a large 
proportion of grocery sales through large stores, local firms lead with little competition from 
outside. 
The rate of penetration in opening up transnational retail outlets has started to pick up in the 
grocery area since 1992, particularly by French stores. In addition to the entry into Spain by 
Carrefour and Intermarché, the French group Promodès has entered Greece, and now has six 
stores in Italy. The complex system of permits required to open supermarkets in Italy is clearly 
a strong barrier for non-domestic firms, but it appears somewhat easier for hypermarkets and 
cash & carry operators to enter, as evidenced by the 19 stores that Metro has succeeded in 
establishing. However, in a market such as Italy, hypermarkets supply the many small retailers 
and therefore perform a rather different economic role from that in their home market in 
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Germany. Since 1993, Metro has also opened in Denmark, further evidence of the mobility of 
this format. During the late 1980s Marks & Spencer expanded its operations in France. During 
the early 1990s it opened outlets in the Netherlands and Spain, and in 1996 it opened its first 
store in Germany. 
Table A.10.2. Retailer activity by national grocery market (1993) 
Firm 
Metro 
Edeka 
Rewe 
Aldi 
Spar 
Carrefour 
Intermarché 
Promodès 
Leclerc 
Sainsbury 
Tenelmn 
Teseo 
Auchan 
Casino 
ICA 
Argylc 
Migros 
Asda 
Co-op Ital. 
Ahold 
Co-op Swe 
System U 
Co-op CH 
Docks de F. 
Cora 
Somerfld. 
GIB 
Kesko 
National markets i 
Retailers in order c 
Source: Nielsen. 
S 
* 
* 
* 
FIN 
* 
* 
DK 
* 
* 
* 
Β 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
A 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
NL 
* 
* 
* 
* 
D 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
I 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
UK 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Ρ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
n order of local concentration (share of top three as in Table A.10.1). 
f share of Europe turnover (from Metro 3.2% to Kesco 0.5%). 
F 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
E 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* ■ 
GR 
* 
* 
I 
* 
Economic analysis of purchasing and distribution structure is complicated by the different 
roles of store types in different countries. UK stores are reasonably homogeneous in their 
approach to integrated distribution and supermarket operation, although there has been some 
penetration by hypermarkets and discount warehouses. The UK approach to organization is 
also used by Ahold, Casino and Promodès. But in France, Germany, and other markets, firms 
such as Intermarché, Leclerc and Edeka - as part-franchise operations - are effectively 
wholesalers rather than integrated retailers. The French No. 3, Carrefour, is in the process of 
centralizing logistics to the UK model in order to reduce costs and increase stock turnover. 
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Α. 10.2. Overview of respondents' operations 
Location and scope 
All our respondents had their operations overwhelmingly based in a single EU country. Each 
operates over 400 stores, from around six or seven warehouses. One had increased its number 
of stores by over 30% in the period, with some increase in average size. Another has reduced 
its number of stores by over 40% in the last six years, with a significant increase in average 
store area. Each firm has operations outside its domestic market, but only a few stores. In each 
case their initial ventures outside the domestic base were supplied from the 'home' logistics 
system, and shop locations were confined to similar markets with shared language and tied -
or almost tied - currencies. 
Each of our respondents had spent a considerable amount of effort attempting to understand 
the significant differences in margins between retail operations in different European national 
markets, not just between categories but within them. In deciding whether or not to invest in 
market entry they had analysed: 
(a) whether there were factors affecting costs and margins for all operators in a market; 
(b) whether there were specific problems in 'managing at a distance' in the market; 
(c) whether the offering was appropriate to the market. 
None yet had a warehouse infrastructure outside the domestic market, although one was in the 
process of assembling a store network to support one. Its plans for logistics post-2000 were 
based on increasing the average size of warehouse, and making greater provision for cross-
border supply. Two problems needed to be overcome before the company could confidently 
commit to this. Firstly, the control systems for dealing with fluctuating currency relationships 
have to be perfected (or a single currency established). Secondly, the ability to understand and 
predict consumer needs and buying patterns accurately needs to be built into the stocking and 
replenishment systems to be used - which even firms such Marks & Spencer found difficult in 
its initial stores outside its home market, 20 years ago. This problem is not yet solved! An 
example was quoted of Teseo finding it difficult to service its Calais store from a Kent 
warehouse, although it had no problem supplying Northern Ireland from Scotland. 
Purchasing is international for all the firms contacted, but controlled from a single centre. One 
respondent had pursued a strategy of dual responsibility for purchasing, in the UK and France, 
but is now concentrating this activity back in the home country. Respondents with a leading 
share in three or four product categories of one or two EU national markets are able to 
negotiate effectively at a global level. For another respondent in grocery, who is a member of 
Associate Marketing Services (AMS), procurement is partly co-ordinated with other members 
of the group, which includes Casino, Argyle, Ahold, ICA, Mercandona (Spain), Kesko, 
Danske Supermarked, Allkauf and Edeka. Migros of Switzerland was a member but has now 
left. The operation of the group is managed after consultation with the EU's competition 
directorate to avoid the exercise of excessive market power, and many of its initiatives are 
bilateral (agreements between two members to share costs of development or distribution), 
rather than Europe-wide purchasing deals. The respondent company retains control of its own 
purchasing function, based in its home market. 
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New market entries 
Only one of our respondents has made an entry into another EU national market at anything 
like the critical mass of shop units required to support a fully integrated distribution system. 
There are examples of other entries described previously, but many of these are into Eastern 
Europe (Ahold, Tengelmann, Aldi, IKEA) or South America (Carrefour) as well as in the EU. 
The drive for growth is what has led retailers to look outside the EU, once the major 
opportunities for development in the Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Italian markets have 
been addressed. The need for growth has proved a more powerful driver in directing entry 
investment than the impact of the single market. One of the reasons cited for this in our 
interviews was the tightening of planning controls on availability of sites for new stores in the 
major EU markets. 
Mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances 
Two of our respondents had been through the acquisition process at the beginning of the 
period, but in neither case had it served to increase transnational scale. Both had been divested 
by a larger group, essentially as national units, and had subsequently focused the majority of 
their efforts on organic growth. 
AMS clearly fulfils the role of a well-functioning strategic alliance for our member 
respondent. Those responsible for business development within the firm see it less as a tool to 
negotiate lower prices, than as a platform for innovation. For example, it has been used 
recently to develop and test a new scanning system to offer better service to customers, and it 
operates shared procurement in areas of the world where individual stores would find it hard 
to operate - thus increasing choice. It has also developed new approaches for refrigeration and 
display, sharing the advantages between participants. 
Perhaps most interestingly AMS has been used to develop common specifications for store 
brand products, together with key suppliers. For example, by agreeing a joint specification for 
disposable diapers with supplier Kimberly Clark, the group has been able to create with the 
manufacturer both development and production scale economies, shared between producer, 
retailer and consumer. This combination of strategic alliance in both horizontal and vertical 
directions may extend to sourcing outside the EU, so is not necessarily linked to the single 
market. 
One of our respondents emphasized how important it was to work with partners or franchisees 
in many of the Mediterranean markets, but this has more to do with local market access rather 
than scale per se. 
A. 10.3. Factors driving dynamic economies of scale 
Differences between national customer needs are quoted by all our respondents as a major 
barrier to integrated transnational operation of retail networks. In the words of one, 'Retailing 
competence has not yet proved to be exportable between countries', while another said 'Our 
format, which is very successful in two countries, fails when operated by others elsewhere, not 
just in the EU but also in the US'. The importance of developing systems to understand, 
predict and provide for local consumer behaviour is paramount. Customer tastes, travel 
patterns, shopping frequencies, response to advertising and promotion, seasonal behaviour and 
price sensitivity are all to some extent national characteristics. Firms' ability to transfer their 
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understanding of these factors from one market to another is limited - much more so than 
appears to be the case in the marketing of individual products. 
The scope for common marketing approaches is limited both by lifestyle differences, and by 
variations in national food safety regulations. One of the AMS members said 'We would like 
to be able to transfer our marketing approach for cheese from France to the UK, but it 
wouldn't be legal'. 
There is no 'lead' market for retailing innovation in the EU, but different countries' retailers 
have focused on different strengths. Within the AMS group, for example, Germany is 
recognized as having developed store operational approaches which maximize space 
productivity, in response to planning constraints. The UK is seen as the leader in IT-based 
logistics as a result of intense competition between the major players in a 'Porter'-type cluster. 
Free movement of products is limited in some areas by food health regulations as noted above, 
but the improvement in trans-European transport links has lowered distribution costs, and 
increased the incentives for firms to co-operate in areas such as seeking return loads for 
partners. Free movement of capital is cited as significant by one of our respondents, but only 
indirectly. 'It was probably important in facilitating the shareholding exchange which helped 
to create AMS. This was a symbolic anchor, a statement of intent and mutual confidence, to 
underpin the relationship when it started. Now we value the relationship enough not to need 
the capital tie.' 
Knowledge transfer within firms is illustrated by our respondent which has entered a market 
adjacent to its home base. Proving that its models of consumer behaviour could be modified 
and transferred required significant internal study; dealing with currency differences was a 
major learning experience in itself, from which the company hopes to benefit when it enters 
another market. But the most important transfer the firm considers it has to make is the ability 
to manage stores at a distance. Many retail firms are tightly controlled, and across Europe 
many successful firms are owner-managed and privately owned. Even where this is not the 
case, our respondent operating in two markets has put significant effort into management 
systems for devolved operation - which has so far been successful. 
Knowledge transfer between firms, in a framework like AMS, seems to those involved to offer 
benefits of scale without many of the risks outlined earlier. Each of the participants nominates 
a co-ordinator who identifies issues which their own store is concerned to explore, and the 
firms seek areas in which they can exchange experience, learning from one another's strong 
points. In part this depends on the companies involved not having 'head to head' competitive 
issues. The three main players in AMS have had fundamentally different strategies over the 
last few years. Ahold, having saturated its main EU markets, is targeting North America and 
other new growth areas; Casino has been through a domestic acquisition programme and is 
now targeting Eastern Europe; while Argyle is developing both share and quality in its main 
domestic market. Within these different objectives, it is possible for firms to share technology, 
procurement, logistics and new product ideas without conflict of interest. Scanning systems, 
return load arrangements, logistical systems and development of store label product 
specifications have all been shared over the five years, and the process has delivered benefits 
on quality and costs. 
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A. 10.4. Influence of external economies of scale 
The ability to secure competitive sources of supply is a crucial determinant of retail business 
success. This is why large sections of the industry are consolidated into buying groups, such as 
Cometca in France, which comprises the top four retailers. In some of these groups it is 
difficult for a supplier to obtain shelf space in any of the member stores without 'buying in' to 
become a supplier to the group - viewed by some suppliers as an anticompetitive practice. But 
these groups do provide networks for information exchange, and stronger bargaining power to 
the retail members. The disadvantage which is seen in some groups, including co-ops, is over-
emphasis on price as a buying criterion as opposed to quality and innovation. In buying groups 
which are shared within a country this does not necessarily benefit either the retailer, whose 
scope for differentiation is reduced, or the final consumer, whose choice may be limited. 
Some international buying groups have proved less successful than others. For example, 
Deuro, established by Metro (Germany), Macro (Netherlands), Asda (UK), and Carrefour 
(France), has been wound down. These are four partners containing quite different formats, 
which may have made external economies hard to realize. 
Within AMS the scope for this type of conflict is somewhat reduced because retailers tend to 
reach bilateral arrangements for specific products, and for the most part the group only has one 
or two members in each national market. External economies are achieved in this system 
through the use of local procurement expertise; for example, Mercandano procures Spanish 
olives for other members using its local knowledge, and Argyle procures whisky and smoked 
salmon. In cases where bilateral procurement arrangements involve products with similar 
transport needs, they can also help achieve external economies through better utilization of 
vehicles and distribution capacity. 
Whichever type of arrangement retailers choose - or if they choose to operate independently -
the ability to purchase across Europe subject only to local health and safety regulations has 
increased both choice and price competition. The existence of 'arbitrage' by retailers and 
wholesalers, shipping products into higher priced markets and eroding local premiums, has 
affected the way in which producers market and price their products both within the EU and 
outside it. 
At least one respondent made it clear that its adherence to an alliance was originally seen as a 
response to 'Europeanization' by manufacturers. The introduction of European sales 
organizations by some brand owners was seen as a potential threat by strictly national retail 
buyers. In the event, apart from levelling down prices in some peripheral markets, the impact 
has been less dramatic. Producers have introduced European branded products, with labelling 
to meet all national requirements, which simplifies the logistics for wholesalers or retailers 
who move products across borders. But the structure of commercial arrangements has 
remained largely national, reflecting the different consumer needs and different procurement 
models for most markets. 
A. 10.5. Impact of the single market 
Interestingly, the retailer among our respondents which had made the most significant move 
into an adjacent market gave the single market least credit for its ability to carry out this move. 
If a single currency had been in place it would have counted for more. However, the existence 
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of common product standards, and the free movement of products and capital was an 
important condition for this firm. 
Another respondent commented that expansion into other EU markets initially led to 
diseconomies, through the complexity of managing different retail environments and serving 
different consumer tastes. Even where the retail formula did prove exportable, success was 
less to do with economies of scale over the longer term and more with targeting growing 
consumer markets in growing national economies. Cost advantages of different locations (e.g. 
in property as well as purchasing) were not significant. 
Our AMS member credited the ability to take shareholding stakes in partners without added 
risk as having given an important impetus to the development of knowledge sharing and 
development collaboration. Enhancing the ability of stores to innovate, perhaps when they are 
not among the top few EU firms, appears to be a significant benefit from the collaboration 
which requires this degree of interdependence. Retail innovation, both in products and in 
systems, is a high fixed cost/high capital process, and so frameworks which permit cost 
sharing should help boost the number of effective competitors. It is difficult to point to 
effective transfer of innovation from partnerships across the EU boundary, although there have 
been many attempts and it will be interesting to see how the eastern European ventures work. 
But real benefits in procurement, in product innovation and in developing store systems have 
been identified by respondents as being at least partly aided by the existence or the expectation 
of the single market. Without the collaboration which it has permitted, products, R&D, and 
operating technology would have cost more or carried higher risks. Increasingly, as 
competitive advantage in retailing depends more on personnel and service development and an 
operator's relative learning rate, the ability to transfer knowledge between markets becomes 
more important; and one respondent saw their membership of the European Council as highly 
relevant in this respect. 
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APPENDIX Β 
Outline technological assessments by industry sector 
This section draws on recent experience from PIMS consultants and company contacts of 
technology changes related to scale and scale economies over the period 1980-95. In addition, 
where sufficient observations are available, it provides a brief profile of business 
characteristics from PIMS observations within each sector. 
It is not complete across the sectors identified by Buiges et al [1990] as 'sensitive' to the 
single market, since there are some in which we do not have either recent international 
experience, or sufficient sector-identified data to provide a robust sector profile. Where one is 
available without the other, we have provided it. 
We comment on the cost impact of changes in technology under four headings: 
(a) technology inherent in the product (e.g. switch to mobile communications); 
(b) technology in process of manufacture (shift to capital intensive mass production); 
(c) technology development costs; 
(d) marketing and distribution systems. 
The sector profiles focus on quantitative measures for which the sector observations show a 
systematic tendency across the sector sample. Usually a characteristic is mentioned only if it 
lies in the top or bottom quartile of the range of values found for all sectors. 
B.l. High technology/public procurement NACE groups 
330 Office machines/computer hardware 
(I) Technology, products and scale 
Downsizing in products delivered to customers from mainframes to minicomputers, then to 
PCs has been carried through since 1980 for many applications. The impact of technology 
change at each stage was to bring down both costs of production and barriers to entry. 
However, measured in terms of functionality and performance, the maximum size of computer 
installation continues to grow. Technology change has transformed monolithic computers into 
systems which can be built up from discrete, relatively cheap, but powerful elements. 
A major technology change in peripheral equipment has been the shift from mechanical to 
optical/electronic systems. For example, the substitution of jet/laser printers for dot matrix has 
pushed some suppliers out of the European market, and brought in others from adjacent 
markets such as copiers - effectively enlarging the market and increasing the scale leverage of 
optical technology research. 
Although software systems are not part of this NACE category, the computer market is 
increasingly affected by them, because they are sold as complementary products in the same 
package. Economies of scale here - in the consumer segment and in standardized business 
applications - can be inexhaustible. However, in tailored software systems for business, where 
an increasing portion of value added is taken by 'value added resellers', it is clear that 
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diseconomies of scope exist alongside economies of scale. Specialists in many particular 
niches of the business systems market, for example, exist alongside large scale generalists 
such as Andersen. 
(2) Technology, processes and scale 
The shift to minicomputers, then PCs in the late 1970s and 1980s permitted new 
manufacturers to enter the market at significantly lower scale than market leaders. This 
suggests either that at first economies of scale were not large, or that market leaders' costs or 
prices were unreasonably high. As entry to markets increased the number of suppliers, 
standardized products and techniques to speed manufacture came to dominate processes: 
(a) in chip manufacture (optical processes and techniques for placing atoms in crystals); 
(b) in PCB stuffing (optical process replacing printing, and press/glue replacing solder); 
(c) assembly (more robotics and automated testing). 
As the number of suppliers in the global market has increased, many of the businesses 
involved in supply have become more specialized and less vertically integrated. Instead of 
IBM producing processors, computer assemblies and software, the global industry is now 
dominated by Intel developing chips, clone/Unix manufacturers designing and assembling 
machines, and Microsoft providing software. 
Economies of scale driving down manufacturing costs of hardware are very different from 
behaviour of costs in one-off big system software. System complexity can make the 
production of large solutions for corporate systems costly. An increasing part of this activity, 
which used to be given away free to sell computers is now being undertaken by independent 
consultants, because hardware prices are being bid down faster than software in competitive 
markets. 
(3) Technology development 
Development economies for major parts of the office machinery market are obvious. In the 
processors sector Intel has established a commanding position, and has maintained the 
importance of innovation (and hence its scale advantage) by linking the expanded capability of 
its new products to the increasing complexity of software systems. Development costs, if 
anything, are getting larger, and so the importance of spreading them over increased output of 
standardized product increases. 
Standardization and innovation have similarly affected optical systems (printers and copiers) 
and software (Microsoft for business PCs and the consumer market). 
(4) Marketing costs 
Marketing approach for big business users has changed less than the products through much of 
the 1960s and 1970s, but is a significant cost. For consumer marketing the introduction of 
direct selling/making to order has made a difference, offering new routes to market for smaller 
suppliers. 
[Source: Consultants working with global and European-focused IT companies.] 
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Sector profile for NACE 330 - 22 businesses 
Businesses in this sector experienced relatively rapid real market growth of 6% per annum. 
Their market sectors were fairly highly concentrated and had high product differentiation. 
Marketing expenses were very high at 15% of revenue. 
Production was primarily in small batches. Value added was high, typically 75% of revenue. 
These businesses had low dependence on a few suppliers for their purchases. 
The investment to value added ratio is low at 67%, and fixed capital intensity (measured as 
gross book value of plant and equipment/value added) is particularly low. Major technological 
change was experienced by 58% of these businesses in the last eight years. R&D expenses are 
fairly high at 3.5% of sales, and the development time for new products long - typically about 
four years. 
344 Telecommunications equipment 
(1) Technology, products and scale 
Products in this industry have undergone major changes, and their adoption has been 
accelerated in many countries by deregulation of user industries. Development of more 
powerful switches and network systems have increased functionality and reduced cost of 
equipment. The introduction of IT into telecommunications systems has increased the carrying 
capacity of conventional lines, led to the explosion of demand for high capacity optical lines, 
and broadened the range of applications for telecommunications equipment. In the corporate 
market, IT is also increasingly being used to develop customized systems for companies, using 
standard hardware components and made-to-order software. 
As in office equipment/computers, costs for individual products have fallen sharply, but 
increasing functionality and complexity of systems have kept system costs high. Development 
of mobile communications has changed market structure, opening up competition between 
system operators but also making economies of scale more important to them. 
(2) Technology, processes and scale 
Economies of scale in production of equipment have become more significant, with similar 
effects to those in office equipment/computers, because the major components of equipment 
and elements of cost are similar: 
(a) system design and development; 
(b) microprocessors and other electronic components; 
(c) PCB manufacture and assembly; 
(d) box and system assembly. 
As in office equipment/computers there has been a steady trend towards outsourcing parts of 
the value chain. Component manufacture and PCB production are subject to external scale 
economies for many producers except the very biggest. 
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(3) Development costs 
R&D continues to rise as telecommunications and IT converge - intelligent communications 
equipment is a fast-growing sector of the market, and the IT required to underpin mobile 
communications is also substantial. 
(4) Marketing costs 
These are becoming more important in the télécoms industry now, because regulated 
monopolies have been turned into competitive markets. In many countries this is because 
mobile communications entrants are challenging state monopolies, or because rules of access 
to former monopoly networks have been changed. Marketing scale economies for those parts 
of the equipment industry selling to end-users are therefore growing in importance, as the 
complexity of routes to market increases. 
[Sources: Consultants working with UK télécoms company, and global 'intelligent télécoms' suppliers.] 
Sector profile for NACE 344 - 17 businesses 
These market sectors had highly differentiated products and services with a very high rate of 
new product introductions. Marketing/revenue was high at 14%. 
Value added for the businesses was relatively high at 73% of revenue. Production was 
primarily in small batches with low customization of products. Fixed capital intensity was 
low. Major technological change occurred for 53% of these businesses. R&D expenses were 
high at 4.8% of sales. 
These businesses had many suppliers. 
372 Medico-surgical equipment 
(1) Technology, products and scale 
Most of the interesting areas of medical equipment where technology is changing - IT and 
electronically based diagnostic and measuring equipment - appear to be included in NACE 
344. Many products are highly specialized, and often customized - which limits scale 
economies in product use or production. 
Medical equipment has seen steady substitution of disposable for reusable items, so volume 
production has become more important in the industry. Many equipment markets (e.g. 
syringes) have been global for ten years because of this effect. 
Main technology trends have come about as a result of improved materials, the search for 
better control of treatment, and - in the US and some other markets - simplification and cost 
reduction in diagnostic and treatment systems which means that their use can be decentralized 
from hospitals to doctors' offices. This means smaller, more standardized items of equipment, 
which are more susceptible to scale economies in production. 
[Source: Consultants working with firms based in France and UK.] 
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Sector profile for NACE 372 - 19 businesses 
Real market growth was high at 6.2% p.a. Market concentration was very high, with the top 
four companies having 90% of the market. Market differentiation was also very high, as were 
marketing expenses at 13% of revenue. 
Vertical integration was high with value added at 71% of revenue. Fairly high R&D/revenue 
costs were incurred and product development times were fairly long. Over 30% of these 
businesses had the benefit of product or process patents. Customization of products was low. 
B.2. Public procurement/regulation 
257 Pharmaceuticals 
(1) Technology, products and scale 
Some of our industry contributors believe that the ability of drug companies to deliver more 
'blockbuster' drugs is declining. Product innovation is becoming more incremental and also 
more related to delivery systems, and to 'packages' of therapeutic treatment rather than the 
traditional 'silver bullet' approach. However, the basic development model of the industry is 
still the same shape as it was ten years ago. Economic pressures come from the fact that the 
rise of generic products has shortened the effective lifespan of branded ethical products, 
during which they can command a high premium over possible substitutes, to terminate very 
soon after the life of the patent. 
(2) Technology, processes and scale 
Production costs have to date been an almost insignificant part of pharmaceutical cost 
structure - typically under 20% of revenue. However, traditional chemical production 
processes for many active ingredients are long and complex, with interdependent multistage 
processes. Ineffective use of capital assets is often a problem with these processes. Scale 
economies, where they exist, arc due to shared know-how in process design and management 
within companies, rather than production scale economies. 
The development of biological routes to active ingredients offers significant potential gains -
lowering barriers to entry and reducing effects of scale economies - but has so far not 
delivered in a big way. 
In generic drugs and some OTC products, however, production costs normally account for 
significantly more of the overall product value, and so are more susceptible to competitive 
pressures. Technology changes in these areas parallel what is happening in other mass 
production industries for packed products for human consumption. Improvements in process 
control, packaging methods and process speeds through automated controls have had a large 
impact. 
(3) Development costs 
These dominate the economics of ethical drugs. Here development of technology for designing 
molecules may have helped reduce initial costs, but these are dwarfed by costs of trials, which 
are driven by regulation. Economies of scale here - in the development of applicable and 
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approved intellectual property - are huge, and are driving mergers of pharmaceutical 
companies globally. 
(4) Marketing costs 
Marketing costs in the pharmaceutical sector need to be considered separately for different 
classes of drugs. For ethical drugs, marketing effort is directed towards prescribing doctors, 
distributors and public authorities, and its total cost is often significantly more than either 
production costs or even development costs. For OTC drugs marketing is directed to 
distributors, opinion formers and end-users - and its costs are also high - again underlining 
the importance of in-market scale. For generic drugs, marketing costs are usually much lower, 
and directed mainly to public purchasers or to large distributors. Growth in the proportion of 
the market taken by OTC and generic drugs is expected to continue. 
[Source: Consultants working with UK and a number of German pharmaceutical companies.] 
315 Boilers and metal containers 
This is a very diverse sector, in which we see no overriding technology shifts in products. 
Boilers for electricity generation may be an exception, as design changes to make major 
energy savings have altered minimum efficient scale in user industries (see electrical 
machinery below). 
The sector contains both industrial products (often made to order), and commercial/domestic 
products which are usually mass produced. Deregulation of energy suppliers has given rise to 
greater demand for innovative, energy-saving products and has opened up new routes to 
market; technology changes have been sector specific for different groups of end users, and 
demand led. 
General trends which apply are: 
(a) better process control in finished products, which may reduce the severity of conditions 
under which equipment is required to operate - decreasing its capital cost to users - and 
increase the potential efficiency of smaller units; 
(b) increasing automation of design and fabrication process, through IT. This sector shows 
the same sort of effects as other engineering and assembly industries. 
[Source: Consultants working with UK energy utilities, and European/American boiler component suppliers.] 
Sector profile for NACE 315-14 businesses 
The businesses in this sector suffered a decline in real market size of 7% p.a. Market 
differentiation was low, and new product innovation virtually zero. Marketing expenses were 
low at 6% of sales. 
Value added was low at 43% of revenue. Production is mainly in small batches with a high 
degree of customization, but about 30% was produced on assembly lines. Businesses 
experienced little technological change. 
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362 Railway equipment 
(1) Technology, products and scale 
No major changes in technology which are driving scale are apparent. Across the industry it is 
rather a case of technology adapting to smaller scale applications - light rail, trams for urban 
transport systems - and at the same time to larger, faster trains to compete in Europe on long 
distance travel. Product changes are mainly caused by the increasing sophistication of rail 
systems, which make modular construction approach for trains a better approach. This has 
been evident in most areas of the market. 
The modular approach has led to more specialization, and hence a greater role for 
subcontractors. This should show up in reducing value added/sales ratio for individual 
companies in the industry. Fundamental product technology development, such as linear 
motors, has shown up only in specialist applications. 
(2) Technology, processes and scale 
Production processes have become more IT intensive, as in most areas of engineering. 
Processes are therefore more capital intensive, with lower variable costs and higher breakeven 
points. 
[Source: Former project director Franco-British electrical company, and consultants working with German 
electrical manufacturer.] 
425 Brewing and malting 
(1) Technology and products 
The trend in demand from distributors in this sector has been towards products which are 
easier to handle, with longer shelf-life and less loss during the process to final consumption. 
Improvements in process control and in packaging have therefore been the most important 
factors in changing the type of products sold. Scale economies achieved in packaging have 
mirrored those in other canned and bottled products, with significant increases in packaging 
speeds, and therefore in minimum scale, achieved during the 1980s. 
(2) Technology, processes and scale 
Response to changes in scale of brewing technology in this industry have historically been 
slow, but steady. For example, Whitbread's City brewery was the largest in the UK when it 
opened around 1740, and was still above UK average scale when it closed in 1976. The major 
changes in process technology and control which led to a revolution in scale and significant 
gains in productivity largely occurred between 1970 and 1985; however, industry investment 
determining how far they were put into effect in different countries was partly dependent on 
changes in national product regulations (e.g. Germany) and on monopoly power in distribution 
(e.g. the UK). 
(3) Marketing costs 
Growth in national and international brand marketing has been substantial, raising the 
threshold scale for major brands. In most countries this is related to a shift in distribution 
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patterns towards supermarkets. However, the impact of marketing costs may be unrelated to 
production, because some brands get licensed to local brewers in individual countries. 
In the UK changes in regulatory frameworks have driven changes in marketing scale by 
breaking the tie between breweries and pubs. The German market has been changed by 
relaxation of laws on products. In both cases the result has been for bigger producers to gain in 
'mass' brands, and smaller breweries to focus on specialist products. The main losers have 
been medium-scale firms with undifferentiated products. 
[Source: PIMS consultants with UK and German brewing companies.] 
428 Soft drinks and spa waters 
(1) Products and processes 
We are not aware of major technology changes in the product itself; the sector has been highly 
automated since the 1970s. There have, however, been shifts in packaging which represents a 
significant part of the value chain. Substitution of glass by cans, PVC and most recently PET 
has been accompanied by a major speeding up of production/bottling. There are significant 
economies of scale in bottling, but in most cases they are most important at national market 
level, because of the relatively high costs of transporting products. Local franchising is often 
used to overcome this problem in soft drinks; in spa waters this may not be possible due to 
regulation. 
(2) Marketing costs 
Marketing economies have driven concentration and internationalization of this market rather 
than production - which tends to be national/local rather than continental. A substantial part of 
enterprise cost is usually in sales, marketing and advertising for 'image' products. 
[Sources: Consultants working with European PET business, and with German packaging conglomerate.] 
341 Electrical wires and cables 
Technology and products 
The major technology impact on this sector is substitution by optical fibre in the 
communications sector, and downstream substitution of mobile for fixed communications, 
which is undermining demand for traditional products but greatly expanding the total market. 
Optical fibre growth has been driven by global companies. 
Sector profile for NACE 341-28 businesses 
The real market size for these businesses has declined by 4% p.a. Market concentration was 
low, the top four companies having 58% market share. Product and service differentiation was 
low, as was marketing at 4% of sales. 
Vertical integration is very low with value added only 36% of revenue. Capital intensity was 
very high (capital employed/value added = 123%). Businesses used a mixture of production 
processes. R&D expenses/sales were low and product development times short. Businesses 
typically depended upon three suppliers for 45% of their purchases. 
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342 Electrical equipment 
(1) Technology and products 
Scaling up of power generation units, which happened steadily for 30 years up to 1975, has 
significantly slowed. The biggest generation sets are unchanged at around 1,200-2,000 MW, 
because of limits to boiler/turbine capacity. The introduction of combined cycle technology 
over the last 15 years, which offers greater efficiency at lower scale and capital intensity, has 
significantly reduced the minimum size of new generating units, particularly where gas is 
available as a feedstock. 
Distribution/conversion technology has been largely stable since the early 1980s. 
(2) Technology and processes 
There has been no real change in manufacturing processes, except the steady substitution of IT 
for people. Robotic control on machinery for making components of generators and motors 
has increased but basic technology is broadly the same. The trend towards modular production 
systems has been steady, as in other engineering sectors, permitting increased use of 
outsourcing by main contractors. 
[Source: Former projects director, Franco-British electrical company.] 
Sector profile for NACE 342 - 65 businesses 
Market growth rate, concentration and differentiation were below median levels but the level 
of new product activity was high. 
Value added/revenue was high at 66%. Although production was primarily on assembly lines, 
a relatively high proportion of products and services were customized. The incidence of major 
technological change was low, as was the development time for new products. R&D expenses 
were fairly high at 3.5% of revenue. 
421 Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 
(1) Technology and products 
Changes in products have been made to exploit available technology (e.g. ice cream/chocolate 
composite products) and economies of scale through global products with uniform ingredients 
and process control. Advances in packaging materials have had an effect in improving shelf-
life and marketing presentation. Nestlé's redesign, and internationalization, of selected 
Rowntree products after takeover in the late 1980s provides clear examples of how in-
company know-how provides scale advantages through production and packaging. 
(2) Technology and processes 
Basic process technologies are largely unchanged, except for progress evident in other sectors 
of the food processing industry on measurement and control, process speed increases, 
substitution of automatic control for people, and focusing of people input in support functions 
- which increase scale economies available. Action by large confectionery companies to take 
advantage of these economies predates, and is independent of, the EU single market. 
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(3) Development costs 
Since innovation is now an important competitive weapon in chocolate confectionery, 
economies of scale on development costs are increasing in importance. This has driven one 
US manufacturer to reposition European brands to align with US formats and positioning. 
(4) Marketing costs 
Economies of scale on marketing and procurement/logistics are seen as the most significant 
sources of cost savings by major producers. The growth of international branding, within 
Europe and beyond, has expanded to take advantage of this. 
[Source: Consultants working with chocolate producers.] 
B.3. Sectors with moderate non-tariff barriers 
B.3.1. Consumer products 
345 Electronic consumer goods 
(1) Products, technology and scale 
Since 1980, the main characteristic of this sector has been a continuing stream of innovative 
products, to meet new needs and to extend the performance and functionality of products 
meeting existing needs. Product advantage has been established by leading firms by 'setting 
the standard' (as in VCRs); by achieving reputation for reliable innovation and good design; or 
by rapid exploitation of scale economies. 
(2) Technology and processes 
Effects of technology on process scale have been similar to those in office equipment and 
telecommunications - because the technology itself, and the core competencies required for 
success in each area, are themselves converging. The increasingly modular approach to 
production, with outsourcing of components where a producer does not possess cost or 
technology advantage, has changed the character of competition. It has led to substantial 
investment in Far East production of modules, by companies competing in markets which are 
effectively global. Scale economies achieved in individual production steps do not show up in 
terms of business size because of this modularization of production. 
(3) Development costs 
Most leading producers depend for maintenance of their competitive position and innovation 
edge on some key product module. Development costs are therefore high, and scale economies 
very significant. In some of the most development intensive product module areas there is 
effectively room for only four or five global suppliers. 
(4) Marketing costs 
Costs of getting the product into markets in this sector are also relatively high, even for global 
players. This has served to reinforce the concentration effects of high R&D. 
[Source: Consultants working with European electronics businesses.] 
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Sector profile for NACE 345 - 28 businesses 
Average real market growth was 7% per annum. Market concentration was fairly low at 68% 
share for the top four businesses. New product activity was high. 
Production was largely on assembly line processes. 40% of businesses had process patents. 
Value added/revenue was high at 74%. On average, businesses depended on only three 
suppliers for 40 % of their purchases. Capital employed was low relative to value added at 
62%. 
Over 50% of businesses experienced major technological change. R&D expenses were 
relatively high at 3.4% of sales, but product development times were fairly short at less than 
two years. 
Sector summary for domestic-type electrical appliances (NACE 346 - 25 businesses) 
Market growth rate, concentration, differentiation and new product activity for businesses in 
this sector were fairly close to the median levels for all sectors in these profiles. Marketing 
expenses were fairly high at 12% of sales. 
Production processes were entirely by assembly line with little product customization. The 
fixed asset intensity (GBV of plant and equipment/value added) was low at 32%. There was 
little technological change. Development time for new products was short at a little over a 
year, and few businesses held either product or process patents. Dependence on a few 
suppliers for purchases was low. 
351 Motor vehicles 
(1) Technology, products and scale 
Changes in products have included increasing use of electronic control systems, and increased 
emphasis on quality - possible through more precise process control. Ford have led the US 
and Europe's 'quality movement' in response to Japanese competition, which has radically 
changed the relationship between major producers and their suppliers. Movement to modular 
product design has also influenced assembler/supplier relationships. Modular design is in part 
a reaction to the increasing technical complexity of the car as a whole - no supplier can master 
all the technology. 
(2) Technology and processes; development costs 
The just-in-time approach and the use of dedicated suppliers reflect a new approach to process 
integration in the vehicle industry. It may have increased barriers to entry in some 
components, but flexible modular approach has moved minimum scale down in a number of 
areas. 
The way in which economies of scale in car development and production are being affected by 
more flexible approaches to manufacture is illustrated by a current Volvo/Mitsubishi project in 
the Netherlands. Two companies have built common plant, with a single production line and 
common 'platform' for two different cars. This approach shares all the costs of platform 
development, and the basic robotics on line. The line operates flexibly, taking Volvo 
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components from one side and Mitsubishi components from the other to produce cars with 
different engines and designs. 
Normal costs of a line and model development for Volvo would be SEK 12 billion; under this 
joint approach it is reduced to SEK 8 billion. Mercedes also has lines which can produce more 
than one model. 
[Source: Consultants working with German and Scandinavian vehicle companies.] 
438 Carpets, lino, floor covering 
(1) Technology and products 
The European floor covering industry has been significantly affected by Scandinavian 
innovation, using printed laminate. Printed foil is stuck onto chip-based backing with plastic 
sealant, substituting for lino, vinyl, wood and ceramics over the last few years. 
(2) Technology and processes 
Production economics of the new process depend on the printing process, where economies of 
scale are large. The leading firm has only one printing centre in Europe and one in the US. But 
lamination is local, because of the logistical cost of backing and finished products. 
[Source: Consultants working with Scandinavian and German floor covering firms.] 
B.3.2. Capital goods 
322 Machine tools for metal 
(I) Technology, products and processes 
The economics of machine tool manufacture in Europe changed significantly during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Particularly in Germany many small, profitable, machine tool firms 
crashed in the 1989/90 recession because they had over-invested in 'flexible systems' of 
manufacture. Most such systems installed in the early 1980s were not flexible, but were very 
capital intensive. This combination of over-investment and inflexibility - and underutilization 
- killed smaller competitors and concentrated the market. 
More successful machine tool businesses have made the switch from mechanical to 
electronic/optical control technology for their products, and for their own manufacturing 
processes where appropriate. Flexible manufacturing systems are now in place, which are 
closer to the original intention. 
[Source: PIMS consultants with German machine tool companies.] 
Sector summary of plant for mines (NACE 325 - 28 businesses) 
Real market growth for these businesses was high at 7.5% p.a. Market differentiation and new 
product activity were low. 
Production was almost entirely in small batches, and about 50% of products were customized. 
Capital intensity was low (capital employed/value added = 39%). Few businesses had process 
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or product patents. Development time for new products was high at about four years, but R&D 
expenses were low at 1.6% of sales. The three largest suppliers provided only 15% of 
purchases. 
347 Lamps/lighting equipment 
(1) Technology and products 
Steady substitution of more energy efficient products for traditional tungsten filament light has 
been going on for years - first by fluorescent tubes, then by more compact alternatives. 
Product technology has evolved rather than radically changed over the 1980s, stretching 
design parameters for better product performance. 
(2) Technology and processes 
Process technology has benefited from better process control/speed of working, but no radical 
changes in technology. Scale economies appear to be significant in this industry, because it is 
so concentrated. Although there is a sizeable market for 'own label' products in supermarkets 
etc., there are no purely own label producers, which suggests that the substantial scale 
possessed by branded product manufacturers is required to compete. As an example, GE 
(No. 3 in Europe, but No. 1 in the US) make all their tungsten bulbs for Europe in one factory 
(in Hungary) and all fluorescents in another (in Leicester in the UK). 
[Sources: Consultants who have worked with US and European lighting manufacturers.] 
364 Aerospace equipment - manufacture and repair 
(1) Products and processes 
Technology change in this sector has been mainly incremental. Improved materials, production 
control systems, and flexible manufacture have changed the products and processes used, but 
have not really changed the basic economics. A modular approach to manufacture has become 
more common. 
(2) Development costs 
An important element of the economies of scale available is on development costs, which only 
main contractors can bear fully. Subcontractors for specific items/subsystems in planes may 
bear part of a technical risk, but proportionately less. 
Increasing complexity of systems/subsystems has increased the tendency for subcontracting, 
and has thus reduced the average size of enterprises at a time when scope for scale economies 
is actually increasing. If this is true, it may show up in reducing value added/revenue for 
companies in the sector. 
[Source: Consultants working with European manufacture and repair company.] 
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Β.3.3. Industrial products 
247 Glassware 
This sector contains at least three subsectors with different economic structures. 
(a) Containers (bottles). The market has been shrinking in many areas due to substitution by 
PVC and PET. Products have changed incrementally - light-weighting, composites with 
polymer sleeving, etc. - but not in a way to affect basic scale economies. 
The bottle-making process has been scaled up over recent years (more 'gobs and sections' per 
machine) to the point where logistics and order book define the limit of plant size - because 
glass bottles are not cheap to transport. Much larger plants exist in France, where the order 
book is dominated by standard wine bottles in certain regions; big plants in the UK focus on 
standard milk bottles. Such plants are inflexible, and leave a significant gap in the market to 
permit entry by smaller rapid response suppliers, who are able to fill gaps and produce short 
runs. 
(b) Flat glass technology has been broadly stable since the float process revolution of the 
1960s, with some scaling up, but also some scaling down. The size of plants is partly limited 
by logistics, but process control improvements over recent years have made it possible to 
introduce float technology economically in smaller units where this would previously have 
been uneconomic (e.g. Pilkington in Finland). Pilkington no longer build plants which employ 
more than 500 people because of diseconomies in labour relations and productivity. 
A recent, and growing, product development is coated glass, which has better heat properties. 
In initial stages this has been more difficult to transport than float glass, which may 
temporarily limit scope for further scale economies. 
(c) Glass fibre products are produced mainly for a range of uses in building, and product 
development over recent years has tended to focus on products which provide 'easy to use' 
modules at the building assembly stage. Costs of complexity tend to offset economies, as scale 
usually requires a difficult mix of products in one plant. Plant size is mainly limited by order 
book. Successful high output plants tend to be limited in range to simple building products. 
Glass fibre is in competition with basalt melting and spinning, based on plants which require 
less capital and produce higher output, but which have been the source of much innovation 
over the last decade. 
(d) Tableware is dominated by one huge French producer, plus a few other national majors. 
There are significant economies in standard machine-made products. For more upmarket, 
labour-intensive products some companies selling under EU brands are moving production 
east to Poland and the Czech Republic, where low labour costs offset any possible scale 
factors. 
[Source: Consultants and managers working with companies in bottle, glass, glass fibre and tableware 
businesses.! 
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Sector profile for NACE 247 - 15 businesses 
Market concentration was very high with the top four businesses achieving 91% of sales. New 
product activity was low, as were marketing expenses at 4% of sales. 
Production was primarily by continuous processes and customization of products was high. 
Capital intensity (capital employed/value added) was low at 69% but fixed asset intensity 
(GBV of plant/value added) was high. Total R&D was low at 1.6% of sales, but the incidence 
of process patents was fairly high. 
251 Basic industrial chemicals 
(1) Technology and products 
Products in this sector are mainly, but not exclusively, commodities, and unchangeable. 
However, there have been shifts for certain products - e.g. PET - towards the emergence of 
concentrated demand for large users in consumer markets, which have given opportunities for 
differentiation. However, this appears to be exceptional. 
(2) Technology and processes 
'Economies of scale in basic chemicals are virtually over in manufacturing, except in certain 
specific products; the main economies now are in business support functions and logistics,' 
(quote from a chemicals planning manager with a European industry leader). Most of the 
major technology changes in basic chemicals production took place in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when some plants still in operation today were built. For example, the UK's biggest ethylene 
cracker (1978) was rated at 500,000 t, but now produces significantly more and is comparable 
in cost to a new German 750,000 t cracker. An important factor which has stopped bigger 
plants being built, placing a brake on the exploitation of theoretical engineering scale 
economies, is the logistics cost of assembling an order book for huge plants like this. 
Some technology changes have been in the direction of smaller economic scale - e.g. the shift 
from mercury to membrane cells in electrolysis of brine to make chlorine and caustic soda. 
This has opened up the market to potential smaller scale competitors - but so far the 
infrastructure costs (handling etc.) show economies of scale to offset production technology 
effects. 
The main areas where changes have taken place are in new growth products. Here normal 
technology changes to improve measurement and process control have made: 
(a) bigger plants possible without losing control of reaction; 
(b) reactions possible to run at less extreme conditions (lower temperature/pressure). 
For example, PET plants have scaled up from 30kt to 120kt, and PTA plants up from 300 kt to 
500 kt. These changes have come about with capital savings, both from increased scale and 
from better process control. 
Catalyst advances have opened up new routes to specific products, drastically cutting the 
capital intensity of the production chain in certain areas. Examples are Dupont's new route in 
nylon during the 1980s; the switch to gas phase polymerization of polypropylene which cuts 
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out liquid handling etc. - and scales up from 50 kt to 120 kt; and Union Carbide's linear low 
density PE process - which cuts capital and has similar effects on operating costs. 
[Source: Managers and consultants working with European and North American chemical companies.] 
Sector profile for NACE 251 - 79 businesses 
Markets grew in real terms by 6% p.a. and were relatively concentrated. Product and service 
differentiation were low but nev/ product activity was fairly high. 
Both capital intensity and fixed asset intensity were high, particularly the latter at GBV/VA = 
149%. There was a high incidence of patents, particularly for processes, and 43% of 
businesses experienced major technological change. On average, businesses relied on only 
three suppliers for over 50% of their purchases. 
Sector summary: Other chemical products for industry (NACE 256 - 56 businesses) 
This industry sector has very few characteristics that distinguish it from the others. This is 
probably because the NACE category definition is very wide, and businesses lack the 
homogeneity of activities found in other sectors. 
A few distinguishing characteristics do stand out. These are high levels for product and 
process patents, low product customization, and high reliance on a few suppliers. 
481 Rubber 
Products and processes 
This sector is dominated by the large tyre companies, whose products have changed over the 
last 15 years in that the switch - in developed country markets - to radial tyres has been 
virtually completed, and the proportion of product from synthetic rubber has steadily 
increased. However, there has been little change apart from this in the basic technology of 
products or processes. Some significant improvements in process control have driven 
increases in plant sizes. The industry is now effectively global, dominated by half a dozen 
major producers, of which half are big European manufacturers. 
[Source: Consultant working with supplier to rubber companies.] 
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APPENDIX C 
Community legislation, etc. 
C.l. Directives 
70/156/EEC: Council Directive of 6 February 1970 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the type approval of motor vehicles and their trailers (OJ L 42, 23.2.1970, p. 1), 
as amended by Decision 73/10I/EEC (OJ L 2, 1.1.1973, 1) and Directives 78/315/EEC (OJ L 81, 
28.3.1978, p. 1), 87/358/EEC (OJ L 192, 11.7.1987, p. 51), 92/53/EEC (OJ L 225, 10.8.1992, p. 1), 
93/81/EEC (OJ L 264, 23.10.1993, p. 49), 95/54/EC (OJ L 266, 8.11.1995, p. 1) and 96/27/EC (OJ 
L 169, 8.7.1996, p. 1). 
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